1964

# REALITY



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# REALITY

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

Father Yves Congar, O.P.

# DEDICATION

It has been said that the present Council is a theologian's Council. It would be truer to say that the Second Vatican Council is an event involving the whole Church in its fullest dimensions. The Church, seeking the *aggiornamento* called for by Pope John XXIII, needs theologians to point the way. The life and work of Father Yves Congar, O.P., are a perfect example of the spirit of the Church in the hour of the Council.

Today there is both the need and the desire for dialogue among the separated Christian churches. It was only natural that the Council should appeal to the author of *Divided Christianity,* a pioneer work appearing over a quarter of a century ago. *Aggiornamento* has now become part of our vocabulary. In 1950 Fr. Congar published *Vraie et fausse réform dans l'Eglise,* a remarkably balanced analysis of true renewal within the Church. Today the role of the layman in the Church is more fully understood and appreciated. This is due in no small measure to the writings of Fr. Congar, especially his *Lay People in the Church.* Despite the modesty of this work's original title (*Jalons pour une théologie du laïcat*), its profound insights have given it an honored place in the libraries of today's conciliar theologians. It bears eloquent witness to the author's preoccupation with truth in a question still far from being completely developed. The role of tradition was heatedly discussed in the first session of the Council. In 1960 Fr. Congar published a solid historical study, *La Tradition et les traditions.* Not to be hurried by the heat of controversy, the second volume did not appear until 1963. It is a complimentary "theological essay" of 350 pages.

Another topic which arose in the Council's first session was that of the collegiality of the bishops. Father Congar realized the need for further research in this field and in characteristic fashion he rose from the deliberations, returned to Paris, and edited the 811 page scholarly study, *L'Episcopat et L'Église Universelle.* This volume was completed in time for the second session of the Council and played no small role in the Council's affirmation of collegiality.

Reading these works and his many others which have appeared through the years, one is conscious of the work of a professional theologian at the service of the Church. His erudition, dedication, and solidity have earned for him the title of "a theologian for theologians." Such a theologian is not formed overnight. Father Congar has devoted more than thirty years to the study of the theology of the Church.

Father Congar's apostolate, however, has another side, little known outside of France. This is revealed in his shorter essays published between 1931 and 1962, mainly in France; these were collected and published in two volumes in 1962. Here we see the professional theologian at work on practical problems of the day: conscientious objectors, interracial marriages in France, the mission of the parish today. These essays were written for a great variety of groups: the young Christian Workers, priests engaged in Rural Catholic Action, university students, Catholic intellectuals in Alsace. In short, we find in Fr. Congar's work a service to the *whole* Church, active men as well as theologians, a service to the Church *catholic,* in the fullest sense of the word. For Fr. Congar, theology is not a science reserved to a gnostic minority, but a reflection in depth on the Good News of Salvation in all its dimensions. Workers in the slums and farmers in forgotten places also have problems which demand the attention of the theologian. The heart of Fr. Congar has never been closed to these Christians involved in the most ordinary situations. Nothing in the life of the Church is "unimportant."

Born in Sedan sixty years ago, on April 13, 1904, Yves Congar studied at the *Institut catholique* in Paris. He entered the Dominican Order in 1925 and studied at the Saulchoir, where he was ordained a priest in 1930. He began his teaching apostolate as professor of ecclesiology and fundamental theology at the Saulchoir. In 1937 he launched the collection "Unam Sanctam" with his volume on separated Christians. This series, which now numbers over forty volumes by theologians from the world over, was destined to be an important instrument of renewal in the theology of the Church.

Imprisoned at Colditz and Lubeck by the Gestapo during the war, mistrusted by Catholics during the priest-worker movement, faced with opposition which called into question his life's work—none of these trials embittered Fr. Congar. His answer has always been to continue serving the truth and the Church.

He was named to the theological commission of the Council by Pope John XXIII. After the Council's second session he was made a Master in Sacred Theology in the Dominican Order on December 8, 1963, at the request of Pope Paul VI.

In this year of 1964, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great, the students of the Aquinas Institute wish to honor Fr. Yves Congar—Dominican, priest, theologian, apostle. As a Dominican, he demonstrates that our traditions of seven hundred years are relevant and, indeed, necessary in the Church of the twentieth century. As a priest, he reminds us that our divine calling is essentially one of service to God and His holy people. As a theologian, he challenges us to think in the Church (*sentire in Ecclesia*) and to open ourselves to every truth. As an apostle, he recalls us, through the example of his own life, to our most basic Christian vocation: bearing witness to Christ in our every action, proclaiming without rest His Good News to all men. With gratitude and respect, we dedicate this volume of *Reality* to Father Yves Congar, O.P.

JEREMY MILLER, O.P.

# COLLEGIALITY— A KEY WORD FROM VATICAN II

*The bishops as a body*
*descend from and succeed to the college of the apostles,*
*Peter being the visible head of that college;*
*. . . they share together responsibility*
*for the whole Church.*
Yves Congar

There is a word receiving much attention at the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. Its imprint, seen in embryo at the second session, is receiving more graphic proportions at this third conciliar session. Its impact will be felt for some time to come.

Collegiality is that word.

Vatican II, cameoed from its very inception with Pope John's dynamic verve for pastoral responsibility, is striving to lay guidelines for a fruitful confrontation with twentieth century problems. Collegiality will stand as one of the Council's most rewarding accomplishments.

*Jeremy Miller, O.P.*

*Collegiality* is a strange and new addition to the vocabulary of most people. But as strange as it sounds to untrained ears, it has certainly become a key word of Vatican II, and the importance that it will occupy in much of the remaining business of the Council and in the wake of the Council should not go unnoticed. For this reason, *collegiality of the bishops* is a key notion that should be meaningful to interested observers.

Realize however, that much thinking on the nature of collegiality is still being debated within the Council walls by the bishops themselves, and well-chiseled formulations on every possible aspect of collegiality are necessarily premature. In addition, the scope of this article is limited to the jurisdictional implications of collegiality, and the latter half of the article attempts in large part to reflect the thought of Father Karl Rahner.

## THE FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH

According to the accounts of the New Testament, the society founded by the Lord as the fulfillment of the ancient covenant made with Israel was entrusted to twelve seemingly unimportant Israelites, fishermen most of them. And what is almost as strange, the Twelve were carefully molded by Christ into a well-knit corporate band before he left them to their unique and responsible mission. Christ instructed them together. Together they received their mission to baptize the world.[1] After his resurrection, Christ told the Twelve that they were to be witnesses of himself to the very ends of the earth.[2] This notion of oneness had developed so strongly in these first followers of Christ, that not long after the defection of Judas, they elected Matthias to assume Judas' share of the ministry given to them.[3] As to the lasting solidarity of this new corporate fellowship among the Apostles, we have Christ's promise that "I will be with you all days, even to the

[1] Matt. 28:18.
[2] Acts 1:8.
[3] Acts 1:15-26.

consummation of the world."[4]

Coupled with this note of togetherness, or collegiality, of the newly born Church, one is impressed with the unique position accorded to Peter. Peter is mentioned in Scripture a hundred and ninety-five times. Next in frequency to Peter is John, to whom there are twenty-nine references. Peter was clearly singled out to shoulder the leadership of the apostolic band—and not only to lead them but to actually confirm them.[5] He becomes the keeper of the keys, the steward of the doorway into the sheepfold.

These are basic facts of our faith with which we all are familiar. We also know that the Church of Christ on earth is imperviously destined to last until the end of time, although its first functionaries, the Apostles, were not so destined. The governorship entrusted to them, obviously, was meant to be passed on to successors. Herein lies the problem. What precise authority are these successors of the Apostles to have? How do we delineate their spheres of competence, both among themselves, and between themselves and the successor of Peter, the pope by divine decree? Before plunging into a discussion of collegiality, accordingly, mention should first be made of the types of authority involved, and of the terminology associated with the question. To clear this up is to whisk away some of the haze surrounding collegiality.

To be the mediator between the Father and mankind to lead men back to God, the Word became incarnate. As Augustine put it, the Lord took on our flesh "that there might be a way from man to man's God through a God-man. For this is the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."[6]

When the Lord was about to ascend to the Father, he sent his Apostles into the world to continue his saving mediation: "As the Father has sent Me, so I also send you."[7] Christ did not have to do

[4] Matt. 28:20.
[5] Luke 22:32.
[6] *City of God*, XI, 2.
[7] John 20:21.

this. He could have ascended into heaven and there continue his role of mediator by acting invisibly from that great distance; his efficacy would not have suffered from this. In much the same way, in performing his Palestinian miracles, Christ was not restricted to making physical contact; he was some distance away when he cured the son of the Capharnaum official.[8] But for the most part, some sensible sign or physical contact characterized Jesus' miracles; people like to see things. They are easily convinced by what they can see and touch.

It was for very good reasons, then, that Christ did not wish his role of mediator to ascend with him from Mt. Olivet and to be confined to acting invisibly and from a distance.[9] Instead, he freely decided that certain men—unlettered fishermen mostly—be invested with divine powers to sensibly convey his divine action to the human race by physical contact. These divine powers are called the hierarchic powers, these men his instruments of mediation. The nature of these powers can be seen from how Christ acts on his Church.

Christ brought the Church into existence in a most mysterious way; it became his Mystical Body and he, its head.[10] In St. Paul's phrase, God "gave him as head over all the Church, which indeed is his body."[11] Again, he is the Head of his Body, the Church."[12] To this very moment Christ continues to sustain his Church. As the branch must remain on the vine lest it wither, so the Church is engrafted into Christ for its very life; as the branch and its fruit owe their being and their nourishment to the vine, in a much greater sense must Christ, the True Vine, communicate the fuel of life to his Church.

> The Word takes flesh and becomes the Head of the Church. He acts on her in two ways. First, from a hidden influx from within,

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[8] John 4:46.

[9] This is not to suggest that Christ ceased to be mediator. This he continues to be, but now, in the normal economy of salvation, he channels his actions through special men in order to save all men.

[10] *Mystici Corporis*, #25ff.

[11] Eph. 1:22.

[12] Col. 1:18.

> he communicates the life of grace. And again he teaches her, from without, by words that reach the mind through the ear, the ways of truth.[13]

The incarnate Christ injects into his Church an interior influx, the life of grace, and nourishes the Church from without by the words of truth, that the fruit of the vine may be cleansed and made richer. "You are already clean because of the word that I have spoken to you."[14] Speaking on behalf of the Apostles, John wrote that "we saw His glory—glory as of the only begotten of the Father—full of grace and truth."[15] Christ, the only begotten of the Father, begot the Church by a sanctifying influx and a vivifying teaching. These flow as from a Head into a conjoined Body, as from a vine into the branches and their fruit. Grace and truth not only beget life, they also sustain it.

## THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH

The Ascension of Christ did not decapitate the Church. The glorified Christ of heaven, at this very moment, continues to infuse the elements of grace and truth into his Mystical Body's bloodstream; this he does through those divinely communicated powers, the hierarchic powers, through the agency of his ministers, the hierarchy. From this we can conclude that the hierarchic powers are of two types: the transmission of divine truth which we may call the jurisdictional power; and the transmission of grace which is called the sacramental power or the power of Order.

Thus it is that as instruments of Christ the High Priest, the hierarchy perpetuate his redemptive sacrifice and confer the fullness of grace through the sacraments, and as instruments of Christ the Prophet-King, they teach what is to be believed and what is to be done.[16] The point to hold on to, however, is that there is one hierarchy with two distinct but interdependent powers, the power of Order and the power of jurisdiction. And although the members of the hierarchy, as individuals, are constantly being replaced, the hierarchy itself, the body of bishops, subsists as a unique living thing from age to age.

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[13] Charles Journet, *The Church of the Word Incarnate* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 21.

[14] John 15:3.

[15] John 1:14.

## *The Power of Jurisdiction*

At this point, we will leave the consideration of the power of Order and concentrate on the power of jurisdiction. This power proposes to men what is needed, either by way of doctrine or by way of legislation, to bring them to eternal life. It is with jurisdiction that the much debated notion of collegiality is involved.

The role of mediator is a role that is properly rooted in Christ but which finds concrete expression in certain men whom Christ uses as agents. It was briefly noted that this exercise of mediation was personified first in the Apostles, with Peter occupying the unique position of headship, and secondly in their successors, the hierarchy of today, with the pope enjoying the position of Peter. This parallels the two types of jurisdiction that exist: a *temporary* jurisdiction and a *permanent* jurisdiction.[17]

Temporary jurisdiction simply means the power of transmitting truth linked with the founding of the Church. It gives its bearers a "spirit strong enough to impart to her (the Church) the rhythm and orientation she was to retain through the ages."[18] Permanent jurisdiction, contrariwise, refers to a teaching and ruling power directed to the conservation of the Church, once founded.

The Apostles, as foundations of the new Church, possessed temporary jurisdiction. Communicating new revelations or writing inspired books are two instances of this jurisdiction. But since they also ruled over an established Church (after having laid its foundations), they were equipped with permanent jurisdiction in addition. Their successors were not founders of the Church, but recipients of the ground-work laid by the Apostles, and thus they possessed only permanent (or ordinary) jurisdiction. Temporary (or extraordinary) jurisdiction died with St. John. Permanent jurisdiction, on the other hand, must be transmissible, since the Church perpetuates from generation to generation "until he comes."

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[16] Journet, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[17] Temporary is also called extraordinary or apostolic jurisdiction; permanent jurisdiction is sometimes called ordinary or pontifical. The terms are Msgr. Journet's.

[18] Journet, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

Christ sent the Apostles out to found the universal Church; in this mission all were equal, including Peter. The Apostles set out to found the universal Church by setting up local churches. But to Peter went the singular function of founding the universal Church by giving it stability and permanence. Peter is the rock. If this stability is to last, and Christ's promise is quite clear about its permanence, then the function of the rock must be transmitted through the ages. It must be, in other words, a type of permanent jurisdiction. Accompanying this is also the function to teach and rule the local churches; this too must perpetuate itself. Permanent jurisdiction, then, divides into *universal* (or papal—not necessarily implying, however, that it is limited to the pope) jurisdiction and *particular* (or episcopal) jurisdiction.

Paul VI, as principle of unity and stability in the Catholic Church, possesses universal jurisdiction; he is the immediate Shepherd of every member of the Mystical Body. A diocesan bishop is shepherd only of a particular flock, and so his episcopal jurisdiction to transmit divine truth is called particular jurisdiction.

We may consider the bishops not only as individuals ruling over particular flocks, but also as a group united together in a college. Considered in this light, "the bishops, taken together and as a college, have always since the earliest days of the Church, participated in the papal jurisdiction which is universal."[19] It is not a question of particular episcopal jurisdiction here; the question concerns universal jurisdiction, not as exercised by merely one man, the Bishop of Rome, but as exercised by the assembly (college) of bishops, headed by the pope. But is the participation merely a concession of the pope to the bishops, or is it something of divine institution which flows from the nature of the episcopacy? Many theologians are opting for the latter.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

### *A Point of Distinction*

If we keep in mind the distinction between the particular jurisdiction with which an individual bishop is invested, and universal jurisdiction with which the college of bishops is invested, certain statements of the popes which seemingly minimize the importance of collegiality —stressing the subordination of bishops to pope—can be rightly understood. Pope Leo the Great, writing to the bishops of Vienne, said that the office of teaching which the Lord wished for all his Apostles was

> grounded principally in blessed Peter, the chief of the Apostles; and that from him as from a head the Lord wished this office to fall to the others. Whoever breaks away from the solidity of Peter cuts himself off from the divine mystery.[20]

Pius XII, speaking on the pastoral role of a bishop to his diocese, expressed the prerogative of Rome in this fashion:

> Yet in exercising this office, they (the bishops) are not altogether independent, but are duly subordinated to the authority of the Roman Pontiff; and although their jurisdiction is inherent in their office, yet they receive it directly from the same Roman Pontiff.[21]

Still, universal collegiate jurisdiction must not be misconstrued as a lessening—or far worse, a usurping—of the pope's universal jurisdiction. As Leo XIII warns us in *Satis Cognitum*:

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[20] Letter 10, PL 54, 629 a.

[21] *Mystici Corporis*, #42.

> But it is far from the truth and openly opposed to the divine constitution, to hold that it is right for individual bishops to be subordinated to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, but not for all of them taken together. . . .[22]

This derived jurisdiction of which the popes speak seems to be particular episcopal jurisdiction, not the universal collegiate jurisdiction which a member of the episcopal college shares. There immediately precedes the observation in *Mystici Corporis* a clear indication that Pius XII is speaking of the individual bishop in his diocese: "Moreover, as far as his own diocese is concerned, each one as a true Shepherd feeds the flock entrusted to him. . . ." Hence, the universal jurisdiction which falls to a member of the episcopal college should not be confused with the particular jurisdiction proper to each bishop.

It is certain that particular jurisdiction is derived from papal jurisdiction as from a source; it comes through the pope.[23] As a consequence, the pope may directly intercede in the affairs of a diocese when he feels that a bishop has swerved from general church teaching.

## COLLEGIALITY—THE CARDINAL ISSUE

The problem debated in the Council, however, lies with collegiality. Father Yves Congar, O.P., expressed this notion in the following manner:

> The fact that the bishops as a body descend from and succeed to the college of the apostles, Peter being the visible head of that college; that therefore they share together responsibility for the whole Church, although in his daily work each bishop has personally charge of a determined part of that whole.[24]

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[22] Denzinger, 1961.

[23] Journet, *op. cit.*, pp. 403, 11.

[24] Quoted by Fr. Ambrose McNicholl, O.P., "At the Council," *Doctrine and Life*, 13 (Dec. 1963), 628.

It is not a question of the rule and power of the episcopal college, independent from, or much less opposed to, the pope. For the college, if it does not include the pope at its head, is non-existent. It is the nature and extent of the shared responsibility that is debated.

The Theological Commission of Vatican II which drew up the schema touching on collegiality instances the polarity of opinion. Bishop Frane Franic argues that tradition affirms that only the pope has full power received immediately from Christ whereas the bishops take their power immediately from the pope and only indirectly from Christ. Archbishop Pietro Parente of the Holy Office, representing a majority of the Commission, sees not only the pope as having a supreme and universal power, but also the body of bishops with the pope at their head possessing the *same* power. The schema, Parente notes, avoids the question of whether the holder of the power is one or plural; but in any case, there is the one same power.[25]

The scriptural basis for collegiality is admittedly thin. The Fathers at the third session of the Council have stressed the "Go and teach all nations"[26] of St. Matthew as the divine commission to all the Apostles to go out into the whole world. The responsibility lies on the Apostles as a *group* for the *whole* world, and not so much on them as individuals for only a local area. Moreover, they were confirmed by the Holy Spirit as a *body;* it was not just Peter that was confirmed. As a consequence, when the Church of Jerusalem sent Silas and Judas to Antioch with instruction for the Gentile converts, we read that "the Holy Spirit and we have decided."[27] This text also refers to group solidarity. Finally, there are the parallel texts in Matthew in which first Peter alone is given the power to bind and loose ("I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatever you shall bind on earth"[28]); then two chapters later the

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[25] An NC news release in *The Catholic Standard and Times,* [Philadelphia], Sept. 25, 1964. Cf. *NCWC News Service* (foreign), Sept. 21, 1964, p. 12.

[26] Matt. 28:19.

[27] Acts 15:28.

[28] Matt. 16:19.

Apostles as a whole are given this power ("I promise you [pl.], all that you [pl.] bind on earth"). These texts suggest a sharing of jurisdictional power in which the Apostles are linked with him who has the keys. It is precisely because this concept of collegiality is not fully delineated in Scripture that scholars today are delving into exegetical and historical aspects of the problem.

At this point the problem can be framed better by seeing what is generally taught about collegiality, and what is still being debated. The notion of collegiality should not be seen as a threat to papal primacy. To think this is to miss the whole notion of apostolic college. Collegiality does not imply that the pope is the first among equals, but rather that the subject of supreme universal jurisdiction in the Church is composed of many physical people, together possessing a moral unity.

Apart from the episcopal college united with the pope, is there another subject of supreme jurisdiction, namely, the pope alone? The schema, as Archbishop Parente noted, was mute on this point. Some theologians say yes, others no.

> The power to rule the universal Church resides first of all in the Sovereign Pontiff, then in the episcopal college united with the Pontiff; and it can be exercised either singly by the Sovereign Pontiff, or jointly by the Pontiff and the episcopal college: the power of the Sovereign Pontiff singly and that of the Sovereign Pontiff united with the episcopal college constituting not two powers adequately distinct, but one sole supreme power—considered on the one hand in the head of Church teaching, in whom it resides in its wholeness and as in its source, and on the other hand as at once in the head and in the body of the Church teaching, to which it is communicated and in which it finds its plenary and integral subject.[29]

Msgr. Charles Journet here sees one power but two subjects of that power. Karl Rahner would rather have one power and one subject. He argues that "the college of bishops always exists as such in the

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[29] Journet, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

Church and does not first come into being when the bishops gather in council," thereby implying that the college as such *always* is the subject of supreme power. Then Rahner goes on to say:

> It is the council itself that acts when the pope acts, by reason of his supreme jurisdiction, because the pope, precisely when he acts *ex sese,* acts not as a private person but as pope, that is, as head of a college of bishops *juris divini.* In other words, in the canonical conception of the nature of the council as subject of the supreme power in the Church, the same thing is implicitly declared to be true of the college of bishops.[30]

Secondly, it is beyond debate that the pope is successor to Peter, and that the bishops—as a group—are successors to the Apostles—as a group. The term "apostolic succession" of late is being seen more in this light than in the notion of tracing one's episcopal descent chain-like back to one of the Apostles.

Finally, collegiality is not merely a mental construct. The body of bishops in a real sense participates in universal papal jurisdiction. The Second Vatican Council is a standing witness to this. The bishops gathered in Rome are not mere consultors to the pope but truly have authority to *judge* what is to be believed and done in matters of our faith.[31] Collegiality is not just a convenient way of conceptualizing all the bishops; it is an entity. Christ did not establish individual Apostles—rather a college of Apostles. The college of bishops today succeeds this apostolic college.

It is difficult to be definitive beyond this. Still to be finalized is the complete role of the apostolic college in the government of the Church, the relation of one bishop to another bishop and to a diocese, and as the hallmark of confusion, the jurisdiction of regional and national conferences of bishops.

[30] Rahner and Ratzinger, *The Episcopate and the Primacy* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1962), p. 86.

[31] Benedict XIV, *De Synodo Diocesano,* Bk. XIII, c. 2, # 3.

### *Collegiality and the Subject(s) of Infallibility*

As regards the subject or subjects of full and supreme authority in the Church, Karl Rahner offers some theological reasoning for his position. He does this by turning attention to the yet controverted question of the subject(s) of infallible teaching authority; this obviously follows closely on supreme and universal jurisdiction.[32] In nub, are there two distinct subjects of infallibility (the pope on the one hand, and an ecumenical council under the pope on the other) or is there only one subject (the pope, with conciliar Fathers merely participating in papal infallibility)?

One society, it would seem, can contain only one supreme authority. Two supreme authorities cannot be metaphysically united; over-all direction can only come from one source. But if a society were to possess an element of infallibility, it would have to reside in the seat of supreme authority where it could function most efficiently. In other words, the source of infallibility would have to be unique. At any rate, two sources of infallibility would be a definite threat to real unity in a society. Granting this, then infallibility in the Catholic Church is properly papal and conciliar by participation.

One should not think, however, of conciliar infallibility as second-rate. According to common teaching, an ecumenical council enjoys an active infallibility, that is, the Council Fathers are actually *judges* with the pope on matters of faith and morals. They are not mere amplifiers of papal decisions.[33]

This conveniently suggests the notion of collegiality. The unique subject of infallibility is the college of bishops with the pope at its head. Thus, both pope and bishops possess a single active infallibility; they all judge.[34]

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[32] Rahner and Ratzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 92ff.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[34] The bishops cannot judge apart from the pope, who is their head. A body without a head is lifeless. Therefore, conciliar decrees do not bind unless they are promulgated by the Roman pontiff. Cf. CJC, no. 227.

An apparent difficulty arises when the Pope, outside of a council, declares a dogma. The theological term for such a declaration is to act *ex sese*. Nevertheless, the theory of collegiate infallibility can still be maintained. The pope, when he acts alone like this, is acting not as an infallible individual but precisely as an infallible pope, that is, as head of the college of bishops. Pius XII, before he defined the Assumption, consulted with all the bishops of the world about the feasibility of the dogma. With this consideration in mind, an act of the pope *ex sese* and a conciliar decree are only different functions of the same one subject, different modes of the same activity.[35]

For example, an ecumenical council defines a dogma. We must not think that the conciliar decree then receives papal "approbation" as a sort of adventitious and extraneous condition which gives the decree infallibility. True that the pope himself is a judge and may even override the decision of the Fathers, still the papal concurrence was originally in the decrees which are promulgated, an organic element of them. Now just as the pope acts when the college-in-council acts, so also the college acts when the Pope *ex sese* acts, in that the pope is acting precisely as the head of the college.[36]

To take collegiality outside the walls of a council, two factors will be of aid. Vatican I declared that revealed truth can be proposed by the Church as divine both by the solemn expression of an ecumenical council and by the ordinary magisterium.[37] Now what is this latter but a function of the episcopal college as dispersed throughout the world. As a consequence, the college of bishops united under the pope (for without a pope there is no college) can lay down doctrinal and moral points with infallible assurance; the college is a supreme teacher.

Or one could reason in the following manner: The bishops in council possess supreme authority in the Church. If the college of bishops comes into being only when the pope calls a council, would not their power then be derived from the pope in a subordinated manner as from a source. This would be a concession of power to the college, which would hardly result in its supreme power. The full authority to teach, then, must be inherent in the college and of divine making.

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[35] Rahner and Ratzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[36] *Ibid.* Cf. pp. 96f. for greater detail.
[37] Denz., 1792.

### *Recent Developments at Vatican II*

There remains a brief survey of what the Second Vatican Council recently decided on this key notion of collegiality. The Council Fathers debated and voted upon amendments to the third chapter of the schema on the nature of the Church; they dealt specifically with the position of bishops.[38]

In the September 22nd session of this year, the bishops by an overwhelming majority—1918 to 322—approved the Tenth Amendment. This stated that just as Peter and the Apostles made one Apostolic Body by Christ's wish, likewise the pope and bishops—successors to Peter and the Apostles—are joined together by the will of Christ. Amendments One and Two more fully detailed the succession and the corporate nature of the apostolic band headed by Peter.[39]

Amendment Five, showing a 2198 to 50 majority, expressed that the bishops are successors of the Apostles by *divine institution.* Archbishop Parente of the schema's preparatory commission said that the Pontifical Biblical Commission had confirmed the text's assertion that the divine origin of the collegial episcopate is in the letter and spirit of the New Testament.

Allaying fears that the text encroaches on and threatens papal primacy, the Archbishop reiterated that the college has no power except in union with the pope and headed by him. Amendment

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[38] As reported in *The Catholic Standard and Times,* [Philadelphia], Sept. 25, 1964, pp. 1, 9. Cf. *NCWC News Service* (foreign), Sept. 22, 1964, p. 12.

[39] As Archbishop Pericle Felici, Council general secretary, pointed out, even though a matter receives a two-thirds majority approval, it is improper to consider it closed, since the Council's act is finalized only when voted on in its final form in the presence of the Pope and with his approval.

Eight, passed 1917 to 328, stated that the episcopal powers of teaching and ruling can only be exercised in union with the head of the college and the other bishops. That the college of bishops has no authority except with the Roman Pontiff, and that his authority over all—both bishops and faithful—remains intact, was the substance of Amendment Twelve, passed 2114 to 90.

Archbishop Parente went on to explain the relation between collegiality and universal jurisdiction. The text stresses the full universal power of the pope. In addition, the body of bishops, headed by the pope and never without his leadership, is a subject of supreme and full power over the whole Church.

The question whether there are two subjects or only one subject of this power remained open. The collegial jurisdiction is based on the 28th chapter of Matthew, the Archbishop continued, where Christ commissioned the Apostles as a whole to preach the Word; it is supported by the parallel texts of Matthew concerning binding and loosing power.

At the 86th session of Vatican II on September 23rd, the bishops approved a crucial amendment stating that the order of bishops, which succeeds the college of Apostles in the teaching authority and government of the Church, and in which the apostolic college continues with the pope at its head, holds supreme and full power over the universal Church; it carried, 1927 to 292.

From the above amendments, which represent the predominant thought of Vatican II, a working definition of collegiality can be fashioned. Collegiality is the corporate order of bishops, headed by the Roman Pontiff and never existing without his leadership, succeeding to the Apostolic Body of Peter and the Apostles in the teaching authority and government of the Church, and holding supreme and full jurisdiction over the universal Church.

NICHOLAS BULLAT, O.P.

# ST. CYPRIAN AND THE ROMAN PRIMACY

*Other apostles were also what Peter was, but the primacy was given to Peter to show that there is one Church.*
St. Cyprian

Despite a clearness of style retained from his earlier life as a lawyer, some of the works of St. Cyprian have been the cause of considerable controversy, being interpreted in one sense to accommodate one group, in an opposite sense to please another, from his own time until the present.[1]

The teaching of St. Cyprian has been claimed for many years by the Anglicans as the basis of their theory of church government, which declares bishops to be of equal power and without need of recourse to a supreme head. That Cyprianic study has been most popular among these reformers is indicated by such a statement as the following: “Both his writings and the story of his life remain as a perpetual witness against the papal and in favor of the episcopal constitution of the Church of God."[2] On the other hand, Cyprian's views have not enjoyed such popularity in Germany, where the Lutherans have not been anxious to claim him for their side. Hence a number of German Protestant authorities such as Harnack and Neander take an estimate of his opinions similar to that of Catholic scholars.[3]

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[1] James T. Shotwell and Louise Ropes Loomis, *The See of Peter* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), pp. 322f.

Although uncertain, the date of St. Cyprian's birth is commonly considered to be around 200 A.D. He was baptized at the age of forty-six and just two years later was urged to fill the empty see of Carthage. He accepted the post in the face of vociferous opposition to the appointment of so recent a convert to the faith. We rejoice in his appointment, however, for Cyprian as bishop, through his treatises and correspondence, sheds a light greater than any other figure upon the history of the third century Western Church.

## THE LAPSI CONTROVERSY

Cyprian had held the Carthaginian see for about a year when the Decian persecution broke out in the autumn of 249. Remaining in daily communication with his church, he left Carthage to go into voluntary exile. There was particular difficulty at the time with Christians who fell away, denying the faith—the *lapsi.* In determining the possibility of and the conditions for their re-admission to communion, Cyprian made his first reference to Rome.

Confessors in prison had assumed power to absolve the *lapsi,* even exempting them from customary penitential exercises. Cyprian refused to allow this, and declared his intention to postpone the study of the problem until his return: "But as soon as, by the grace of God, I come to you, then we will discuss together those things which either have been or still remain to be done."[4] When Cyprian communicated this decision to many other bishops and to the clergy of Rome, that great See was vacant. It had been vacated at the death of Pope Fabian on January 20, 250. In their reply, the Roman clergy stated that it would be better to wait until peace was restored before making a decision on the matter:

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[2] Frederick William Puller, *The Primitive Saints and the See of Rome* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1893), p. 357; in Luke Rivington, *The Primitive Church and the See of Peter* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894), p. 47.

[3] John Chapman, O.S.B., *Studies on the Early Papacy* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1928), p. 28.

> Both we and some of our neighboring bishops, as well as others whom the force of persecution has driven here from distant provinces, believe it best not to initiate any new measures until our bishop is appointed.[5]

The reluctance of Cyprian to allow his priests to make a major decision without him, and the similar unwillingness of the Roman clergy to decide the matter indicate the respect shown the rights of the bishop at that time:

> For there have come down to us through time and due order of succession the ordained office of the bishop and the constitution of the Church; for the Church is founded upon the bishops and every act of the Church is subject to these rulers.[6]

This letter, a probable first draft of the *De unitate ecclesiae,* gives the first hint of Cyprian's position: the episcopacy is founded on St. Peter, and the power is passed on to the bishops as their inheritance. In virtue of this power, the bishop presides over all the activity of his church. Since this letter did not settle the controversy over the admission of the *lapsi,* however, Cyprian had eventually to excommunicate their leader, Felicissimus. Felicissimus in turn excommunicated Cyprian.

One hope remained for the *lapsi*: the support of Rome and the bishop soon to be elected. The election took place about the middle of March, 251. Cornelius, a priest of Rome who had no part in the dispute, was chosen despite disagreement among the electors.

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[4] Cyprian, *ep.* xiv, 4. CSEL III-II, p. 512. (Translations mine.)

[5] Cyprian, *ep.* xxx, 8. CSEL III-II, pp. 555f.

[6] Cyprian, *ep.* xxxiii, 1. CSEL III-II, p. 566. Cf. Pierre Batiffol, *Primitive Catholicism,* trans. Henri L. Brianceau (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), pp. 350f.

Protesting the election, the Roman faction of the *lapsi* elected their own Pope, the priest Novatian. While Cornelius sent a simple letter of notification of election to the various bishops, the Novatianists sent to Cyprian a full delegation, hoping to win him to their side. Cyprian read Cornelius' letter to his synod in order to prevent admittance of the Novatianist delegation. However, because of Novatianist charges against Cornelius, the synod determined that it would delay recognition of either papal candidate until reliable information could be collected by emissaries to Rome. Before the return of these legates, however, clergy and other witnesses arrived in Carthage from the Eternal City. They confirmed both the election and the subsequent position of Cornelius. After hearing of this confirmation, Cyprian wrote to Cornelius, protesting his own loyalty and expressing his abhorrence for the dissenters:

> But when we discovered that Novatian had been made a bishop, we were distressed by the wickedness of an illegal ordination, performed in opposition to the Catholic Church, and decided at once to prohibit them from communion with us. . . . We said that it was inconsistent with our dignity to permit the honor . . . of our colleague to be questioned any longer by the voice of slanderous rivals.[7]

He also wrote to the Roman confessors who had supported Novatian urging that they return to the true head of the Roman Church:

> It disturbed me when I heard that you had consented to join another bishop against the dispensation of God, against the law of the gospel, against the unity of the Catholic institutions. . . . I pray that there will not continue among you that breach in our brotherhood, and that you will return to the mother from whom you have broken.[8]

[7] Cyprian, *ep.* xliv, 1, 2. CSEL III-II, pp. 597f.
[8] Cyprian, *ep.* xlvi. CSEL III-II, p. 604.

A short time later Cornelius replied to Cyprian, and announced the return of some of the lapsed confessors to the legitimate Church. To this Cyprian replied expressing his joy that they should "return to the household of unity and truth . . . [and] leave behind the enemies of the faith and the Catholic Church"[9] and that "the Catholic Church is shown to be one, unable either to be divided or torn."[10]

## DE UNITATE ECCLESIAE

After the persecution had ended, Cyprian convened the Council of Carthage in May, 251. His first purpose was to try the priests of Carthage who had gone against his decision concerning the *lapsi* —particularly their leaders, Felicissimus and Novatus. It is most probable that at this time the famous treatise *De unitate ecclesiae* was composed and read to those present at the Council. The fact that this work has been the center of much dispute concerning Cyprian's position on papal primacy, is attested to by the existence of three editions of the text. One refers directly to the Petrine primacy, and another refers solely to the primacy of the bishops, saying nothing of Rome. The third is merely a combination of the first two.

Since this text is of such importance in determining Cyprian's views on Roman primacy, it would be well to investigate the validity of the variant readings. The so-called "interpolation" in favor of the papacy was for many years thought to have originated with the edition of Paul Manutius published at Rome in 1563, and was omitted from the Oxford edition of 1682. However, it was discovered later that this "falsification" did not originate with the Manutian edition, but could be traced back to much earlier dates in the history of the manuscripts. Bede quoted this text in the eighth century: "The other apostles were also what Peter was, but the primacy was given to Peter so that the unity of the church would be preserved. They are all pastors, but there is one flock."[11] Thus there are two texts generally conceded to have been the work of Cyprian, though written at different dates:[12]

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[9] Cyprian, *ep.* li, 1. CSEL III-II, pp. 614f.

[10] *Ibid.*, 2. CSEL III-II, p. 615.

> If anyone wishes to consider and examine these matters, laborious treatment and argument are not necessary. There is an easy argument for faith in the pursuit of truth. The Lord speaks to Peter: 'I say to you,' he says, 'that you are Peter and upon this rock I shall build my Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it. I shall give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'

| *Traditionally authentic text* | *'Interpolated' text* |
|---|---|
| Upon one man he builds the Church, although he gives equal power to all the apostles after his resurrection, saying: 'As the Father has sent me, so also I send you. Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.' Yet, so that their unity might be manifested, he established by his authority the origin of that same unity as rising from one. The other apostles also were what Peter was, endowed with an equal rank, both in honor and power; but the foundation rose from unity, so that the Church of Christ might be shown to be | And likewise after his resurrection he says: 'Feed my sheep.' Upon one man he builds the Church, and he commands him to feed his sheep; and although he gives equal power to all the apostles, he established but one chair and instituted the origin of unity by his own power. Other apostles were also what Peter was, but the primacy was given to Peter to show that there is one Church and one chair. They are all shepherds, although there exists but one flock which all the apostles care for in their unanimous agreement. Does he who does not cling to this unity of which Paul spoke be- |

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[11] Bede, *Homilia xv, in Vigilia Beatorum Apostolorum Petri et Pauli.* PL 94, 219.

[12] Batiffol, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-69.

one. The Holy Spirit, in the person of the Lord, describes this one Church in the Canticle of Canticles, saying: one only is my dove, my perfect one, her mother's chosen one, the dear one of her parent.' Does he who does not cling to this unity of the Church believe that he holds the faith? Does he who opposes and resists the Church believe that he is actually within that Church?[13]

lieve that he holds the faith? Does he who leaves that chair of Peter, upon which the Church was founded, believe that he is truly in the Church?

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[13] super unum aedificat ecclesiam, et quamuis apostolis omnibus post resurrectionem suam parem potestatem tribuat et dicat: 'sicut misit me pater et ego mitto uos. accipite Spiritum sanctum: si cuius remiseritis peccata, remittentur illi: si cuius tenueritis, tenebuntur,' tamen ut unitatem manifestaret, unitatis eiusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit. hoc erant utique et ceteri apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio praediti et honoris et potestatis, sed exordium ab unitate proficiscitur, ut ecclesia Christi una monstretur. quam unam ecclesiam etiam in cantico canticorum Spiritus sanctus ex persona Domini designat et dicit: 'una est columba mea perfecta mea, una est matri suae, electa genetrici suae.' hanc ecclesiae unitatem qui non tenet tenere se fidem credit? qui ecclesiae renititur et resistit in ecclesia se esse confidit?

et idem post resurrectionem suam dicit: pasce oues meas. super unum aedificat ecclesiam et illi pascendas oues mandat suas, et quamuis apostolis omnibus parem tribuat potestatem, unam tamen cathedram constituit et unitatis originem adque orationis suae [rationem sua] auctoritate disposuit. hoc erant utique et ceteri quod Petrus, sed primatus Petro datur ut una ecclesia et cathedra una monstretur. et pastores sunt omnes, sed grex unus ostenditur, qui ab apostolis omnibus unanimi consensione pascatur. hanc et Pauli unitatem qui non tenet, tenere se fidem credit? qui cathedram Petri super quam fundata ecclesia est deserit, in ecclesia se esse confidit?

(Cyprian, *De unitate ecclesiae*, chap. 4. CSEL III-I, pp. 212f.)

Both versions continue as follows:

> When the blessed apostle Paul taught this same doctrine and declared the sacrament of unity he said: 'One body and one spirit, one hope for your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God.'

These are the two texts combined in the Manutian edition, which we know to be of considerable antiquity since it was quoted as early as the sixth century by Pope Pelagius II:

> And blessed Cyprian the martyr also said: 'The foundation rose from unity; and the primacy was given to Peter, so that one church and one chair of Christ might be instituted: and they are all pastors, but there is one flock.' . . . And after this: 'Does he who does not cling to this unity of the Church believe that he holds the faith?'[14]

Since the two versions have been shown by Chapman and by Harnack, Perler, van den Eynde, Quasten and others, to be authentically Cyprianic in origin, there is little doubt that Cyprian held the doctrine of Roman primacy. The words "He established one chair. . . . the primacy was given to Peter. . . . the chair of Peter upon which the church was founded"[15] can designate nothing else. However, whether Cyprian considers the primacy one of jurisdiction or simply one of honor is still to be determined. An extract from the same text presents the problem when it states that "the other apostles were what Peter was, endowed with an equal rank, both in honor and in power."[16]

A number of non-Catholic authors, particularly Anglicans, have attempted to refute Roman primacy using the *De unitate*, but denying the authenticity of the "interpolated" text. Thus Dr. Hugo Koch attempted to establish merely a primacy of time:

> The Lord could have delivered the power of the keys to all the Apostles at once, but he gave the full powers first to Peter, and

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[14] Pelagius II, *ep.* iv. PL 72, p. 713.

[15] Cyprian, *loc. cit.* The authors cited vary on the order of the different texts.

[16] *Ibid.*

> only later to the rest of the Apostles, in order that He might show clearly that His Church should be one. . . . As a distinction for Peter there remains only the priority of time of his investiture with the power of the keys.[17]

Koch further stated that "Peter is not the principle, not the cause and center, but merely the starting-point in time and the means of recognition of Church unity."[18]

Chapman counters this, denying that by "the Rock" Christ intended to signify a man who would possess for his lifetime alone the government of the Church. He further denies the idea of simple priority of time, for if "foundation" means priority of time only, then the bishops of whom Peter is the archetype "are the foundation of the Church as having authority first in order of time," certainly an absurd proposal. Moreover the words in both texts "he built his church upon one" and "he established the origin of unity by his authority" cannot possibly refer only to priority of time.

But what, then, is the prerogative of Peter? Chapman contends that Cyprian was referring to Peter as the source of unity of the Church, *without defining what that unity implies.*[19]

Following the Council of Carthage in 252, the condemned Felicissimus went to Rome to complain to Pope Cornelius of his treatment and to protest the legitimacy of Cyprian's episcopal position. Cornelius considered the problem and wrote to Cyprian. In reply Cyprian reproached the Pope for having listened to Felicissimus, and for not having returned him to Cyprian, under whose jurisdiction he fell:

> I was astonished to discover that you had been somewhat perturbed by the threats and warnings of those who came.[20]
> For it has been decreed by all of us and it is furthermore right and just—that every case be tried in the place where the wrong was committed; for to each shepherd has been assigned one portion of the flock for him to direct and govern, and to give later an

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[17] Hugo Koch, *Cyprian und der Romische Primat* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 13f; in Chapman, *op. cit.*, pp. 29f.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 43; in Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[19] Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[20] Cyprian, *ep.* lix, 2. CSEL III-II, p. 667.

> account of his ministry to the Lord. . . . Unless, perhaps, the authority of the bishops in Africa seems insufficient, in view of the fact that they have already passed sentence upon these men. . . . Their case has already been investigated, the verdict already pronounced, and it is not consistent with priestly discipline that we should be charged with easily changeable and inconstant mind.[21]

However, despite Cyprian's complaints regarding jurisdiction, he refers in the same letter to the Roman Church as possessing a special pre-eminence: "They dare to set sail to the See of Peter, to the leading church, whence the unity of the priesthood arose."[22]

## DEALING WITH POPE STEPHEN

Cornelius was banished for confessing the faith in 253, and was succeeded first by Lucius, whose reign lasted for less than a year, and then by Stephen, the most important Pope with whom Cyprian was to deal. Shortly after the papal election, there occurred the affair of the Spanish bishop, Basilides, and priest, Martial. During persecution both had apostatized and had subsequently been deposed and excommunicated by the local churches. A new bishop, Sabinus, and priest, Felix, were chosen in their stead, and the deposed bishop and priest appealed to Rome for reinstallment in their respective offices. Stephen accepted their appeal without waiting for a report from Spain on the matter, and restored Basilides to his see. The Spanish then turned to Cyprian and his synod for help in the matter; particularly concerned, of course, were Felix and Sabinus. Cyprian, having heard only one side of the matter, noted that Stephen had been deceived by Basilides. Cyprian made this deception clear in replying with the synod:

> Basilides, after his sins had been detected and further revealed by the confession of his own conscience, went to Rome and deceived

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[21] Cyprian, *ep.* lix, 14. CSEL III-II, pp. 683f.
[22] Shotwell and Loomis, *op. cit.*, pp. 377f.

> Stephen, our colleague, who was a long way off and ignorant of what had happened and of the truth.[23]

Cyprian advised that the people adhere to Sabinus as their bishop; Stephen, in his opinion, had been led astray by false testimony. However, since the bishops and people of Spain were themselves confused and divided on this matter—and they knew more than either Cyprian or Stephen—it is difficult to judge this particular case, and there exist no records to yield a satisfactory conclusion.[24]

Following this, Faustinus, bishop of Lyons, along with other bishops of that province, wrote to Stephen concerning the conversion of Marcian of Arles to Novatianism, requesting direction in a case in which he and his fellow bishops felt they had no jurisdiction. For some reason Stephen took little or no action, and the bishops turned to Cyprian for help in stirring the Pope to make a judgment. Cyprian in turn urged Stephen to resolve the matter, to issue a letter of formal excommunication (although Marcian had previously been formally condemned by the Gallican bishops) and a mandate for the election of a new bishop.[25]

> You ought to write full directions to our fellow bishops in Gaul, so that the wayward and insolent Marcian may no longer be allowed to insult our assembly . . . and that he may be cut off from communion with us for studying and pursuing the errors of Novatian.[26] Also you should send letters to the province and to the people of Arles, excommunicating Marcian and appointing another in his place.[27]

The tone of Cyprian's letter in this case was hardly complimentary to Stephen's inaction, and his invocation of the memory of Cornelius and Lucian was surely not calculated to please the Pontiff:

[23] Cyprian, *ep.* lxvii, 5. CSEL III-II, p. 739.
[24] Batiffol, *op. cit.*, pp. 376f.
[25] Luke Rivington, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72.
[26] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 2. CSEL III-II, pp. 744f.
[27] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 3. CSEL III-II, p. 745.

> For it is our duty to counsel and to give aid.[28]
>
> How foolish it is . . . that we have up to now allowed these flatterers to mock us and to pass judgment on the majesty and dignity of the church.[29]
>
> For there is no greater or more important duty of a pastor than diligently and lovingly to cherish and care for the sheep. For the Lord spoke, saying: '. . . and you did not go after those that wandered . . . and my sheep were scattered for lack of a shepherd. . . . I am coming against these shepherds, and will claim my sheep from them. . . .' Since the Lord so threatens those shepherds who neglect His sheep and allow them to perish, what else shall we do, dear brother, but show the greatest care in gathering and watching over the sheep of Christ.[30]
>
> The glorious honor of our predecessors, the blessed martyrs Cornelius and Lucius, should be upheld; and while we all cherish their memory, much more ought you, dearest brother, who were chosen their vicar and successor, to revere and uphold it with the weight of your authority.[31]

This, together with the difficulty concerning Basilides and Martial—for Rome may well have had good reason for setting aside the recent law concerning the restitution of lapsed bishops and priests—could have produced enough friction between the two to prevent any easy solution of the coming baptismal controversy.

### *Cyprian Questions Papal Authority*

Here we touch upon that incident in Cyprian's life which some take to indicate his denial of papal authority. It has been said that he "maintained in act the abstract independence of Churches, which he had in theory maintained,"[32] and that "the defenders of the English Church may safely stake their case, so far as it relates to the Papal claims, on the witness borne by St. Cyprian!"[33]

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[28] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 1. CSEL III-II, p. 744.
[29] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 2. CSEL III-II, p. 745.
[30] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 4. CSEL III-II, pp. 746f.
[31] Cyprian, *ep.* lxviii, 5. CSEL III-II, p. 748.
[32] *Library of the Fathers, St. Cyprian,* p. xvii in Rivington, *op. cit.,* p. 47.
[33] Puller, *op. cit.,* p. 363 in Rivington, *op. cit.,* p. 47.

There had long been a divergence of opinion on the procedure to be followed regarding the admission of catechumens who had been baptized by heretics. In Asia, Egypt and parts of Africa, general practice considered such converts as not cleansed from original sin, and therefore in need of baptism. However, at Rome, Alexandria and elsewhere, a generally held doctrine maintained that since a baptism performed in the name of the Trinity was valid, any repetition of the ceremony was sacrilegious. The former practice was invoked at Carthage, since it had been approved by Tertullian and the previous Councils of Africa, Asia Minor and Antioch.[34]

Cyprian, upon conducting several inquiries into the subject, decided that the Roman position was erroneous, and in 255 convoked a synod of thirty African bishops to discuss the problem. All present agreed with Cyprian, and sent notice of their solution to the Numidian bishops who were especially concerned.[35]

Discussion continued for some time, since there was some difficulty in persuading the remaining African bishops of the Carthaginian position. A second Council of Carthage affirmed the position of the first. Cyprian then sent notice of this decision to Stephen, hoping to persuade the Romans of their "error." On their arrival at Rome, however, Cyprian's delegates were coldly received, very possibly because of the previous letters in the cases of Marcian of Arles and Basilides; certainly they were not aided by the defiant letter which they bore:

> We are, moreover, aware that there are some who refuse to abandon a position once taken, or to alter a policy without difficulty, but who still preserve the bond of peace and concord with their colleagues, while retaining certain convictions of their own at which they have already arrived. Therefore, we command no one, and lay down the law to no one, for *every bishop has freedom of*

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[34] Batiffol, *op. cit.*, p. 381. It is interesting to note that Cyprian in his early years read Tertullian's works avidly.

[35] Shotwell and Loomis, *op. cit.*, pp. 395f.

> *decision according to his own will in the conduct of his church and will give an account of his behavior to the Lord.*[36]

Heated words were exchanged, and "Stephen was not ashamed to call Cyprian a false Christ, a false apostle and deceitful worker."[37]

Pope Stephen's reply to Cyprian's delegates is no longer extant, save a segment quoted in Cyprian's letter to Pompey of the Tripolitan province. Some authors consider it to have carried the weight of excommunication:[38]

> If then any persons come to you from any heresy whatever, *let there be no innovations beyond the rule that has been passed on to us,* which is that hands be laid on them for repentance; for the heretics themselves do not re-baptize persons who come to them from another of their own sects but simply admit them to communion.[39]

We know from Cyprian's correspondence that in his letter Stephen had also justified the Roman custom by tracing primacy back to the Apostles, and particularly to Peter and Paul:

> Furthermore he defames the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, claiming that they themselves handed down this rule, whereas in their epistles they despised heretics and warned us to shun them.[40]

Stephen further appealed to the authority of the Chair of Peter which he occupied as Bishop of Rome:

> In this respect I am justly indignant with Stephen for his open and conspicuous foolishness, since he so boasts of the seat of his episcopate, and insists that he holds his succession from Peter, on whom the foundations of the Church were laid.[41]

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[36] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxii, 3. CSEL III-II, p. 778. Italics mine.
[37] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 25. CSEL III-II, p. 827.
[38] Duchesne, *op. cit.*, I, p. 308. See also Shotwell and Loomis, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[39] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxiv, 1. CSEL III-II, p. 799. Italics mine.
[40] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 6. CSEL III-II, pp. 813f.
[41] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 17. CSEL III-II, p. 821.

### *Cyprian Calls Council of Carthage*

In reaction Cyprian convened a third Council of Carthage which met on September 1, 256. There he read the exchange of letters between himself and the bishop Jubaianus, and elaborated his own position.[42] The letter of Stephen was not mentioned by Cyprian, although we have the testimony of Cyprian himself that it had already been received: In the previously mentioned letter to Pompey (written before the meeting of the synod) he protested the "arrogant, irrelevant or contradictory statements which he has made, without proper instruction or caution,"[43] and spoke against Stephen himself:

> What blindness of mind this is, what wickedness[44]. . . . We ought to consider whether the account of a priest of God who upholds and accepts the baptism of blasphemers can stand in the day of judgment.[45]

These statements can refer only to Stephen's decision.

Following the reading of the correspondence, Cyprian called on the eighty-seven bishops present to make known their opinions.

> It is now proper that each of us state our opinion on this subject, judging no man and denying no man the right of communion if he differ from us. For *no one among us sets himself up as a bishop of bishops, or by tyranny and terror forces his colleagues to compulsory obedience, seeing that every bishop in the freedom of his liberty and power possesses the right of his own mind, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another.* We must all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone has power both to appoint us to the government of his Church and to judge our acts therein.[46]

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[42] See Cyprian, *ep.* lxxiii. CSEL III-II, p. 778.
[43] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxiv, 1. CSEL III-II, p. 799.
[44] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxiv, 4. CSEL III-II, p. 802.
[45] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxiv, 8. CSEL III-II, p. 805.
[46] Mansi I, 951 (*Acta Concilii Carthaginensis III sub Cypriano Episcopo*). Italics mine.

The vote following this pronouncement was unanimous against Stephen, and each bishop appended a short statement[47] including a declaration of adherence to the Carthaginian practice.

At this time Pope Stephen was declaring to the various sees that baptism by heretics was valid and that these catechumens required only the laying on of hands for admission to the Church. Almost simultaneously Cyprian was sending out notices of the Carthaginian decision. The most notable of these was sent to Firmilian, bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. These letters gained support for Cyprian. Unfortunately Cyprian's letter to Firmilian is no longer extant, but by Firmilian's own testimony the reply was couched in harsh terms and echoed Cyprian's own words and feelings on Stephen and the controversy:[48]

> For this we may thank Stephen, because his harshness has brought it about that we receive this proof of your faith and wisdom.[49] But how deep is the error, how profound the blindness of him who says that remission of sins may be granted by the gatherings of heretics, and who does not remain on the foundation of the single Church.[50]
> You [Stephen] are worse than all the heretics! For when the multitude discovers its error and comes to you to obtain the true light of the Church, you aid and further their errors at their coming, and increase the darkness of the night of heresy by obscuring the light of the Church's truth.[51]

Stephen did not actually excommunicate the dissenters,[52] but relations were severed for a time between Rome and the churches of Asia Minor and Africa. The death of Pope Stephen on August 2, 257, brought a relaxation of the tension, and the succession of Pope Xystus II led to a modification of attitude and a renewal of relations between Carthage and Rome. The variation of practice, however, continued until 314 and the Council of Arles.

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[47] See Mansi I, 952-65.

[48] See Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 4. CSEL III-II, p. 812.

[49] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 2. CSEL III-II, p. 811.

[50] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 16. CSEL III-II, p. 820.

[51] Cyprian, *ep.* lxxv, 23. CSEL III-II, p. 824.

[52] See letter of Dionysius of Alexandria in Eusebii Pamphilii, ***Historia Ecclesiastica,*** VII, 4-5. PG 20, 641f.

In the same year a fresh persecution broke out, and Cyprian was arrested on August 30. On September 13, 258, he was summoned for a hearing, confessed the faith and was martyred.

## EVALUATION

As we have seen, St. Cyprian affirms both the primacy of Peter (and through him the primacy of the bishop occupying the Roman See) and the autonomy of each bishop who

> possesses the right to his own mind and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another, [and who] must await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone has power both to appoint us to the government of his Church and to judge our acts therein.[53]

St. Cyprian is concerned when a rival bishop Novatian is set up at Rome against the legitimate successor to the See, Cornelius. But he is likewise concerned when the same incident takes place in Spain, and in the latter case even assumes the authority to reverse the decision of Pope Stephen.

His attitude in the baptismal controversy is due in part to his fiery temperament and in part to Stephen's curt exposition of the Roman position. Primarily Cyprian's position rests on his conviction that the whole controversy is a matter merely of ecclesiastical discipline rather than a question concerning the very nature of the sacrament.[54] He was not defamed by later writers for his actions. Augustine, for example, sympathetically states that "he penetrated less clearly the hidden aspects of the sacrament," and that "he did not cut himself off . . . from those of varying opinions."[55] And in the sixth century, Facundus writes:

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[53] Shotwell and Loomis, *op. cit.*, p. 411. See Mansi I, 951 (*Acta Concilii Carthaginensis III sub Cypriano Episcopo*).

[54] Rivington, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 86. See also C. Lattey, S.J., *The Papacy* (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1924), p. 34.

> We may not call blessed Cyprian and his colleagues heretics, for they erred through human weakness in the question of baptism; and we cannot deny that they remained even to the end within the Catholic Church.[56]

Cyprian's difficulty was certainly not aided by his conception of the episcopate and its relation to the primatial See. Although he considered Rome the *ecclesia principalis* and the origin of the unity of the priesthood, "that unity was principally to be preserved by the fraternal love and concord of the bishops among themselves established by the Holy Spirit."[57]

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[55] St. Augustine, *De baptismo libri VII*, I, xviii, 28. CSEL LI, pp. 171f.

[56] Facundus, *Liber contra Mocianum Scholasticum*. PL 67, 865.

[57] Berthold Altaner, *Patrology*, trans. Hilda C. Graef (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961), p. 203.

WILLIAM T. KRAMLINGER, O.P.

# CHRIST-LIKE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH

*You know that those who are regarded as*
*rulers among the Gentiles*
*lord it over them,*
*and their great men*
*exercise authority over them.*
*But it is not so among you.*
Mark 10:42-43.

The resolve of the present Vatican Council to re-think and to settle some of the problems of Church government has opened the minds of many to questions about the governing techniques in the Church. The indictments against the "inquisitorial," "absolutistic," "legalistic" and "rigid" methods used by high ecclesiastical authorities are known to all.[1]

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[1] Xavier Rynne, "The Church, the Curia, and the Council," *Jubilee*, 11 (June, 1963), 40.

Not only do the Council Fathers and their close observers worry about the techniques of the central governing body of the Church, but even ordinary people have begun to express their concern over the methods which all priests use to govern the souls and parishes in their control. A recent poll conducted by *Jubilee* magazine elicited statements such as the following: "The priest is too much of a business and professional man . . . The priest acts as if he were the only authority . . . Laymen are people, not sheep . . . Some priests act like hard-hearted businessmen, unchristian."[2]

These remarks were not made against businessmen but against priests. Their methods, it is claimed, are too authoritarian. But the charge which causes the most concern is this: that the present government of the Church is "unchristian." Granting that priests and bishops are the representatives of Christ and have his power to govern the Church in spiritual matters,[3] many feel that there is still a question as to whether or not the psychological forces which the clergy use are those which Christ would use.

The problem is an old one. The Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky's famous work addressed these words to Christ:

> Didst thou not often say then, 'I will make you free?' But now Thou hast seen these free men. . . . Yes, we've paid dearly for it. But at last we have completed that work in Thy name. For fifteen centuries we have been wrestling with Thy freedom, but now it is ended and over for good. . . . We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon *miracle, mystery, and authority*. . . . For who can rule men if not he who holds their conscience and their bread in his hands? We have taken the sword of Caesar (and in taking it, of course, have rejected Thee).[4]

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[2] "The Council," *Jubilee,* 10 (Oct., 1962), 9-19.

[3] The representative character of the bishops has been proved to be an essential part of the Church's reflections on its own structure. See Othmar Perler, "L'éveque représentant du Christ selon les documents des premiers siècles," *L'épiscopat et l'Église universelle,* eds. Congar and Dupuy, (Paris: Cerf, 1962), pp. 31-66.

[4] F. Dostoyevsky, "The Grand Inquisitor," *The Brothers Karamazov,* Bk. V., ch. 5 (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 298, 305f.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the governing techniques used by Christ. In this way we will have a true model and measure of Christian government in the Church. We will have a firm basis from which to judge whether or not (or to what degree) modern clergy have, as the Inquisitor suggests, "corrected" the methods of Christ.

We must take a warning ahead of time, however. We cannot expect anyone after Christ to govern in the exact same manner as Christ himself. No one else is God incarnate. Church government, like civil government, is the art of the possible. In looking at Christ's methods we seek to find only those forces of control which are humanly imitable.

## GOVERNMENT AND CHRIST

Before investigating Christ's governing methods themselves, we must discuss briefly a few basic juridical points for the sake of context. These questions are three in number: What is government? Whom did Christ govern? And to what purpose did he govern them?

Government, we know, is the executive direction of men to their proper goals.[5] Since government directs men to *their* goals, it is essentially a kind of service, a benefit first to the governed, and only afterwards to the governor. "All authority," writes Ernest Barker, "and all the functions of government, including the function of immediate sovereignty, are services owed to rights [i.e., to the rights of the governed to attain their goal]."[6] We shall see later how Christ's personal government manifested itself as a service to the governed.

Who were the subjects of Christ's authority, and where was he leading them? It seems he extended his authority to all men.[7] His efforts with the Jewish leaders prove that he was trying to lead more than those who voluntarily joined him. His principal subjects, however, were, just as they are now, those who attached themselves to his association, or church. Even among these, some were more closely his subjects than others: first the apostles, then the disciples, and finally the crowds who came to hear and see him. It is according to this gradation of membership in his society that we must judge the value of his governing methods.

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[5] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 103, a. 1, ed. Leonina, *Opera omnia*, IV (Rome: Poly. Vat., 1888).

[6] Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951), p. 228.

The purpose of Christ's government, of course, was to direct people toward their supernatural perfection and everlasting life. "I came that they may have life, and have it more abundantly" (Jn. 10:10). These brief considerations of the nature, the subjects, and the purpose of Christ's government focus our attention on the main inquiry: What techniques did Christ think can be used to direct his more or less fervent followers to a supernatural goal—what physical and psychological measures can be used?

### TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

Modern social psychology distinguishes five categories of governors. Each of these reflects a different kind of force applied by the governor, and each emphasizes one or another of the common techniques of control. We will record these distinctions here in order to have a scheme of reference when examining the methods of Christ.

First of all there is the *authoritarian* type of governor. He is described as one who himself initiates most of the group action by issuing commands to his well organized subordinates. Secondly, there is the so-called *democratic* governor who encourages the initiative of his followers by using logic and persuasion, and by distributing his powers to his subjects. Another is the *laissez-faire* sort of governor. His chief method is not to initiate action, but merely to facilitate the communication of ideas, suggestions and energies which arise within the group. Neither is the *bureaucratic* governor an initiator of action. He sees his role as that of an overseer promoting a predetermined system of regulations. Finally, the social psychologists describe what they call the *charismatic* leader, one who moves the masses by his great deeds and his single-minded sense of mission.[8]

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[7] Christ's authority, in his own eyes, seems to have extended to at least all men within the territorial limits he set for himself during his early ministry (Mt. 15:24); he later expanded these limits by telling the apostles to go to all nations (Mt. 28:20).

At first glance, Christ seems to fit in this last category—a charismatic type of ruler. We read, for instance, that "there followed him a great crowd because they witnessed the signs he worked on those who were sick" (Jn. 6:2). We can even see the crowd responding to his sense of mission:

> And the crowds were seeking after him, and they came to him that he might not depart from them. But he said to them, 'To the other towns also I must proclaim the kingdom of God, for this is why I have been sent' (Lk. 4:42f).

No one doubts that Christ was a charismatic leader; in fact, he is usually pointed out as the standard of the breed.[9] But does that category fully account for his methods or for his attitudes? It seems that Christ knew only too well the limitations of government by popularity. St. John says that "many believed in his name, seeing the signs that he was working. But Jesus did not trust himself to them, in that he knew all men" (Jn. 2:23f).

Certainly he was not a bureaucrat. He was not nursing a predetermined system of rules. It would be truer to say that he was anti-bureaucratic, because of his opposition to the bureaucrats of his day, the Pharisees and doctors of the Law.

There is little evidence in the Gospels of Christ using laissez-faire policies. He usually initiated, or at least contributed to, the action there recorded (as, however, we might expect in a biography). The one notable exception was when he told the apostles not to forbid a certain outsider from working in his name, because "he who is not against you is for you" (Mk. 9:37-39). But by and large, Jesus Christ took definite and positive measures to control his followers; thus he was not a laissez-faire governor.

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[8] See H. Bonner, *Group Dynamics* (New York: Ronald Press, 1959), pp. 179ff.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 186ff.

It does seem, however, that Christ made ready use of democratic methods, since he took many pains to motivate his disciples by persuasion and trust. He gave them responsibilities in his organization, as when he sent them out to preach on their own.[10] We also know that he did not control his group's finances; Judas did that.[11] Furthermore, he usually gave the disciples reasons for his directions, even if the reasons were sometimes of a sublime nature and beyond their understanding:

> No longer do I call you servants, because the servant does not know what his master does. But I have called you friends, because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you (Jn. 15:15).

An example of his giving reasons was the time when he told Peter to put aside his sword, "for all those who take the sword will perish by the sword" (Mt. 26:52).

The heart of democratic government is the preference to use persuasion rather than coercion.[12] All of Christ's moral teaching was a process of persuasion. While the majority of his practical maxims were expressed in the imperative mood, such as in the Sermon on the Mount, it is obvious that these were usually meant as persuasions, especially since he often expressed matters of counsel in the same mood: "Whoever forces thee to go for one mile, go with him two" (Mt. 5:41). We also find Christ using persuasion when he directed the apostles to perform specific actions. Near the end of his life, for instance, it was dangerous to go to Judea. But Jesus wished to go there in order to raise Lazarus, and he wished to take his apostles along. He did not command them to go. He did not say, "Come, we are going to Judea." Rather he suggested, "Let us go again into Judea." With the apostles he discussed the prudence of the maneuver. The outcome of the discussion was a decision made by the apostles themselves to follow Christ even into danger. The entire passage is worth quoting:

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[10] See Lk. 9:1f., and 10:1f.

[11] See Jn. 12:6.

[12] Yves Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1951), p. 115.

> Then afterwards he said to his disciples, 'Let us go again into Judea.' The disciples said to him, 'Rabbi, just now the Jews were seeking to stone thee; and dost thou go there again?' Jesus answered, 'Are there not twelve hours in the day. If a man walks in the day he does not stumble, because he sees the light of this world. . . .' These things he spoke, and then after this he said to them, 'Lazarus, our friend, sleeps. But I go that I may wake him from sleep.' His disciples therefore said, 'Lord, if he sleeps, he will be safe.' Now Jesus had spoken of his death, but they thought he was speaking of the repose of sleep. So then Jesus said to them plainly, 'Lazarus is dead; and I rejoice on your account that I was not there, that you may believe. But let us go to him.' Thomas, who is called the Twin, said therefore to his fellow-disciples, 'Let us also go that we may die with him' (Jn. 11:7-16).

### COERCION

The question arises whether or not Christ was also an authoritarian type governor, that is, one who initiates most of the group activity by strong power tactics within a centralized society. Nothing could be plainer than the centralization of Christ's organization. In the Gospel, just about everything done came to his attention (as again, however, we might expect in a biography). There is much evidence also that he initiated most of the group activity.[13] The real question about authoritarian type government is whether or not the governor uses coercive tactics. We believe that Christ did.

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[13] See above, p. 39.

There are two kinds of coercion, physical and psychological.[14] We will first look at Christ's physical coercion. There is only one incident we know of where Christ actually used physical force; that was the cleansing of the temple. *That* he used force is manifest; that he used it as a means of governing his own society is not quite so clear. The action was not taken against the members of his in-group, but was directed against anyone who sold in the temple. We can say, however, that this was a true case of domestic discipline if we remember what we said above: that the Israelites (and indeed all men) are subject to his authority, because he is the only person who can lead them to their common supernatural goal.[15]

The second kind of coercion is psychological. This type includes such means as commands, threats (the motive of fear), reprimands and propaganda.

Jesus Christ used all of these mentally coercive tactics. As we indicated above, it is rare to find a statement of Christ's which is not in the imperative mood. He clearly commanded moral norms: "A new commandment I give you, that you love one another" (Jn. 13:34). He also commanded definite, concrete actions. For instance, when he sent his followers out to preach, "he commanded them to take nothing for their journey" (Mk. 6:8). The apostles themselves bear witness to Christ's use of commands by their subsequent action. While instructing the household of Cornelius, St. Peter mentioned that "he [Jesus] commanded us to proclaim him to the people" (Acts 19:42). St. Paul showed that he was well aware that as Christ's representative he too had the power to command, for he told Philemon that "in Christ I could command you," when he urged Philemon to take back the slave, Onesimus, with charity.[16] Also, Paul expected his own successors to issue commands, for he wrote to Timothy: "These things command and teach" (I Tim. 4:11).

Christ used various motives of fear when presenting his legislation; for instance, he said, "All whose deeds are evil will be thrown in the blazing fire" (Mt. 13:42). Neither did he consider himself above the practice of confronting people face-to-face with threats: "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites . . . serpents, brood of vipers, how are you to escape the judgment of hell?" (Mt. 23:13 and 33). He rebuked even his own disciples. "Get behind me, Satan," he said to Peter, "Thou art a scandal to me" (Mt. 16:23). And again he chided Peter, saying, "Could you not, then, watch one hour with Me?" (Mt. 26:40).

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[14] Simon, *op. cit.,* p. 109.

[15] See fn. 7 above.

[16] See Philemon, 8.

Commanding, threatening, and rebuking are direct and major ways of mental coercion. There is another, less direct psychological means which Christ used, but which requires some reservations in our recalling it, namely, propagandizing. Yves Simon describes propaganda as an overdose of one-sided information coupled with an intense use of rhetoric.[17] Certainly Christ's rhetoric was intense and single-minded, and from that point of view it was propagandistic. But we cannot stretch this idea too far. The true propagandist does not usually care to engage in public debates with his adversaries since it gives the latter an opportunity to disprove him. We see Christ, however, going straight to the temple and the synogogues to preach, places where he is most likely to be confronted by the Pharisees. Almost every page of the Gospels contains a dialogue between Christ and the Jewish leaders, a dialogue conducted before the eyes of his followers. Furthermore, the true propagandist never recommends anything good in his opponents. If Christ was a true propagandist, he could hardly have said the following: "The doctors of the law and the Pharisees sit in the chair of Moses; therefore, do what they tell you; pay attention to their words" (Mt. 23:2).[18]

One final point on coercion is that Christ suggested excommunication from his Church as a means of compelling the incorrigible. He said, "if he refuse to hear even the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican" (Mt. 18:17).

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[17] Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[18] He adds, however, "But do not follow their example."

We have shown so far that Jesus used many of the techniques proper to the various kinds of human governors. He used the charismatic tactics of moving large crowds by his example, his great deeds (miracles), and his single-minded sense of mission. In this regard we might add that he governed by public opinion. He certainly used this opinion against the Jewish leaders who opposed him.[19] Secondly, he applied many of the methods of democratic government; he often used persuasion, and gave reasons as well as responsibilities to his assistants. Finally, he used the coercive means of authoritarian government, both physical and psychological coercion. He forcibly cleared the temple, and he often directed his followers by commands, threats and reprimands; he even made a qualified use of propaganda. There are only two types of government which Christ did not exercise. He did not use bureaucratic methods at all, and he made only a minimal use of laissez-faire policies.

## LOVE

The unique element in Christ's leadership is that he united all of these methods in an obvious attitude of love toward his subjects. Perhaps it was this love which gave all the force to his government, especially since he himself called for obedience as a response to love: "As the Father has loved me, I also have loved you. Abide in my love. If you keep my commandments you will abide in my love. . . ." (Jn. 15:9f).

There is no doubt that Christ expected his representatives to govern their subjects by a similar display of love. Yves Congar indicates how much Christ wanted the episcopacy to consider itself a *service* to the faithful when he quotes this statement of Christ:[20]

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[19] For example: "And the chief priests and lawyers were bent on making an end of him, with the support of the leading citizens, but found they were helpless, because the people all hung upon his words." (Lk. 19:47f).

[20] "L'hiérarchie comme service selon le Nouveau Testament et les documents de la tradition," Congar and Dupuy, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 67-99. In all fairness to Fr. Congar we must note that he himself does not subscribe to a further conclusion which we are hinting could be derived from his treatise; namely, that church government should be only democratic in its operation.

> You know that those who are regarded as rulers among the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over them. But it is not so among you. On the contrary, whoever wishes to become great shall be your servant; and whoever wishes to be first among you shall be the slave of all; for the Son of Man has not come to be served but to serve (Mk. 10:42-45).

And again: "If, therefore, I the Lord and Master have washed your feet, you also ought to wash the feet of one another" (Jn. 13:14). We said above that all government is essentially a service to the governed, leading them to their goal. Christ wished the government of his Church to manifest this service in the highest degree. He wanted it to be a service of love.

But saying this, we must not be deceived. Genuine love is a powerful psychological agent in governing men, especially when Christ uses it to bring out the best in his followers. Nevertheless, this love is not the only Christian means of governing. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that this love expresses itself in other governing methods. Christ did not limit himself to making calls for a loving response. When it came to the difficult, everyday acts of government, we have seen that Christ used, and apparently desired his representatives to use, a strong dose of human methods, even the less popular authoritarian processes of coercion.

### CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this article we asked whether modern ecclesiastical authorities govern in a "Christian" manner or whether they have, like Dostoyevsky's inquisitor, "corrected" and therefore rejected the methods of Christ. This question really cannot be answered in justice—at least not here. The most we can offer is a norm for judging, a norm taken from our analysis of Christ's government. It is this: if the representatives of Christ wish to be leaders like their founder, they must use the best techniques from among the various kinds of human government; but they must also govern in a spirit which is eminently one of service and charity, preferring to use kindness and persuasion rather than coercion and pressure.

The authoritarian, strict and business-like clerics alluded to at the beginning of this paper are not "unchristian" just because they are authoritarian, strict and business-like. Christ too acted in this way. They are unchristian only if they refuse to show their love for the people—if they never and in no way wash the feet of their subjects. St. Augustine stated our conclusion well and succinctly when he wrote of Christian superiors: "While both are necessary, let them seek rather to be loved than to be feared."[21]

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[21] "Et quamvis utrumque sit necessarium, tamen plus amari a vobis appetat quam timeri." *Regula ad servos Dei.* PL 32, 1384.

ANSELM THOMASMA, O.P.

# A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF CHEMICAL EXPANSION

*The spirit of modern physics*
*will penetrate into the minds of many people*
*and will connect itself in different ways*
*with the older traditions.*
Werner Heisenberg

Philosophy reunited with science? Is it possible that these two giants of thought are once more discovering mutual techniques and explanations? In the present day, new theories have arisen which seem to make the possibility of reunion more than wishful thinking. As a consequence of these new theories, scientists are re-evaluating solutions to problems long since thought to be solved. One such problem is that of the expansion and contraction of chemical bodies, often referred to as rarefaction and condensation.

Expansion and contraction are phenomena usually explained by the separation and concentration of particles through empty space. We intend to show that, on the contrary, expansion and contraction are types of qualitative alteration, and that they therefore follow the pattern of other cases of intensification and remission of a qualitative form in a subject. Atoms or molecules composed of atoms, we suggest, do not grow further apart, but rather, increase in magnitude. We shall see that this apparently revolutionary view of the phenomena of rarefaction and condensation agrees with modern quantum theory and field theory and fits experimental observations.

## THE PHENOMENON OF EXPANSION

It is necessary to have a chemical description of expansion before proceeding to a more detailed explanation of the phenomenon itself. The rarefaction of gases offers itself as a good subject for our study. For a gas in which there is no change of state at constant temperature and under ideal conditions, Boyle's Law states: "The volume of a given quantity of any gas varies inversely as the pressure to which the gas is subjected."[1] If we keep a definite quantity of gas at a constant temperature by means of an external source of heat, it expands. This phenomenon is the process of rarefaction and is caused by a decrease in pressure, and not by an increase in heat.

We need a description of a gas as well, if we are to discuss its expansion or rarefaction. A gas is that state of matter which always assumes the shape of its container and totally fills it, even if the original volume of the gas is not equal to that of the container. A gas has neither a definite shape nor a definite volume.

Our daily experience of a gas, such as the air we breathe, is not exact enough for science. In order to understand the expansion of a gas, we must isolate the phenomenon from our daily experience of it. Once it is isolated, we can control the gas and take measurements. By means of a controlled experiment, information is contributed for an acceptable theory.

If a volume of argon gas is subjected to a change in pressure at constant temperature by removing the plunger from the cylinder of gas, the gas expands to fill the larger volume assumed.[2] We observe that the argon remains everywhere present in the container, exerting a uniform pressure on the walls, even though the quantity of the pressure per square centimeter has diminished. How can we account for this phenomenon of uniform expansion?

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[1] C. D. Hodgman *et al.*, eds., *Handbook of Chemistry and Physics* (Cleveland: Chemical Rubber Co., 1957), p. 2842. We shall exclude a discussion of condensation from this paper, since it is merely the reverse of expansion or rarefaction. Nonetheless, condensation should not be confused with the application and use of the word in organic chemistry, where it signifies a process of reaction in which there is a change of state.

## MECHANISM

The common explication of the phenomenon of expansion is mechanistic in tone. In many texts accepted as authoritative, mechanistic preconceptions prejudice the understanding of this complex phenomenon. Since expansion is hard to picture or imagine, these texts frequently present oversimplified models of natural processes. These models tend to ignore the distinction between reality and mental construct, and picture nature as basically mechanical. In some texts, the model and reality are seldom even distinguished.

### *The Mechanistic Explanation*

According to the mechanical view, a gas is a conglomeration of molecules (in the case of argon, atoms) traveling in straight lines in random directions and at high rates of speed. The force of these particles bouncing off the sides of the container accounts for pressure. The space occupied by the particles is a small portion of the total volume.

> Hence we may conclude that molecules generally are separated from each other by distances which are large compared to molecular diameters, and that within a gas the space actually occupied by molecules is very small, most of the volume occupied being 'free' space. . . . On expansion the average distance between molecules is increased, and thereby also the 'free' space of the gas. In

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[2] Argon (symbol A) is a colorless, inert gas with a molecular weight of 39.944, a melting point of —184.2°C, and a boiling point of —185.7°C. It is not diatomic, and hence is composed of atoms of argon and not molecules. There is enough argon in the atmosphere of the earth for each square mile of the earth's surface to support 800,000,000 pounds of this gas. (*Ibid.*, p. 488).

> any case the random motion of the molecules will give the effect of completely filling any containing vessel in which the gas is placed.[3]

In this explanation, we notice three postulates: the rectitude of the kinetic theory; the certainty that the filled container is an *effect* of random motion of particles; the assurance of the existence of free space. Since argon is composed of atoms and not molecules, the atoms serve as common denominators for the three explanations of the phenomena to be discussed.

First we shall turn our attention to the kinetic theory, and then to the other two postulates mentioned above. The kinetic theory has been the provisional explanation of the ultimate nature of a gas. We will see in the course of our treatment how false this description is. The kinetic theory contains seven basic postulates:

1. A gas is composed of minute particles called *molecules.* For any particular gas, all molecules have the same mass and size.
2. The molecules of a gas are in a state of ceaseless, chaotic motion, during which they collide with each other and with the sides of the container.
3. The phenomenon known as pressure is caused by molecules colliding with the sides of the container.
4. Collisions between molecules (and between molecules and the sides of the container) must be perfectly elastic (i.e. no kinetic energy is lost due to friction) since the pressure does not decrease with time.
5. At low pressures the molecules are so far apart that the intermolecular attractive forces (which decrease as the distance between the molecules increases) may be considered negligible.
6. At low pressures the volume occupied by the molecules may be considered negligible compared to the volume of the container.

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[3] Maron and Prutton, *Principles of Physical Chemistry* (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 7.

7. The absolute temperature of a gas is a function only of the average kinetic energy of all the molecules.[4]

Based upon atomic theory, the kinetic hypothesis has its roots in the thought and experiments of many great scientists of the past. The idea of explaining one motion solely in terms of a more fundamental local motion, e.g., the expansion of a gas by the movement of particles, had occurred to Newton. Newtonian expansion was the increase of distance between particles, based upon atomic interplay of local motions.[5] Following Newton, Dalton, Lavoisier, Bernouilli, and Avogadro all refined, magnified and re-applied this concept to the puzzles presented by science in their day. These scientists found a philosophical champion for their ideas in the Greek philosopher, Democritus. To them he was an outstanding intellectual light, for he expressed their outlook at the dawn of thought. "According to convention there is a sweet and a bitter," says Democritus, "and according to convention there is a hot and a cold, and colour. In truth there are atoms and a void."[6]

### *Difficulties in the Mechanistic Explanation*

The modern scientist seeks to explain all phenomena by theories which conform to experience or experiment, and is wary of proposing theories which might contradict, ignore or circumvent empirical observations. However, the kinetic theory of a gas

> has none of the characteristics of a legitimate physical theory. Its premises are as inadmissible as the reasoning upon them is incon-

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[4] S. L. Kittsley, *Physical Chemistry* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1957), pp. 12f.

[5] "For the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this—from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena." (Sir Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World*, trans. Florian Cajori, [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934], pp. xvii f.)

[6] Dampier & Dampier, *Readings in the Literature of Science* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 55.

> clusive. It postulates what it professes to explain; it is a solution in terms more mysterious than the problem.[7]

In accordance with observations, this theory has no validity because

> It professes to explain them on the basis of at least three arbitrary assumptions, not one of which is a datum of experience, viz;
> 1. That a gas is composed of solid particles which are indestructible and of constant mass and volume.
> 2. That these constituent particles are absolutely elastic.
> 3. That these particles are in perpetual motion, and, except at very small distance, in no wise act upon each other, so that their motions are absolutely free and therefore rectilinear.[8]

Let us examine these three assumptions. The first of these, that the particles are indestructible, has been negated by a discovery within natural science itself. Because of the existence of sub-atomic phenomena such as electrons, X-rays, light and electromagnetic waves, the atom can no longer be thought to be indestructible. Since argon gas has as its basis the atom, it is obvious that this gas is not composed of indestructible particles. We must therefore dispose of this assumption because it is "a generalization from facts crudely observed and imperfectly apprehended."[9]

The second assumption, that the constituent particles are absolutely elastic, must also be rejected, for it explains one motion by a more complex motion. Instead of explaining by simplifying, it reverses the scientific procedure, for it argues *idem per idem.* Moreover, the arbitrary postulation of elasticity has no basis in experience. Only in a perfect vacuum could elasticity of this sort prevail. Even if we could manage to obtain an ideal vacuum in a container, the wall itself would be a sufficient cause for slowing down the gas molecule whose pressure is almost imperceptible. The retardation of the molecule is a warranted concept, for this is the only reaction we observe when we see one object collide with another. It seems that the faulty concept is that of "bouncing-ball" molecules and atoms.

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[7] J. B. Stallo, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics,* ed. Bridgman, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 150.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 143.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 177.

Similarly the third assumption, that the perpetually moving particles do not act upon one another except at very small distances, must be rejected. It too is contradicted by experience. Study of natural motions of particles demonstrates that they do indeed react upon one another, even at great distances. This fact is observed by astronomers. The inter-stellar gases are in a state of extreme turbulence. This turbulence is explained mechanistically in terms of friction between particles, much like the friction produced when two billiard balls are rubbed together. Here the mechanistic explanation meets an impasse. Particles in outer space could never exhibit frictional properties. They are too far apart. The gas is too rarefied to contain particles which would collide with one another with the frequency characteristic of extreme turbulence. Evidently the particles must be acting upon one another in some non-frictional manner, such that the motion of the whole would be influenced by the removal of one particle,[10] and such that the particle cannot be defined except by and through its influence on the others.[11]

We must now turn our attention to the additional two postulates mentioned above. The first of these is that in the expansion of a gas the filling of the container is only an effect of the random motion of the particles. We may legitimately ask, since this paper deals with the ideal and optimum conditions, what would happen if there were only one particle of argon gas in the cylinder? After the volume is increased, would the full container still be an *effect* of the random motion of the single particle? Would the atom continue its elastic rebounding on the walls of the containing vessel, and maintain a faint pressure on the walls which is evenly distributed and constant at all points? For those of the mechanistic persuasion, these questions are difficult to answer, and, as we shall see, are more readily answered by the field theory.

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[10] George Gamow, "Turbulence in Space," *The New Astronomy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955), p. 79.

[11] "To the cosmic corpuscles we should find it natural to attribute an individual radius of action as limited as their dimensions. We find, on the contrary, that each of them can only be defined by virtue of its influence on all around it." (Pierre Teilhard De Chardin, S.J., *The Phenomenon of Man* [New York: Harper, 1959], p. 41.)

The last problem raised by the mechanical approach is a perennial one: That of free space between the particles. There are three ways of explaining the free space concept within mechanism: void, inert medium, and substantial aether. We will treat each of these in the light of contemporary advances in natural science.

Our opposition to the concept of a total void is founded on reason and experiment. Experiments have led scientists to believe that the void is a mythological concept, a construct never existing in the real world. Outer space, usually thought to be empty, is in fact filled with matter. Matter is admittedly very thinly apportioned in space, but the fact remains that material substances are distributed on the average of about one atom per cubic centimeter.[12]

Modern science has developed a highly mathematical notion of the void or vacuum. In this conception, the void is not empty, but rather the matter in the void is unspecified. Long ago, Aristotle commented upon this approach to the void: "The void does not exist unless the matter qua matter of the movement is considered as the void."[13]

We note that the original proponents of the kinetic hypothesis did posit a vacuum. At the same time they spoke of the influence of particles within this vacuum upon one another. The elasticity of the atoms, for instance, as construed by Lavoisier and adopted by Dalton, "is due to the tendency of the molecules to separate from one another, and there is some pressure even when they are very rarefied, hence this repulsion is exerted at very great distances."[14] The repulsion of particles can actually be measured. However, even though these men formulated a void between particles, reason and common sense rebel against action at a distance or mutual influence of bodies through a void in a mechanistic manner.[15] Since the repulsion or effect of the action of one particle upon another can be measured, the postulated void must be abandoned; it is a myth.

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[12] Hannes Alven, "Electricity in Space," *The New Astronomy, ed. cit.*, p. 79. Plasma waves also fill the universe and even pervade solids. See Raymond Bowers, "Plasmas in Solids," *Scientific American,* CCVII (Nov., 1963), 46.

[13] Aristotle, *Physics,* IV, 9, 217b-20.

[14] J. R. Partington, *A History of Chemistry* (London: Macmillan, 1962), III, p. 465.

Besides the void, the other alternatives for explaining free space in a mechanistic context are inert, intermediate matter and the ether. Could the medium be inert, intermediate matter? At first glance, this seems the most sensible answer. The kinetic hypothesis speaks of distance between particles, and "if there is no intermediate matter, it does not make sense to speak of distance."[16] In order to refer to place and distance, and subsequently to speak of local motion, it is necessary that there be an intermediary body between particles. In this case, the intermediate body is called a medium of localization. However, the inert matter theory fails for the same reason that the theory of the void failed: It does not explain the influence of particles upon one another—matter cannot act if it is inert.

A substantial ether remains as the sole possible environment for the particles of a gas according to the mechanistic system. This ether must have an ability to propagate transverse waves as does an elastic solid, and must pervade all of space. In this way, the ether-filled free space can carry contact forces. However, the existence of an ether is almost universally denied. Due to advances in science ether is no longer considered a real substance, a really existing solid-like body.[17] Ether was first postulated to explain how waves of light could travel through outer space, but with the advent of the new theories, it is no longer necessary to explicate this phenomenon by means of an ether; the ether has lost its *raison d'être*.

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[15] Action at a distance as required by the mechanical theory is impossible, for the action or the effect of the action (repulsion) cannot pass through the empty space of the void. See H. Van Laer, *Philosophico-Scientific Problems* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), pp. 110f.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[17] "The ether, the carrier of light and of electric and magnetic forces . . . even today is still regarded as continuous—though it has lost most of the characteristic properties of a substance and can hardly be called a continuous medium." (Max Born, *Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949], p. 19).

The clinching argument against ether being a substance having solid qualities is that it has never been observed. Its gross properties should be observable by the poorest, most phlegmatic observer. Stallo solidifies the case against the aether as follows:

> However ready we may be to accede to the demands of the theorist when he asks us to grant that all space is pervaded, and all sensible matter is penetrated, by an adamantine solid exerting at each point in space an elastic force 1,148,000,000,000 times that of air at the earth's surface, and a pressure upon the square inch of 17,000,000,000,000 pounds—a solid which, at the same time, wholly eludes our senses, is utterly impalpable and offers no appreciable resistance to the motions of ordinary bodies—we are appalled when we are told that the alleged existence of this adamantine medium, the ether, does not, after all, explain the observed irregularities in the periods of comets; that furthermore, not only is the supposed luminiferous ether unavailable as a medium for the origination and propagation of dielectric phenomena, so that for these a distinct all-pervading electriferous ether must be assumed, but that it is very questionable whether the assumption of a single etherial medium is competent to account for all the known facts in optics.[18]

In the light of these objections against the mechanical approach to nature, we cannot accept mechanism as a valid explanation of the phenomenon of rarefaction. Nevertheless, such an explanation is useful when used with caution for picturing the multiple complex of actions and reactions within a system. In short, the mechanistic view is an artificial conception, and must not be accepted as an explanation of the natural process of expansion.[19]

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[18] Stallo, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[19] "Het voor de klassieke fysica zo evidente fundamentele beginsel van het mechanicisme is derhalve het sterkst aangetast, sterker dan de klassieke theorie zelf." (A. G. M. Van Melsen, *Natuurwetenschap en Techniek* [Antwerpen: Aula Boeken, 1962], p. 26.)
It is important to note at this point that it is not the existence of the atom which is denied, but rather the notion of a billiard-ball nature for this existence. For a complete discussion of the artificiality of the mechanistic outlook, see Werner Heisenberg, *Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlts Tashenbuch Verlag, 1962), pp. 7-15.

## FIELD THEORY AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

We have seen the inherent difficulties of mechanism and the reasons why it is unsuitable for an explanation of the true nature of expansion. Another interpretation of the phenomenon of expansion is found in the field theory. We will first discuss the general lines of the theory and then apply it to our problem.

### *What is Field Theory?*

The conviction that our external senses are imperfect tools for the discovery of the phenomena of nature has led modern science ever further into abstract, mathematical realms, where new aspects of nature are continually revealed. Matter is seen to have three faces: plurality, unity, and energy. This empirical finding does not differ greatly from the observations of the ancient Greeks, except that today's theory is derived from a more abstract experimental methodology.

No matter how far we divide material things they always proclaim their unity. At the same time each object takes on multiple forms. Underlying all material things in this universe there must be some fundamental and exceptional kind of substance[20] which is a unique unifier, a special foundation. Increased activity at the microscopic level of experimentation has thrown new light on this substance, and has led to the discovery of quantum packets of energy and electrical forces in the atom.

The new view of nature is a union of wave mechanics and field theory,[21] and explains many phenomena by combining the ideas on

[20] "It is almost as if the stuff of which all stuff is made were reducible in the end to some simple and unique kind of substance." (De Chardin, *op. cit.*, p. 41.)

[21] Although opposed to mechanism, the new view is not entirely contradictory to classical conceptions: "Quantum mechanics therefore does not represent a completely new way of looking at nature; it is a historical development of classical mechanics. As with all revolutions, the quantum mechanical revolution is really an evolution, strongly conditioned by its antecedents." (Kauzmann, *Quantum Chemistry* [New York: Academic Press, 1961], p. 153.)

the continuity and discontinuity of matter common to both these theories. As the name "quantum" implies, discontinuity is an important concept. Radiation emitted by atoms is discontinuous. Electrons "jump" in the atom from one orbit (really an energy level) to another and require discrete units of radiation in order to jump. We may imagine an atom as a staircase, and the electron as a ball. When the ball is bounced down the stairs, it can only rest on certain steps or levels and not in between.[22]

A second important role played in this new outlook on nature is the extension or "smearing" of the particle. Because of the uncertainty of defining simultaneously the position and momentum of an atomic particle, the atom is now considered to have systems of stationary waves instead of electrons. A stationary wave is a wave whose ends do not move. This wave is like the path of a rope when two children stand in their respective positions and bob the rope up and down. Thus the classical conception of a material point such as that postulated in the kinetic hypothesis, has given way to a more general concept of a parcel of waves, infinitely narrow, "interfering with each other in such a way as to cancel each other everywhere in space except at the place occupied by the material point."[23] The classical conceptions with their material particles are nothing other than particular instances in a more general theory of wave mechanics.[24] Field theory with its requirement for more extended particles gives a better explanation of the exceedingly complex structure and operation of nature. We might also point out that the wave function of particles presents a mathematical probability that a certain state exists for this particle, and denotes a measure of reality whether it be the energy of the corpuscle or the electrical density at each point.[25] We wish to emphasize that the particle is extended or smeared over an area of a field.

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[22] This example was given by P. W. Merrill, *Space Chemistry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 44f.

[23] Max Planck, *Philosophy of Physics* (New York: Norton, 1936), p. 64.

[24] "Zo blijft na de opkomst van de kwantummechanica de klassieke mechanica rustig voortleven als een vereenvoudigd geval van de nieuwe mechanica, met voortaan slechts een beperkt geldigheidsgebied." (Van Melsen, *op. cit.*, p. 26.)

What then is a field? By a field is meant a spatial region whose state at every point is completely determined by quantitative values. Every event which takes place in this region is specified by quantitative values. A field is said to have "strength" in proportion to the number of events occurring within it. This is why we said earlier that when a field physicist speaks of empty space-time, he does not mean a vacuum. A vacuum would have zero field strength since no action occurs in such a state and quantitative values are non-existent. Empty space-time for a field physicist means a representation of unspecified field vectors. The old ways of explaining free space have vanished! All places are filled with fields; no longer is there a void. The field is neither an inert medium nor an aetherial substance.[26]

### *Field Theory applied to Expansion*

Let us consider the nature of particles in the field theory. The particles of a gas are

> not merely atoms. . . . They are in fact atomic connections between events in space-time which is represented as a continuum in the mathematical theory. The particle is localized only where it is created, where it is annihilated, or where it interacts with a localised field of force, and in each of these instances the localisation is crude; it is not punctual as it would be in classical physics.[27]

The particles are extended, structured "points," and should be "considered as different types of excitations of universal fundamental field."[28] The empirical discovery of the muon, considered as an excited electron, proves that particles have an extended, irregular shape. Here we come to an important concept: the "new-view" particles have ill-defined boundaries and are transient entities. If we try to imagine these particles by using mechanistic concepts, we actually are reversing the procedure upon which the existence of particles has been postulated, a procedure leading away from mechanical notions.[29]

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[25] See H. Van Laer, *Philosophy of Science* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1962), p. 167. Also, Maurice Duquesne, *Matter and Antimatter* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 62.

[26] W. H. Watson, *Understanding Physics Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 149.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

We have seen that the field has replaced the notion of free space. But in what way? Let us borrow the analogy from the mechanical hypothesis that the particles are planets in the solar system. What seems to be empty space between the planets in the classical model is, in the new view, space filled with ionized inter-stellar matter (plasma) and atoms of gases.[30] A weak magnetic field likewise pervades all of space. Thus, the free space of classical context must be a field, and a field is a mode of matter. The relativity theory of Einstein led to the startling assertion that all of nature is a field and that the elements of matter do not preserve their material identity in the course of motion. We may now think of material particles as similar to vortices moving within a liquid (the field).

Just as the proof of the pudding is in the tasting, so too the proof of our new view of nature, taken from quantum and field theory, must lie in its ability to elucidate old and new observations. Once the new view has been tested against the observations which the mechanical theory was unable to answer satisfactorily, we may apply it to the expansion of a gas.

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[28] J. P. Vigier, "Determinism and Indeterminism in a new 'Level' Conception of Matter," *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,* Nagel *et al.,* eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 264. Since matter in the form of particles having mass comes from the field which is energy, energy itself must be a form of matter.

[29] Classical conceptions are valuable as a friendly face in a crowd of strangers. However, this friendly face often turns out to be an enemy to understanding, and hence to progress. Bohr's use of familiar mechanical notions to explain the atom is a famous case in point.

[30] "A plasma is a collection of positively and negatively charged particles moving about so energetically that they do not readily combine." They are everywhere in the universe. (R. Bowers, "Plasmas in Solids," *Scientific American,* CCVII [Nov., 1963], 46.)

Our new outlook on nature can explain the observations more readily than the classical notions and without their arbitrary assumptions. Field theory explains, for instance, how cosmic-ray particles are driven by electric and magnetic fields through space, and how they are accelerated before hitting our atmosphere, a phenomenon escaping the explanation of the mechanists. It can also explain (without the "friction" of particles) how inter-stellar gases are in a state of turbulence, and how these gases, influenced by magnetic fields imposing an almost undetectable order on the particles, are responsible for the large-scale energy transports throughout the universe. Again, classical physics could not explain field emission of electrons without an input of energy. But the field theory and wave mechanics explain it as an effect of an electric field.[31]

In relating this new view of nature to the argon experiment, one of the new techniques, the Fourier analysis of the field, permits us to speak of particles being absorbed and emitted by the field. When the plunger is drawn out of the cylinder, thus granting more volume to the gas, the energy and momentum of the system is decreased and more particles are produced. Contrary to the classical notion, the particles do not create the pressure on the walls of the container, the field does. The pressure decreases because the fundamental field of the gas expands and becomes weaker upon the expansion of the gas. This process can be imagined two-dimensionally as a sheet of rubber being pulled, or three-dimensionally as play-putty which is pulled and expands in all directions at once, leaving no interstices.

[31] W. P. Dyke, "Advances in Field Omission," *Scientific American*, CCX (Jan., 1964), 108. Wave mechanics, nevertheless, is not the last word. It could not explain the anomalous Zeeman effect, and a few other experimental results in chemistry. "Dat immers het bepaalde in de quantummechanica gebruikte wiskundige formalisme in de chemie toepasselijk is, is een ervaringsgegeven." (Van Melsen, *op. cit.*, p. 77.)

The more we try to conceive of what happens when a field expands, the easier it is to see that any descriptions of the theory are necessarily poetic (for example, the word "smear") due to the abstractly mathematical nature of the theory.

The weakness of the expanded field accounts for the loss of uniform pressure at any point on the side of the vessel, and yet the atoms of argon (actually a smear of fields, intersecting at intervals and thus forming particles) fill the entire container; indeed, each atom fills the whole container as do all the other atoms, inasmuch as they are parts of the field.[32] Each atom fills the whole continuity individually as part of the field. The filled container, then, is no longer merely an effect of the random motion of particles. The space filled by the particles does not behave as their inert receptacle, but as an active center of direction and transmission in which they are organized. This active center is known as the initial principle of energy.[33]

If merely one atom of the gas were present, field theory would have no difficulty in explaining how the single atom, as a field with particles, could expand to fill the whole container. This single atom would gently exert its pressure on the walls, a pressure equal throughout because it would be due to the field and not due to bouncing particles. Indeed, evidence shows outer space to be as rarefied as this, while at the same time the evidence indicates the existence of a magnetic field throughout space.

The new view of nature offered by field theory is a more satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of expansion than that given by mechanism. It conforms with reason and experience in bringing us closer to the true nature of reality.

[32] "However narrowly the 'heart' of the atom may be circumscribed, its realm is co-extensive, at least potentially, with that of every other atom." (De Chardin, *op. cit.*, p. 41.) It is important to remember that each atom cannot actually fill the whole container or we would have two or more objects in the same place at the same time, a violation of a basic physical principle.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

## EDUCTION OF FORM

The notion of eduction of form can be traced back to Aristotle. For Aristotle, a form could come to matter either by being superinduced by an external agent, or by being educed or developed from within. Matter has a potency for many forms, and an external active agent, or even a conglomeration of agents, can actualize this potency towards any one of the many forms. St. Albert utilized the theory of eduction of forms to explicate the nature of expansion.

### *Expansion as a Qualitative Change*

When a gas expands or contracts, it "is the matter which is potentially both that comes to be each of the two."[34] The "two" here signifies the greater or lesser state of expansion. When argon expands from a minor degree of expansion to a major one, it is the same argon which is rarefied, but between two extreme states of magnitude or density. This change between contrary states in the same substance is called alteration. In any alteration the material substrate remains the same; what alters or "turns" is the form of this substrate—or better, what happens is that the old form simply increases or decreases the intensity of its presence in the substrate. It can readily be seen how well this notion conforms with the concept of an expanding field, since a field always remains as the same substrate while the strength and size of the field (its "form") increases or decreases.

We can now examine more deeply what kind of alteration occurs in expansion. We will first determine exactly what form changes when a gas expands. In the argon experiment, we notice that the gas increases its volume as the plunger (the locally moving external agent) is extracted. The increase in volume in one and the same argon indicates that the gas alters one of its accidental forms. The accidental form in question is the form of *magnitude*, or if you like, size, external dimension or volume.

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[34] Aristotle, *Physics*, IV, 9, 217a-32.

In order to pinpoint more precisely the form involved in an expanding gas, St. Albert stresses that all the forms which change by alteration belong to the genus of sensible qualities. This genus has two species: proper and common sensibles. The proper sensibles are color, sound, odor, flavor, and tactile qualities. It is obvious that these are not under consideration in our discussion. However, the common sensibles, which are shape, number, motion, and rest, are pertinent. The latter wax and wane as a subject changes its quantity and/or its matter.[35] When a gas expands there is a change in its quantity. At the same time we note correlative changes in its qualities: in its shape (larger volume or magnitude), in its number (more particles), and in its motions. Thus the most obvious changing form in expansion is magnitude. Magnitude, however, is a *qualitative* form.

## *Comparison with Other Theories*

The insistence on magnitude being a *qualitative* form marks the first difference between the explanation of the classical physicist and that of the scholastic. Expansion is a type of alteration, and, as such, is a motion between qualitative differences. Although ultimately dependent upon local motion, qualitative alteration does not harmonize with the concept of "billiard-ball" motion found in classical physics.

On the other hand, the scholastic notion so far explained does agree with that of the field theorist. The agreement is evident at three levels. First of all, the expansion of the field takes places by some sort of growth in size. For the scholastics, the gas expands by some alteration in the qualitative form of magnitude within the quantity of the gas. At another level, field theory says that the field itself expands. Similarly, the scholastic notion holds that the qualitative alteration of magnitude depends on a more basic change in quantity. Field theory explains expansion without recourse to an increase in the matter of the gas. Likewise for the scholastic, the expansion of gas is the process of actualizing greater dimensions in the same matter. No new matter is produced, but the dimensions of this matter increase.[36] Therefore, the two views are in harmony at this stage.

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[35] St. Albert, *Metaphysics,* V, tr. 3, c. 1, ed. Geyer, *Opera omnia,* XVI, I, p. 257.

### *Explanation of Process of Expansion*

Our knowledge about the form which changes in the process of expansion leads us to the question of *how* the change occurs. Expansion takes place between two qualities which are really different degrees of one and the same underlying quantitative form. As, for example, between greater and lesser magnitude, or between rarity and density.[37] Now a difference in the degree of something can occur in one of two ways: by acquisition or by intensification. Acquisition is not a mechanical process, such as the combining of strips of wood to make a beam, but is rather an actualization of inherent germinal capabilities under the action of a proper disposing agency. An example of this type of actualization is the acquisition of a virtue by a man previously only disposed toward it.

The second type of alteration is also a non-mechanical process. Intensification (or its opposite, remission) of an already acquired quality is a more perfect eduction of an accidental form from the subject. This is difficult to picture, but perhaps an example from photography might help. To understand what happens when argon expands, we might consider an underdeveloped film as having a potency to be colored when developed. When placed in the developing solution the colors begin to appear, but not clearly. The first appearance of color is analogous to the acquisition of a quality. The stage between the incomplete, hazy and imperfect development of the film and the perfect clarity of color later to be obtained by further development, is analogous to the intensification of a quality already possessed, but previously had in an incomplete manner.

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[36] Aristotle, *Physics*, IV, 9, 217b8-9. For an excellent discussion of the history of this concept and the relationship it has to the modern concept of mass, see J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., "Matter in 14th Century Science," *Concept of Matter*, ed. E. McMullin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 326-40.

[37] On the qualitative level, the two contrary qualities differ only in degree. Thus we have the rare and the less rare or dense. However, rarefaction considered as the more basic alteration of *quantity* can be considered as occurring between two separate forms of dimension.

Intensification and not acquisition explains the expansion of a gas. When discussing the expansion of argon we are concerned not with its original acquisition of quantity and qualities, but with the subsequent increase in these forms. The gas expands through a process of educing increased degrees in the original quality of magnitude contained in the quantified matter of the gas.

Two kinds of change are involved as the gas intensifies in magnitude and gains new dimensions: a change of quality and a change of quantity. The expansion, precisely as such, is a qualitative change in magnitude. But this magnitude is the magnitude of the quantity of the gas. Magnitude is the qualitative form which manifests the quantitative actuality of the substrate. Thus while the change between the more or less perfect eduction of quantity is manifested as an alteration between two qualities (the dense and the rare, for example) these qualitative changes depend on a more basic change in quantity.

### *Underlying Reason for Process of Expansion*

The scholastic explanation fully considers the nature of this underlying change in quantity. Recalling what we said about the Fourier analysis of the expanding field, we may speak of an increase of particles when the field expands. Where do these extra particles come from? Certainly not from an external source, since argon gas is an isolated system in its container. The particles must have been derived from within the field itself. But they did not seem to be there before!

Let us examine this dilemma more closely. Using the approach of a *Gedankexperiment,* we may suppose that we have a minute portion of the field with an arbitrary ten particles. Upon the expansion of the gas, the same "amount" of field now fully fills twice the volume and has, let us say, twenty particles. No new argon has been added, so we must infer that the ten extra particles existed in some mysterious way in the field before expansion.[38] Again we see how well this field theory concept agrees with that scholastic notion whereby a certain portion of matter increases in dimensions without increasing in matter. But what about the mysterious particles?

According to the scholastic, the basic principles of reality are potency and act. If we apply these principles to the problem at hand, the following explanation results. The gas is a continuum, composed of quantitative parts in act. These parts are extended into the environment, and are distinguished from one another in the continuum (but not separated from one another) by points, lines and surfaces. The latter are actually present but serve only to continue the parts. When the gas expands, the quantified parts are multiplied (from ten to twenty particles in twice the volume) without an increase in the subject; that is, the continuum simply gains more parts in act. But since these parts did not come from an external source, they must have existed previously *in potency* within the matter of the continuum. The actualization of these quantitative parts is manifested as an intensification of that qualitative form which we have called "magnitude." Thus the greater the actualization of quantity educed from the potency of a material substance, the greater becomes its number of extended parts in act, its extension, its dimension, its degree of expansion, its magnitude, its eduction.

## CONCLUSION

Scholastic or qualitative explanations of the phenomenon of expansion concord very well with the new view of field theory. The scholastic is accustomed to speaking of the proper sensibles when explaining eduction, but the modern scientist, as we have said, is dealing with more abstract and abstruse concepts, and is concerned with the more basic changes underlying the changes in the proper sensibles—those in the common sensibles.

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[38] New theories consider the particle a state of its field because inertial and field mass concepts are equated. However, the particles can also be regarded as singularities in the field. (Max Jammer, *Concepts of Mass* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961], pp. 194-215.)

The single major difference between the two views is that the field is a mathematical concept, divorced from the subject in which it resides. The field physicist considers the expansion of a giant field to be an increase in size of some sort of substance, of a body. The scholastic considers the field as it resides *in* a body, not as it *is* a body.

The scholastic approach can clarify the relationship of the field to reality. What does the field really represent? Will our conclusion be vitiated by those theories which consider the field as only quasi-continuous, an agglomeration of particles for the convenience of mathematical analysis? It seems rather that the field itself is an accidental form of quantity which resides in a more primary substance and which has its own qualities. The mathematical consideration of the field as a substance is analogous to the consideration of a line in so far as it has the quality of an angle.[39] Just as a line is able to increase in "angleness," so too the field can increase in dimension. Quantity can be considered, then, as a substance relative to the qualities it contains, that is, as a subject with its own qualities.

Position of bodies for the scholastic results from the respective contact of these bodies with some extended medium, the medium of localization. Localmotion results from continuous and successive contact with this medium. Here again, wave mechanics and field theory are aligned with the qualitative approach, for they represent just such a medium for localmotion.[40] Because these new theories represent a formal approach to physics, we may conclude with Fernandez, that "the consequences of these theories seem to touch philosophy and reunite it with science."[41]

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[39] St. Albert, *Meta., loc. cit.*, p. 258.

[40] Motion is seen to be a direct consequence of the field equations, not something superadded. (Jammer, *op. cit.*, p. 215.)

[41] Anicetus Fernandez, O.P., "Scientiae et Philosophiae secundum S. Albertum Magnum," *Angelicum*, III (1936), 24.

MATTHEW FOX, O.P.

# GOD IN OUR TIME

*The question of God and the question of myself are identical.*
Rudolf Bultmann

"Any discussion today of the existence of God," the president of the Newman Chaplains Association recently informed an audience, "must begin with man's psychological needs and his quest for happiness." If the reader requests such a criterion (and we shall presume he does) he has good reason to be proud of his demands. For man is endowed with the gifts to know and to love; a mature thinker and a mature lover is one who has synthesized both operations in his life.

The separation of man's knowledge from his loves results in one of two extremes. There is the position often supported (though I think they do the man an injustice) by Pascal's dictum that "the heart has reasons the mind can never know." Such a principle begets a grand subjectivism, with society made up of two and one-half billion persons, each following willy-nilly the movements of his appetite. The other extreme would convince us that there is nothing so satisfying to a man, his family, his community, than the remains in a test tube or the data of an electronic computer or, for some, a perfectly arranged syllogism. The fallacy here is pinpointed by Ignace Lepp, a Christian psychiatrist and former atheist: "The agnostic, even so radical a one as Rostand, dare not promise any happiness as a consequence of scientific knowledge of the universe."[1] While one camp will give us love without knowledge, the other offers knowledge without love. Neither fulfills the demands for happiness raised in every human heart whereby man loves what he knows to be true and knows what he loves.

The quest for God which we embark upon in this paper, then, must avoid the subjectivity and naïvete of those who would say that every heart knows that God exists—while at the same time avoiding the shortsightedness of those who would relegate man's awareness of his Creator to the role of a note card syllogistically classified for the human intellect much as IBM cards are earmarked for the machine. This paper will venture the middle road and present a psychological proof with an ontological foundation. No less a thinker than Plato warns us of the difficulty of such a task.

> How hard, or rather impossible, is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these [regarding spiritual things] in the present life. And yet he would be a poor creature who did not test what is said about them to the uttermost, or who abandoned the task before he had examined them from every side and could do no more.[2]

Fortunately for us, the road we set out on is not an altogether unexplored one; great minds of the past and in our own day have set for themselves similar goals and have marked a safe way. The recently developed psychic sciences provide much information about ourselves which is indispensable in any discussion of man's quest for happiness. We must remember, however, that in themselves psychology and psychiatry have nothing to say about the existence of God. Their domain is man, not God. Therefore, while we shall initiate our inquiry with the anthropological sciences, we shall not stop there but will broaden our vision to include a philosophical and ontological panorama of reality.

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[1] Ignace Lepp, *Atheism in Our Time,* trans. Murchland (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 131.

[2] *Phaedo,* 85.

There will be three stages to our inquiry. The first, an examination of ourselves, our friends and those people mankind commonly esteems, to see in what sense man speaks of goodness and nobility and to discover, if possible, an ontological or basic foundation in reality for the common human pastime which assigns comparatives and superlatives to the objects in the world about us. The second step will seek an explanation for these gradations of good and noble, and the third step will synthesize our findings and arrive at the knowledge of a God related to ourselves, our friends and our society in so far as these realities harbor real good and nobility. Should our investigation be a success we will not be surprised to find ourselves in agreement with Rudolf Bultmann who says, "The question of God and the question of myself are identical."[3]

## HIERARCHY OF GOOD OBJECTS

### *From Personal Experience of Love*

It is an accepted datum of traditional western thought, strongly supported by Freud and modern psychiatry, that a well-balanced, mature man who has ordered his life well and is happy, both knows himself and loves himself. "Know yourself" said Socrates and "Love your neighbor as you love yourself" charged Christ. Love, in a broad sense, is an attraction to what is good. Since of all the goods we encounter the first is ourself and our own person and existence, it is natural and universal, as the philosophers tell us, for everyone to love himself and first of all his own existence.[4]

Although one's awareness of love and of goodness begins with the good in himself, in a healthy individual it by no means stops there.

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[3] Rudolf Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology,* p. 53, in John Macquarrie, *Twentieth Century Religious Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 376.

[4] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate,* q. 21, a. 2.

A psychiatrist commenting on Freud's insight into this phenomenon says that Freud broadened his

> concept of libido to include and feature love itself. He actually put creative love at the center of his system; in the clinical situation he was more than dubious of the possibility of helping a patient who could only love himself.[5]

While expressing his own thought, which strongly resembles Freud's, the author remarks that he is sure

> that the disfunction present in most people with emotional disorders stems from the inability to make satisfying relationships with other people, particularly with those whom they love.[6]

Freud comments:

> The capacity for the radiation of libido towards other persons in object-investment must, of course, be ascribed to all normal people. . . . A human being is therefore on the whole only accessible to influence, even on the intellectual side, in so far as he is capable of investing objects with libido; and we have good cause to recognize, and to fear, in the measure of his narcissism a barrier to his susceptibility to influence.[7]

Why is it that a person loves another? Pascal offers us an insight. "It is natural for the mind to believe, and for the will to love; so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false."[8] The key phrase here is "true objects." Love, in the strict sense, is the will's movement to an object; but what constitutes a "true" object for our love? St. Augustine, in his painful self-analysis, raised this same question.

> What was it that I delighted in, but to love and be beloved? but I kept not the measure of love, of mind to mind, friendship's bright

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[5] Francis Braceland and Michael Stock, *Modern Psychiatry* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 79.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 575f.

[7] Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, trans. Riviere (New York: Permabook, 1957), pp. 453f.

[8] Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, par. 81.

> boundary; but out of the muddy concupiscence of the flesh, and the bubblings of youth, mists fumed up which beclouded and overcast my heart, that I could not discern the clear brightness of love, from the fog of lustfulness.[9]

In other words, says Augustine, one can love many objects. Although one's subjective condition may adversely influence one's judgment of his love-object, yet there remains an objective hierarchy of loveable objects. Some love-objects are good, others are better, and still others are best.

If the true or better and best objects of which Pascal and Augustine both speak are recognized and pursued, happiness, nobility, peace result. Says Augustine, "Our hearts were made for you, O God, and they will not rest until they rest in you." If, however, the lesser objects be pursued—the "muddy concupiscence of the flesh" —then chaos, tragedy, beastliness result. Pascal puts the composite picture succinctly. "There is in man some great source of greatness, and a great source of wretchedness."[10] For our purposes we want to emphasize the words "greatness," "wretchedness" and their implication, namely that there are grades in between of more and less greatness, more and less wretchedness. Because I cannot see as much to love in a burnt steak as in a medium rare one, or in a professor as in a close friend, I know that the object of my love, namely the good, also varies in degree.

### *From Observations of Literature*

Throughout literature we find our conclusion graphically presented. In Dante's *Divine Comedy* the author sees a hierarchy in the perfections which man acquires (or fails to achieve) in this life. Through the love Dante bears Virgil and Beatrice, who possess great good, he is borne upward through the graded plateaus corresponding to the goodness in the souls in heaven to "the Good which is the object of the will is all collected in it; and outside of it, that is defective which is perfect there."[11] This object is the "light intellectual full of love, love of true good full of joy, joy which transcends every sweetness."[12] The point we emphasize in Dante's journey is the hierarchy he encounters at each stage of his journey—a hierarchy corresponding to the gradation of goods in souls.

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[9] St. Augustine, *Confessions.* Bk. III, c. 2.
[10] *Pensées,* par. 430.

Nor is one confined to Christian literature to encounter the reality of goods of varying degrees of goodness. In his *Symposium* Plato instructs his listeners to love beautiful colors, forms and bodies—and to rise from these objects to love the fountain of their good which is the soul with its thought and its spiritual beauty. But such goods are with increase and decrease, beautiful at one time and not at another, beautiful in one respect and repulsive in another, fair to some and foul to others. By means of these partially good objects a person rises to love the

> beauty which does not reside in any other being different from itself, . . . but which exists externally and absolutely, by and in itself, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things.[13]

Let us note especially Plato's insistence on a hierarchy of goods.

### *From Common Experience*

This hierarchy or gradation of goods is verified by our common observation. There is the case of parental love. While all parents love their children, some—as is evident by their actions—truly love their children more than others. That is to say that some parents achieve that good which is a proper love of children to a greater degree of perfection than do other parents. A mature love of parents for their children establishes a relationship which

> permits each one to develop individually. Unless they can see this offspring as something outside themselves, they are going to have

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[11] Dante, *Paradiso*, c. xxxiii.
[12] *Ibid.*, xxx.
[13] Plato, *Symposium*, 211, c.

> a hard time refraining from projecting upon him all sorts of frustrating dreams, anxieties, guilts, and resentments.[14]

Another example of the reality we are attempting to discern is the events in the life and death of our late president, John F. Kennedy. One of his most widely used campaign posters during the 1960 presidential race carried the slogan, "It is a time for greatness." Now we make no judgment here about whether the candidate and future president fitted the criterion his poster boasted of, but we do declare that people—voters in general—understood the concepts referred to and the realities involved. In other words, many people could agree that the 1960's is a time requiring greatness in our national and world leaders and they agreed generally on what the term "greatness" encompasses: a breadth of vision, an acquaintance with the universal and best as opposed to the ephemeral and expedient, a nobility of character impervious to considerations other than the noble and dignified. In using this word "greatness," then, we understand that while no man fits the criterion perfectly, some men (our president, we hope) will share in it to a greater extent than others.

To pursue the subject of this example further, let us recall the dignity and nobility of his stately funeral, attended by the great of the world, accompanied by dirges composed by mankind's most gifted artists, resplendent in the poignancy of a capitol and nation and world bent in grief. From the honor of his funeral one would have to say that this man, at least in so far as he represented a great nation, was indeed a great man. Compare his funeral to Lee Oswald's, for example, attended only by his family, to which his own family minister refused to come, and one would have to say that Kennedy's greatness was of far greater proportions than that of Lee Oswald.

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[14] Braceland and Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

## SOURCE OF GOOD IN OBJECTS

At the outset of the last stage of our inquiry we said that we were to find that the object of man's love—the good—is had differently and in varying degrees from different objects which variously manifest the possession of good. That such is a fact corresponding to a reality in the lives of all of us, we think is now manifest. Its connection to the present phase of our inquiry, namely, "Where does good come from?," is shown in the self-revelation of Ignace Lepp whose conversion from atheism to belief was referred to above.

> I questioned myself about the meaning of this life. It did not seem logical that beings endowed with a capacity for thinking and loving could be thrown into an absurd universe, where there was nothing to think, nothing to love, nothing to hope for. It was with these psychological dispositions that I encountered the Christian message.[15]

In these words Lepp expresses the truism that man has great capacities for desire and recognition of the good. In our previous discussion we established that objects in the world about us—ourselves, our friends, our public figures—possess the good and the noble. Now the question is, Where does the good come from? Does it come from these objects whom we love? Ourselves, for example? That is impossible. We know that although our capacity for good seems infinite, we only *receive* the good, or better yet, a portion of the good. Our own existence, for example, which is a love-object universal to all creatures, was given us. No creature has brought himself into this life. Does the good come ultimately from our friends? No. A friend is like ourself—we know that he too only shares in the good, that although he may be a fountain of good for us, he lacks a plentitude of goodness or he would have no need of a friend. He would be self-sufficient. But if all men receive good, take part or share in it, where is its source?

In all the examples of love-objects we have cited, one characteristic is common. That is that the perfection present in them is good. It is not evil or distorted or maimed, but good. Let us take Plato's example of a handsome body. In its symmetry, in the disposition of its members, its colors and shades, the body is pleasing and beautiful and good. In itself it is good and there is no evil in it. But it is not all the good, for, as Plato said, the soul is more perfect and more deserving of love. The problem which confronts us, then, is this: in itself good has no imperfection, knows no limits; yet in reality—in me and in you and in your loved ones and esteemed ones—the good is limited. In the world about us good is had according to more and less; it can come and go, we must work at preserving it.

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[15] Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

Since good is a perfection which *de facto* exists imperfectly in the things we experience, a sufficient explanation for its real though limited existence must be forthcoming, for we have established that good exists. The only cause commensurate to explaining this phenomenon of imperfect perfection is a Being of a higher order which must possess by his very nature the good which earthly beings receive. For Him, *to be* is to be good. The existence of this Being must be as real as the existence of the beings we love in the world about us.

Our everyday speech presents us with this same principle. If you ask two people to guess your age and one guesses twenty-five and the other twenty-one, when you are really twenty-six, then you might say: "You (meaning the first guesser) are more correct than the other contestant." And if we ask the reason why (as the less correct fellow is sure to do) you will reply: "Because I am really twenty-six." And that settles it. The more and the less correct are spoken of only in relation to *the* correct or the truth. All three—the age twenty-one, age twenty-six, and age twenty-five—express the reality, but age twenty-six expresses the supreme reality from which the others derive their share of correctness and meaningfulness. "More and less are spoken of in regard to different things in so far as they approach to a different degree something which is the maximum."[16]

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[16] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3.

The maximum, however, does not share but has (or better yet *is*) the goodness all to itself. The lesser goods share in this goodness.

### RESULT OF OUR STUDY

What are the consequences of the investigation we have pursued? When we know that man at his best yearns for great good and that such great good does exist in its Source, we can conclude that it is good for man to seek his happiness and fulfillment in such a good. Modern psychiatry agrees with this conclusion. "The satisfaction of spiritual yearning is held to be indispensable for the full unfolding of the individual's potentialities."[17] Modern analysis shows, however, that it is not necessarily in God that man finds such a great good. In great movements or commitments of many sorts man can share in benefits greater than those he can give alone, thus achieving apparent happiness. Frequently the effects of such happiness closely parallel the lives of saints. The zeal and unselfishness, the contentment and conviction which a devoted communist manifests, for example, can move the world. Ignace Lepp has declared: "It is precisely this awareness of living for something very great which makes the conversion of a sincere communist to religious faith almost impossible."[18] In other words, such people do have their god. An analogous phenomenon occurs when two lovers choose to devote themselves to each other. The happiness achieved appears sufficient to satisfy the human heart. These people have found their god in each other.

The point of difference between such gods and the one we have discovered is that their god is not the true God. The god of the communist has no ontological but only a socio-psychological reason for existence. The god of lovers is neither great nor eternal, as is evidenced by the death of one person or the violation of the supreme good of virtue and the laws of faithful love. The God we have arrived at, however, is known to us solely by means of the actually existing realities of good and noble beings, and his existence is as actual and real as these effects, though it surpasses them all. To Blaise Pascal's frequently-quoted remark we would add that "the heart has reasons which the mind on reflection can know,"—and further, "that the mind can discover truths which the heart would do well to pursue."

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[17] Braceland and Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 182. Cf. Lewis Wolberg, *The Technique of Psychotherapy* (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954), pp. 19, 146; Paul Tournier, *The Strong and the Weak* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 55 and *passim*; A. A. Roback, *The Psychology of Character* (Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers, 1952), pp. 553, 74, and *passim*; Alexander Schneiders, *Personality Development and Adjustment in Adolescence* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1960), pp. 154, 88 and *passim*.

[18] Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

What should follow from acquaintance with the God we have discovered in this paper? Cardinal Newman says that it is a mark of those persons

> who have hitherto thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become in point of intellect, different beings from what they were. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object and an awful moral.[19]

Arriving at God by way of our love for self, for friends, for society, no hiatus exists between God's existence and his relationship to us. We have all experienced the want of ourselves, our friends, of the human community for a Supreme Goodness and joy that is unending. "But," one says, "our interest and love for our friends, for the human family, even for ourselves can grow cold." This is precisely the point. Friendship wanes or falls short if one depends solely on his friend or desires his friend to depend on him, for the yearnings of both are greater than the ability of either to fulfill. The reason for this is that we—even the most noble among us—receive only a share. It is in the third person—the Supreme Good—that all friendships are rooted and maintained and nourished. At this stage we defer to John Ruskin: "Really great men have a curious feeling that greatness is not in them, but through them, and they see something divine in every other man and are endlessly, foolishly and incredibly merciful."[20]

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[19] John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 155.

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[20] Quoted in Braceland and Stock, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

STEPHEN SHIMEK, O.P.

# KARL BARTH'S CONCEPT OF SIN

*Whenever and wherever*
*there may be men,*
*sin will never be anything else*
*but unbelief in the Word, the Son.*
Karl Barth

Man cannot reduce sin to irrational anxieties and guilt feelings, to neuroses or psychoses, without depriving himself of great truths and, above all, of a path to eternal life. The understanding of sin contributes greatly to a balanced view of human life. If sin is explained away as a psychological disorder, man's relationship to God is in peril of being disposed of in like manner. God drops out of the picture. But of what value is human existence deprived of a divine goal?

In our affluent society God is often neglected, and the denial of sin plays a dominant role in this neglect. Some think that the full acceptance of sin would warp a personality, making it fear and tremble before the face of God, the Judge. On the contrary, a true sense of sin develops a loving and humble submission to the God one has offended. The liturgy cries, "O happy fault," an enigmatic statement to be understood only in reference to the tremendous event which sin has occasioned—the Incarnation.

Karl Barth, the renowned Protestant theologian of Basle, has been struggling against the secularization of the modern world for half a century. His theology, called the "Theology of the Word," stresses man's relationship to the transcendent God and is Christ-centered in its approach. The revelation of Christ is the turning point of human history, and the subsequent awareness of sin in the believer is a necessary condition for man's return to God. Perhaps Barth may be wrong in some of his positions, but the Christian motivation behind his work is undeniable. Sin cannot be forgotten.

Apart from passing remarks this paper will not attempt a comparison of Barthian thought with Catholic doctrine nor will it undertake a critique of his position. What is aimed at is an objective view of Barth's doctrine on sin with emphasis on the validity of his basic insights. That this limited objective is itself no easy task can be gathered from the complaint of Barth himself. He warns us:

> I do not expect anyone to agree with me—still less that he say nice things about me. But since it now happens that there are those who have so much to say about me, without presumption I might expect that they had first informed themselves about me and therefore had read me, and moreover, had read me calmly and in some measure completely.[1]

To avoid Barth's censure of our evaluations we will rely heavily on those commentators who have fully digested his thought and on the Barthian texts.[2]

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[1] Karl Barth, in the forword to the English edition of Otto Weber's *Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics,* trans. Arthur C. Cochrane (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), p. 8.

[2] Those commentators upon whom we have relied most extensively include: Hans Küng, *Rechtfertigung. Die Lehre Karl Barths und eine Katholische Bessinnung* (Einsiedeln, 1957). Jerome Hamer, O.P., *Karl Barth,* trans. Dominic Maruca, S.J. (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1962). Henri Bouillard, *Karl Barth* (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1957). Sebastian A. Matczak, *Karl Barth on God* (New York: St. Paul Publications, 1962). The work by Dr. Küng is famous not only for its critical appraisal of Barth's stand on justification, but also for its

# KARL BARTH

## BACKGROUND TO UNDERSTANDING KARL BARTH

If one wishes to follow the thought of Karl Barth on sin, it is best to follow the path he himself has laid down and to look at sin through his eyes. While this paper of necessity will not dwell on problems preliminary to the treatment of sin-problems, nevertheless, Barth's presuppositions do have obvious bearing on all that follows.

One such preliminary problem which is too important to ignore, concerns Barth's epistmology. He states, "If I could hear only with my own ears and see only with my own eyes, how could I, in order to understand, go beyond my own intellect and use that of another?"[3] Barth seems to be holding here that no one looks at reality without preconceived forms and categories which color his vision. "Knowledge consists in a sort of modeling of the object so that it enters the *a priori* categories of the knowing subject."[4] These and like opinions are just those which nourish the doubts which men like Hamer and Boulliard voice concerning Hans Küng's reconciliation of Barthian and Catholic teaching.[5]

As for philosophy and the use of reason in theology, Barth insists on the need for a "key" to understand revelation in the Scriptures. But he warns that this need breeds dangers. Philosophy must be subordinated to the Word as an inadequate means and must be recognized as hypothetical. Every form of human thought naturally differs from the true "philosophy" of Scripture. Thus any system may be used in a pragmatic fashion to interpret Scripture according to individual lights. The systems can even be interchanged; no con-

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preface wherein Barth affirms that Küng has interpreted him rightly and that if Küng's statement of the Catholic position is correct, then Barth feels he must agree with it. Küng feels that the difference lies particularly in stress. Barth stresses justification from God's point of view while Trent emphasized justification from man's position. The other commentators listed here do not share Dr. Küng's optimism and take exception to any supposed agreement with Barth on more fundamental grounds concerning the formal meaning of Barth's terms.

[3] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I, 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p. 727.

[4] Hamer, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[5] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. xvii-xxv.

sistency is needed. Barth liberates theology and Scripture from the bonds of philosophy to set them in the higher sphere where they belong.

Barth's understanding of the relation of reason and faith can be seen in his notion of the *analogia fidei* as opposed to the *analogia entis* of Catholic thought. This comparision illustrates the diverse understanding of the same word, *analogia.* Analogy according to Barth is the similarity or partial correspondence of realities designated by the same word. This seems to coincide with the scholastic notion of analogy, but Barth's later explanation shows that the correspondence is only equivocal. An example will bring out the point. One can call God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and by these words denote perfectly the reality of God, inasmuch as God in revelation can "requisition" these human words to express His own thought. God can use these words, however, to express a reality completely different from the reality man expresses by the same words. "All human words are empty shells which God fills with a content that we cannot even guess."[6] The correspondence is partial because it is one-sided; it totally escapes man, so that on God's part there is perfect correspondence, while on man's part there is none.

There is much more to this problem, but the little seen here should indicate the danger of seeing any easy agreement or reconciliation of Barthian thought with Catholic theology. However Barth looks on sin, however he explains it, his explanation will ultimately rest on this epistemological framework. There are other root problems beneath Barth's doctrine of sin—the relation between the natural and the supernatural, the analogical status of created things—but space does not allow even a brief treatment here.

All the preceeding has been rather negative but it has seemed necessary if only in order to follow Barth's path to an understanding of sin. The way will be much clearer in the light of this minimal groundwork. Moreover, at least this much of a more positive character can be said of Barth's fundamental epistemological and theological assumptions.

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 70f.; see Bouillard, *op. cit.*, III, p. 208.

Karl Barth has a valid insight into theology. It is an extension, it seems, of the Catholic notion of this science. To be a theologian in the strict sense one must have the gift of faith. The principles of any science should be firmly grounded in truth, but if a man cannot believe the principles of revelation, how can he proceed to the science of theology? The unbeliever is in a separate realm and the arguments of faith have no meaning for him.[7] Although Barth acknowledges a limited utility for philosophical concepts about God, he relies ultimately on faith—a gift of God, a grace—as the only means of knowing Him. All efforts of the theologian rest on his acceptance of revelation, for revelation is the only bridge over the abyss between God and man. The heart of Barth's thought lies in the Bible—in God's Word to man. Barth does not proceed from man's knowledge as he interprets the Scriptures. He does not try to explain the meaning of the Gospel in the light of his own understanding of human nature; Barth's procedure

> avows itself an exposition of God's disclosure of Himself in Jesus Christ and of all that is implied therein for the understanding of man and his cosmos. Barth, therefore, does not move upwards from man to God, but downwards from God, or rather, Christ, to man, and he erects his theology on the doctrinal foundations of the Word of God, the Trinity and the Incarnation.[8]

This method is employed by the Catholic theologian as well. The object of the theological science is to have a vision of reality which ultimately, insofar as is possible, imitates the Wisdom of God.

### THE REVELATION OF SIN

Barth's method of treating the specific topic under discussion, namely, what is sin?, is entirely consistent with his general approach to theology. He looks at revelation to find sin. Barth treats the Bible as a whole. He passes over the minute historical criticism which has characterized much contemporary exegesis and attempts to see the entire message of God by relating and comparing part with part. The outcome is a focus on the Incarnation and Redemption. Revelation as well as the very being of man take their meaning from the intervention of God in human affairs. The Old Testament looks forward to this intervention in hope, while the New Testament preaches the good news of the event. For Barth, Christology developed through the centuries along with theology until our day when "the man, Christ Jesus, is the key to the understanding of creation, reconciliation and redemption, and of the nature and destiny of man."[9]

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[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 8.

[8] Wilhelm Pauck, in the introduction to Karl Barth's *Christ and Adam* (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 14.

### *Christ, the Forgiver of Sin*

Can we look to Christ, however, for the revelation of sin? Christ was sinless. How can sin be discovered by focusing on him? The answer lies in this: While Christ was never a sinner, he was the pardoner. He reconciled man with God by bringing Life (John 10:10). Only the price of suffering which Christ the pardoner paid reveals the gravity and meaning of sin. There is no sin in an arbitrary ethics, yet the Word of God declares all men to be sinners. Sin is the *raison d'etre* of the Redemption. Regarding the moral systems stemming from Aristotle and Plato, Barth remarks, "Strange as it may seem, that general conception of ethics coincides exactly with the conception of sin."[10] When we consider forgiven sin, however, philosophy cannot help us; only the revelation of Christ can show us forgiven sin.

> It is only of forgiven sin that we know that it is recognized as sin, that it is sin. (And the conception of forgiven sin enters human thought only with Christ.) What we may more or less know apart from forgiveness is perhaps defect, error or vice. But to know sin as sin, as our rebellion against God, as our transgression of His command, we must know its forgiveness.[11]

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[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics,* II, 2 (Edinburg: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p. 518; see also, IV, 1, p. 387.

[11] *Ibid.,* II, 2, p. 768.

Perhaps Barth is too sweeping in reproaching nearly all theologians from the Reformers to modern Protestants and Catholics for trying to understand sin apart from Christ. Yet in his defense it may be noted that the meaning of sin for Barth in this context appears to be very restricted.[12] We must admit that faith in Christ and in his redemptive death is the place where the Christian can truly understand the nature of sin, its gravity and to what depth it affects human existence.

> There it appears in ineluctable fashion that sin is not only a relative imperfection, but a breech, not only a fault or error at the human level, but a separation from God which divides man himself.[13]

It is irrelevant and superfluous to search anywhere else than in Christ for a knowledge of sin or for a norm by which to measure sin. Why? Because Jesus speaks to us about our sins: "Thou are the man!"

> We see him and in this mirror we see ourselves as those who commit sin and are sinners. We are here inescapably accused and irrevocably condemned. . . . We have to acknowledge that we are totally unrighteous. We find our competence to work out the standard by which to measure ourselves denied. We are no longer permitted to parley and come to terms with ourselves about ourselves. We have no room or breath for fine distinctions between evil deed and evil being. . . . There can be no pardon by our own devices, no explanation and interpretation of sin and the man of sin, when we are confronted by Jesus Christ and hear the Word spoken in his existence.[14]

Barth stresses the existential presence of Christ at each moment of human life. The reaction to his presence can only be a personal recognition of the self as sinner. Knowledge of sin in practice consists in the appreciation that "I am this man." The existential presence of Christ reveals man as a sinner not merely because of the contrast between his holiness and our unworthiness but also because Christ became man to represent us and the Father condemned him as our representative as worthy of death on the cross.

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[12] Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 1, pp. 387ff.

[13] Bouillard, *op. cit.*, II, p. 112; see also, Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III, 2, pp. 35ff.

[14] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1, p. 389.

> The God against whom the man of sin contends has judged this man, and therefore myself as this man, in the self-offering and death of Jesus Christ, his own Son, putting him to death, and destroying him.[15]

Jesus Christ died in solidarity with us, taking on himself the punishment of sin due to each and every man and especially, for Barth, that punishment due to "myself." Christian revelation has a personal quality as the here and now contact with the man of sin. Christ's perfect obedience, plus his acknowledgement of man's error and sin on behalf of man, his unquestioning submission to the verdict of the Father—all this shows the truth and validity of God's judgment. It shows that man is the man of sin and no other. Sin is the cause of this drama and the total depth to which Christ went to pardon sin points up the total depth of perversion in human nature which sin effects. It is at the cross of Christ that justified man learns the meaning of human sin.

### *Man, the Sinner*

Not only is sin present in the gospel as an abstract force which killed Christ, but there are also present men of sin. We find religious leaders of Israel in their blind fanaticism, the judge with his unrighteous judgment, Peter and his denial, and especially, Judas in his treachery. These men are representatives of humanity, no worse than anyone else. Evil in the world is apparent; it is the given. One is aware of the universality of human sin simply by observation. Man can achieve satisfaction in acting according to the norms of his society in his day to day existence. But in the gospel man sees himself as Peter, or as Judas, not in an everyday context. Man's evil stands out in the

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

suffering person of the Son of God whom all this evil wounded and does wound. Judas illustrates in the gospel what each man is in reality—

> the being whose heart, whose inmost and most proper nature, is disclosed in his attitude to Jesus Christ, in his encounter with the goodness of God, in the supreme fulfillment of the merciful will of God, in what he thinks and does in this situation.[16]

## WHAT IS SIN?

Before we investigate the nature of sin we must reflect on the dynamic aspect of Barth's theology. Barth's approach to theology is dialectical and has been called "theology on the wing." His thought moves; it does not crystallize. He warns us vehemently against categorizing his thought and saying, "This is it." The Heraclitean quality of Barth's system leaves it open, and this is his wish. Theology is alive, and it must always progress. In detail, therefore, Barth's thought does change. Yet he has been called the most consistent of theologians, and this because he proceeds with a single method and outlook.[17] Note how the master works. Speaking of sin, Barth boldly states, "Sin in its unity and totality is always pride. The sin of man is the pride of man." A little later, however, in the same paragraph he more cautiously protests, "This definition is not exhaustive . . . , but can be supplemented."[18]

### *Unbelief, the Only Sin*

Regardless of the fluid dialectic, it is possible to determine with a certain degree of accuracy what sin is for Barth, for he is consistent in his outlook and method. Man's sin exposes itself in man's relationship or confrontation with Jesus Christ. Christ was sinless and obedient to the will of his Father. He reveals in himself the loving God who wants to reconcile man. In obedience, in imitation of Christ and in faith in Christ there is salvation. In the absence of these things there is sin. Sin is exemplified throughout the Bible as disobedience and unbelief. For Barth Christ is confronting each man in every age, and as a result, each man in every age sins when he does not accept the lesson Christ teaches. The Jewish judges and Judas and Peter are mere figures of how each man responds to Christ. The eternal Son of the eternal God encompasses all limits of time.

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 399.

[17] Hugh Ross Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology—Schleiermacher to Barth* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 264.

[18] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1, p. 413.

> The disobedience and therefore the sin of man was revealed at Golgotha as unbelief in this God—but only revealed, for in fact (in Israel or among the other nations) it was never anything else but unbelief in this God, and whenever and wherever there may be men it will never be anything else but unbelief in the Word, the Son, in whom God made them his and himself theirs, unbelief in Jesus Christ.[19]

The will of God for mankind is illustrated for humanity in Christ who alone among men "did the will of His Father." Within this Christological context sin may be defined as the action of man which does not correspond to the divine action in Jesus Christ but contradicts it. This action finds expression in the mode of unbelief which, according to John, is the sin which deprives man of life.[20]

## *Pride, the Root of Sin*

Man, however, acts for the good, and there is some goal which he seeks in life. For Barth this goal is simply man himself instead of God. In other words, pride is at the basis of disobedience and unbelief. These are different words for the same assertion of self against God. "The pride of man is a concrete form of what a more general definition rightly calls the disobedience of man and Christianity rightly and more precisely calls the unbelief of man."[21] In *pride* man desires to do his own will and determine his own goal. In *disobedience* man ignores and despises the "redemptive significance" of the divine command which he should lay hold of. In *unbelief* man rejects confidence in God and God's right to demand from man a conformity to the plan and destiny which he has from all eternity chosen for him.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 415.

[20] Cf. Jn. 12:48; 3:18; 5:23; 3:36; 16:9; and 1 Jn. 5:10.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

Barth would go along with Luther's statement that "the chief sin of which the Holy Ghost tells us is one of which the whole world is guilty, or he could not convict the world of it. And this sin is not to believe in Jesus Christ."[22] Unbelief is the root sin of which all other offences are manifestations. As we shall see, the consequences of this one sin render a certain meaninglessness to all other sins.

Barth provides four examples wherein we see man opposing the divine order as seen in Christ. These acts of opposition elucidate the nature of sin. The first instance is the fact that God became man. He who has it in his power to perform such an act did so. In the shadow of this act man in his turn wants to become God. This is altogether beyond his power, and any such act contradicts and destroys the very concept of man. Thus it is that God's omnipotent act of humility exposes us as proud men. Secondly, Christ became a servant. In his omnipotence he becomes a subject. He for whom Christ became like a slave is the very opposite, for man is the servant who wants to be Lord. Here again man directly contradicts in his own action the humility of the act of God.

The third example is Our Lord as the true judge, for he is God. "He has accused us by turning and taking to himself the accusation which is laid properly against us." He has pronounced sentence on himself, acknowledging that he—representing man—was in the wrong against God. This shows Christ's humility starkly contrasted to the pride of man. Man has set himself up as judge from the time of Adam to the present. Adam sought to know good and evil by eating of the forbidden fruit. He tried to make himself judge. God alone is the judge, and man destroys himself by his action.

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[22] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1, p. 414.

The fourth example of opposition to the divine order is that Jesus Christ submitted to the depths of humiliation—to death on the cross. "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" (Matt. 27:46.) He surrendered himself to the depths of *helplessness,* "The depth in which he had nothing but nothingness under and behind and beside him, and nothing but God before and above him." But man for whom he did this has from the beginning insisted on helping himself and on laying claim to the help of God. Certainly man can and must help himself in various ways, but when it comes to his status as a being under God—the preservation, governance and salvation of his very soul—man of himself is helpless. His efforts are futile attempts to lift himself by his own bootstraps. Only God has such power over man and any attempted self-help in this area is pride.[23]

As we have seen, the Barthian concept of sin is derived from God's revelation in Jesus Christ. This revelation is certainly compatible with Catholic tradition. Barth's probing provides a valuable reminder for Catholics, who can be mesmerized by the availability of the sacraments which forgive sin into forgetting sin's horror and gravity.

On the other hand, Barth's thought is decidedly not Catholic on the question of man's role in his own salvation. Cannot man judge himself in some way? Cannot he reasonably fashion an ethical code according to his nature which will correspond to the will of God who created this nature? Barth reckons any such attempt as sin.

Again, to what extent is man helpless before God? Does not God respect the free will which he has created? Though every human action is ultimately caused by God, does he not work according to the mode of acting of the creature? Whatever man does to help himself, even in matters which go to the depths of man's being, however defective it may prove to be, it has its origin and being from God and is therefore radically good. Yet it is man's action; and being somewhat good by reason of its divine origin, it is pleasing to God.

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 418-67.

## KARL BARTH

### *The Degree of Man's Sinfulness*

Though Barth starts with revelation to find out the nature of sin, his interpretation of that revelation rests on the traditional Protestant doctrine of total depravity. Barth, however, espouses his own interpretation of this doctrine.

Barth's preoccupation with human depravity is more marked in his earlier works, particularly his commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans. In the *Church Dogmatics*, a later and definitive summary of his thought, the theologian of Basle is more positively concerned with the saving action of God in Christ Jesus. He stresses man's emergence from sin and depravity. Barth's theory, however, is both positive and negative, and the happier dress of recent works does not imply a rejection of his earlier thought.

Depravity for the early Barth is total. Man's wretched condition permeates Barth's considerations, starting with his treatment of creation and running through his epistemology and his thought in the specific areas of sin and justification. Between creature and Creator there is an abyss which cannot be bridged by human efforts, for God is good and man in his very nature is sinful. Personal sin, which is man's attempt to bridge the gulf, only deepens the abyss.

At this point we must register an important reservation. Barth contends that his knowledge of sin stems directly from the light of the Cross. We may wonder if this is the case. Does not Barth rather approach the light of the Cross encumbered by a distorted notion of an impassible gulf between God and man? And is this preconception not acquired previous to and outside of the light of revelation? Certainly he sees the magnitude of sin on Calvary, and this is the only place where one can get an adequate estimate of this evil. Yet Barth uses the portrayal of sin on Calvary to conclude to the ultimate depravity of man—a conclusion not to be found on that holy mount. One gets the impression that Barth goes to revelation to find something and finds it, no matter how meagre the evidence for its discovery.

## CONCLUSION

Though there are grounds for disagreement with Barth, his basic intuition is valid. The present day need for a Christ-centered theology of sin, a need so keenly felt by Barth, cannot be overstated. Sin is a fact. It is impossible to ignore depravity in the world. Without the enlightment of Christian faith, however, the depravity one sees is not fully known for what it is. The full significance of sin, its utter destruction of the good in man, and the ruin it wrecks in the face of God's love for man, cannot be measured fully except by the Cross. Karl Barth is courageous to convict our world of sin. The sense of sin is a major component in man's filial response to a loving God, and if this sense is lacking, society needs to be told. If Barth overemphasizes the destructive results of sin and risks leading man towards a servile fear of God, it is only because he wants so earnestly to bring the modern world back into balance, to subject contemporary society to its Creator in obedience, and to highlight, in a world steeped in sorrow and misery, the redemptive and merciful goodness of Christ.

JOEL RIECK, O.P.

# DE MAGISTRO AND AUGUSTINE'S ILLUMINATION THEORY

*Objects cannot be understood unless they*
*are illumined by something else as by*
*their own sun.*
St. Augustine

The illumination theory of St. Augustine's maturity is an answer to the problem of knowledge. Without a deliberate attempt, however, to relive the experience in which the question took shape, confusion is inevitable. This problematic is drawn most fully in the *De magistro.* A study of the illumination theory in terms of this dialogue should shed welcome light on the most controversial of all Augustine's positions.[1]

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[1] For a history of the modern controversy over the meaning of illumination in Augustine, see C. E. Schuetzinger, *The German Controversy on St. Augustine's Illumination Theory* (New York: Pageant Press, Inc., 1960).

*Joel Rieck, O.P.*

# THE ILLUMINATION THEORY AND DE MAGISTRO

The first lesson to be learned from the *De magistro* is Augustine’s debt to the hellenistic intellectual tradition. St. Augustine begins his dialogue with a question about the purpose of speech. So prosaic a beginning to the difficult question of the nature of knowledge is unexpected, but it betrays Augustine’s allegiance to the mainstream of Greco-Roman speculation. Plato had entered the fray about the nature of knowledge with a similar beginning. His way was to analyze the scientific inquiry which precedes knowledge; the slave boy of the *Meno* and his prompt docility to Socrates the teacher had shown Plato that learning was an internal process of recollection. Aristotle frames his *Posterior Analytics* with the same perspective: a solution to the problem is best achieved through an analysis of knowledge in its genesis, the ‘question.’

St. Augustine is heir to the same bent of mind which shaped the Greek mentality; the nature of a thing is most easily determined by an analysis of the processes that produced it. This methodology traces back to the pre-Socratics and is employed by Aristotle in the first two books of his *Physics*. There it was a question of the constitution of material substance, and the inquiry was begun with an analysis of change; the factors responsible for the possibility of change and process will be those which characterize the nature of material being at its deepest level.

## *The Meaning of Signs*

Thus St. Augustine’s point of departure. Daily experience shows that knowledge is acquired most often through human encounter, and through speaking in particular.[2] In fact, all speech seems to be ordained to teaching; questions are not excluded since they accomplish the task of revealing one’s ignorance.[3] In the second chapter, Augustine observes that all teaching seems to be through speech or signs, and raises the question of where the content or experience signified by signs is located; it is in the mind, he suspects, but proof is needed.[4]

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[2] E. Gilson, *Introduction a l’étude de saint Augustin*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1949), p. 88.

[3] *De mag.* I, 1; PL 32, 1194; CSEL 77, 1, 10.

He searches for this dialectically by asking Adeodatus to explain the meaning of certain words. Immediately difficulties ensue, the chief being that his son is forced to explain words by means of other words, without being able to transmit the object of signification directly. After having established this fact with regard to words or signs, Augustine proceeds to confirm his original statement that all teaching is through signs, by pointing out that even gestures used as a substitute are actually signs.

This is Augustine's first important find: if objections can be made to the ability of signs to communicate truth, teaching itself is discredited as a medium of engendering truth. This is what Augustine proceeds to do. Beneath the notion of signs, there lies a deeper level, that of meaning. Words are the veil of a more abundant reality.

With a touch of humor, Augustine forces Adeodatus to admit that "when signs are heard, the attention is turned towards the things signified and not the signs themselves."[5] When m-a-n is heard, the mind does not think of a noun, but of a rational animal. In a similarly comical vein, Augustine shows his pupil that the teacher does not display the object, but only its sign, when he utters a word; a lion does not emerge from the speaker but only "lion."[6]

### *The Meaning of Knowledge*

Augustine shows that the cognition of things is of more significance than knowledge of their signs.[7] Augustine observes that a deeper reality which is quite independent of the surface phenomena underlies every use of signs. He begins by noting that there are things which can be *learned* without signs and without being *taught*:

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[4] *De Mag.* II, 3; PL 32, 1196; CSEL 77, 7, 6; and *De mag.* III, 6; PL 32, 1198; CSEL 77, 11, 1.

[5] St. Augustine, *Concerning the Teacher and on the Immortality of the Soul*, trans. G. G. Leckie (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938), p. 35. PL 32, 1207; CSEL 77, 35, 3. (Henceforth, this translation will be referred to by 'L.')

[6] *De mag.* VIII, 23; PL 32, 1208; CSEL 77, 33, 2.

[7] *De mag.* IX; PL 32, 1209-12; CSEL 77, 35-39.

> Surely the sun and the light bathing and clothing all things, the moon and the other stars, the lands and the seas, and all things which are generated in them without number, are all exhibited and shown through themselves by *God and nature* to those who perceive them.[8]

The structure of the dialogue at this point in *De magistro* indicates a change in mood, and by removing Adeodatus from the scene, the stage is prepared for a monologue by Augustine. Now that teaching has been discredited as the exclusive source of learning, the dramatic form is adjusted to correspond. No longer are the teacher and pupil on stage, but the human intellect stands alone, staring out at the reality which confronts it without a medium. The last remark of Adeodatus is significant in this regard. "To that I can add that if the learner be very intelligent, he will know what walking is fully when it has been shown by a few steps."[9] The native ability of human intelligence is given free rein, liberated from the tyrrany of human converse.

If the teacher no longer has a monopoly on the source of knowledge, it remains to discredit teaching and signs altogether as possible channels of knowledge. The argument is simple, though embellished with many examples.

> For when a sign is given me, if it finds me not knowing of what thing it is a sign, it can teach me nothing, but if it finds me knowing the thing of which it is the sign, what do I learn from the sign?[10]

In fact,

> it is more correct, as I have said, that we learn the meaning of the word, that is, the signification which is hidden in the sound when the thing itself which it signifies has been cognized, than that we perceive the thing through such signification.[11]

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[8] *De mag.* X, 32; PL 32, 1213; CSEL 77, 43, 8; L 43. (Italics mine.)
[9] *De mag.* X, 32; L 43.
[10] *De mag.* X, 33; L 43.
[11] *De mag.* X, 34; L 45.

Augustine's famous "*sarabellae*"[12] confirm the argument that we do not learn the thing, but only its sign, in the process of education. Words, then, have only an auxiliary use. They serve to call our attention to some object we may not yet know when we are perplexed by a new and unknown sound; or they may conjure up memories of things we are not presently averting to, but which have been known in the past.[13]

As a result, if there had been any doubt previously regarding the superiority of cognition of the thing over knowledge of their words, it is easily dispelled. Since cognition of the thing precedes knowledge of the word's meaning, and since words have a minor role as simple recall devices, there can be no doubt that knowledge of the thing is eminently superior.

Augustine's remarks about the superiority of knowledge to the thing known[14] implies an important principle. Although its ramifications are not fully apparent in this dialogue concerning the objects of sense perception, it will affect much of his later discussion on the nature of sensation. Since the act of cognition elevates the sensible object, there must be a higher reality of some kind attained in cognition which surpasses the sensible manifestation in the *sensibile*. Further, the process of sensation by itself cannot be autonomous since it attains only the sensible object and must be directly proportioned to it. Some other activity of the soul is involved which attains the more perfect analogate and which influences the senses so that they too somehow attain it; this reality is unattainable through human communication since signs are only a vehicle *ab extra*, and no teaching is effected through signs.

At this point, Augustine is ready to bring the force of his whole dialectic to bear on his real intent. Making a distinction between sensibles and intelligibles,[15] Augustine first sums up what he had said

[12] *De mag.* X, 33; PL 32, 1214; CSEL 77, 43, 18.

[13] *De mag.* XI, 36; PL 32, 1215; CSEL 77, 46, 4.

[14] *Supra*, fn. 7.

[15] *De mag.* XII; PL 32, 1216ff; CSEL 77, 47ff.

with regard to learning as it had application to things perceived by the senses. Such objects are not learned through words but only through sensory experience. When things previously experienced through the senses and stored in the memory are called up by words, it is still the sensory cognition which is primarily responsible for their presence. The only learning possible with speech is the meaning of the word—provided the object is previously experienced.

With regard to those things grasped by the understanding, the analogy from sensory cognition is valuable. Just as "we consult light concerning color and other things which we sense through the body,"[16] so too, "the intelligibles are said to be things which we see immediately in that interior light of truth by virtue of which he himself who is called the interior man is illumined. . . ."[17] Accordingly,

> even though I speak about true things I still do not teach him who beholds the true things, for he is taught not through my words but by means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul.[18]

### *Summary of De Magistro*

The point of Augustine's laborious analysis of the relation between words and the sensibles they purportedly communicate is now obvious. The argument can be summed up briefly. Signs are the only media by which one may learn from another the structure of intelligible reality. But signs lack the ability to communicate man's sensory cognition. Even on the level of the senses, there is no teaching in the usual sense of that term. With greater cause, then, one must conclude that there is no communication in this fashion between men in the realm of the intelligibles. It goes without saying—Augustine presumes—that man does not produce such knowledge by his own powers; God is the only, and necessary, teacher of all things grasped by the mind.

This argument is strengthened by a more direct consideration.

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[16] *De mag.* XII, 39; PL 32, 1216; CSEL 77, 47, 19; L 48.
[17] *De mag.* XII, 40; PL 32, 1217; CSEL 77, 47, 23; L 49.
[18] *Ibid.*

It is commonly known that there are two methods of teaching for any subject matter: the discourse and the Socratic or questioning method. Both can be used for any given issue. Now, to claim that there is genuine transmission of knowledge in a lecture would imply that the pupil did not know the material beforehand. Hence, even in the Socratic method, there must be real transmission of knowledge. But what is more absurd than to say that the pupil is ignorant of the conclusion desired when he gives the correct answers to the questions posed by his teacher? The teacher feigns ignorance with a question and asks to be instructed regarding some particular aspect of the topic under consideration. Obviously the pupil is not ignorant if he can communicate the answer to the teacher's question.

> What could be more absurd than to think that he is taught by means of my speaking, when even before I speak he can express those very things if questioned?[19]

This is the argument used by Socrates in the *Meno*, and it retains its same compelling force when reapplied by the Christian master. This analogy with the *Meno*, however, can be taken only so far, for Plato's solution to the learning evinced by the slave is anamnesis.[20]

In the dialogue, Augustine had first raised the problem of memory. Augustine did not emphasize the previous event of sensation when he analyzed memory, but the fact of present vision. The memories are "*documents* of things sensed before."[21] It is their present status that interests Augustine; they are viewed in the present, though not, it is true, as the result of present sensory experience. Consequently, when discussing intelligibles and their analogous memories, his statement that "the speaker has reminded them"[22] must be viewed in this light. The analogy does not force our attention to a previous act of the mind in an experience pre-existent to union with the body; rather it merely points to the presence of knowledge that cannot be explained by the present, immediate bodily experience of listening to a teacher.

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[19] *De mag.* XII, 40; PL 32, 1217; CSEL 77, 49, 5; L 50.

[20] Gilson has shown how anamnesis is not adopted by the mature Augustine. It is interesting to note, moreover, that even at the early period of the *De Magistro's* authorship, Augustine appears to have more reservations about this solution than even Gilson suspects. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 94, 389.)

[21] *De mag.* XII, 39; L 49.

[22] *Ibid.*

There is a striking resemblance between Augustine's arguments and Socrates' which forces the reader to reconsider any literal acceptance of memory from the past. After observing that teaching in no way imparts ideas, Augustine immediately concludes "God reveals [this experience] within the soul."[23] Plato himself, after a rigorous investigation of the learning problem, blindly jumped to the divine—but on the level of myth. He takes his 'solution' from certain "priests and priestesses"[24] who had the answer from inspiration and not from reason. One suspects that both "memory" and "Christus magister" serve the same mythical purposes for Augustine as does Plato's anamesis from a previous existence: it was a 'likely story.'

One last point deserves notice at this level of the argument. While Augustine is showing with the aid of the Socratic method that there is no teaching of intelligibles, he makes the interesting comment:

> Now, if it often happens that he who is questioned denies something, and is driven by other questions to affirm that which he denied, this happens because of a defect in his discrimination insofar as he cannot consult that light about the whole matter. He is advised to do it part by part when he is questioned by one step after another about those very parts of which the whole consists, which he is unable to grasp in its entirety.[25]

Teaching, if it can be used as an expression, is merely a process to be described by the scholastics later as the *via resolutiva*. Since man knows a matter well not when he sees its parts, but when he sees their interrelation clearly, teaching can serve an auxiliary role, helping a pupil to avert to the analysis which he already possesses and to perform the subsequent synthesis without mistake.

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[23] *De mag.* XII, 40; L 50. See fn. 18.
[24] *Meno,* 81a.
[25] *De mag.* XII, 40; PL 32, 1217; CSEL 77, 49, 7; L 50.

The two final chapters of *De magistro* reveal no new principles of Augustine's thought, but serve to impress more deeply the total effect Augustine has been striving for. The experience of knowledge is individual and incommunicable; failure is often had when one person attempts to open his mind to another.[26] No longer is there an attempt to convey truth but merely to convey the fact that one possesses a truth or an opinion. Even this is often futile. Conversely there are sophists without number who convince naïve pupils of great truths by the clarity of their delivery, without any assent on the teacher's part.[27] Truth in the ultimate analysis allows of no mediator; there is no intersubjective contact, only that of subject and object. For Augustine, then, cognition is both a majestic and lonely experience. Though it intimately binds man to the world bathed in the light of God, it vigorously refuses communion with other souls.

May we not detect a trace of personal emotion in this position? Has not Augustine's great quest for wisdom, which made of his early life a literal dialectic in truth—from one sect to another—left its permanent mark on his philosophy? Man the knower falls victim to an unbridgeable dichotomy; he may eventually gain the universe and God, but he loses mankind. There is grandeur and pathos here. When Augustine sets out to write his life history, it is not a detached recounting of his experiences with man and society, but an intimate conversation with the divine Master.

What Augustine has insisted on, then, with irresistible logic is the immanence and incommunicability of the cognitive act, which operates on a level that far exceeds any of its expressions in language.[28] Unlike modern theories of cognition, Augustine's concern is not with the source of ideas and knowledge, but with their subject of inherence and the subject's elevation beyond all human contact. Human converse itself is a function of knowledge on both sides of the exchange.

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[26] *De mag.* XIII, 41ff; PL 32, 1218ff; CSEL 77, 50ff.

[27] *De mag.* XIV, 45; PL 32, 1219; CSEL 77, 53, 16.

[28] As Gilson puts it, "the radical interiority of cognition" (*op. cit.*, p. 102).

Speech is a relative thing, merely the token which signifies knowledge pre-existent in the minds of the speakers. It is absurd then to look for the genesis of knowledge in anything other than the immanent process of lonely research. *A fortiori,* knowledge itself lies far beyond language and sign.

The source of knowledge is beyond Augustine's concern; true, it has its roots in sensory experience, but Augustine is interested in its truth—to use Randall's phrase[29]—or its certitude—to use Thomas' expression. This is derived not from direct contact with experience but from the first principles which are already determining the mind and which are synthesized to produce science. Using Randall's description again, Augustine is developing a theory of 'logic'[30] which provides the standard of judgment and certitude, not a science of psychology that will account for the source of information.

The *De magistro* is a work whose significance cannot be underrated for a student of St. Augustine. It is vivid proof of the depth of Augustine's committment to the illumination theory. The very fact that the proposal of divine illumination never ventures, in the *De magistro,* far beyond the 'mythical' or 'ideological' shows how theocentric Augustine's thought is. No theoretical analysis of the cognition process has forced Augustine to invoke Christ the teacher as the illuminator. As a result of his dialectic, Augustine must search for some source external to one's ordinary experience, even if he adopts a theory of anamnesis. His choice of Christ the teacher, however, is somewhat arbitrary.

On the other hand, Augustine's choice is not wholly gratuitous. One piece of evidence for a principle of knowledge which is in some sense internal is the fact that formal education can at best merely impart to the student what is in the teacher's mind. Didactic can never convey that truth of the matter, which *should* be in the teacher's mind.

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[29] J. H. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 28.

[30] *Ibid.*

This argument will recure later as one of the key steps in establishing the illumination theory on a firm philosophical basis.[31]

What this means is that even in the *De magistro* there was a definite if unclear notion in Augustine's mind of where his later investigations would take him. He dimly saw that aspect of the problem of cognition that would force him to adopt divine illumination. In any event, the *De magistro* is clear proof that "the idea of God is the fundament for the cosmic outlook" of Augustine.[32] So convinced is he of the centrality of God to all philosophical statement that he is ready to propose Christ the teacher without any formal analysis.

### THE ILLUMINATION THEORY OUTSIDE OF DE MAGISTRO

There are intimations of the illumination theory even before the *De magistro* (389). In the *Contra Academicos,* his very first work as a catechumen (386), Augustine credits a higher being with the distribution of true knowledge. "You remarked that only some divinity could reveal truth to man."[33] But the first real indication of illumination as an activity of *God* is found in his *Soliloquies* (387).

> So, likewise, for those things which are taught in the sciences and which everyone understands and acknowledges, without any cavil, to be most true—one must believe that they cannot be understood unless they are illumined by something else as by their own sun.[34]

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[31] *Infra,* p. 111. This same contact is also observed in a celebrated passage from the *Retractationes*: "credibilius est enim propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis, etiam imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis aeternae, ubi haec immutabilia vera conspiciunt; non quia ea noverant aliquando, et obliti sunt, quod Platoni, vel talibus visum est." (I, 4, 4; PL 32, 590.)

[32] J. Heesen, *Die Begrundung der Erkenntnis nach dem heil. Augustinus* (Munster i. W.: Aschendorffschen, 1916), p. 62. See also H. Weinand, "Die Gottesidee der Grundzug der Weltanschauung des hl. Augustinus," *Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte,* X, fasc. 2.

[33] III, 6, 13. *Against the Academics,* trans. J. J. O'Meara (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950), p. 111. "Etenim numen *aliquod* aisti solum posse ostendere quid sit verum." (PL 32, 940.)

[34] I, 8, 15. *Writings of St. Augustine,* I (New York: CIMA Publishing Co., 1948), p. 362.

God, then, is compared to the sun in the sensible order. But only the intelligible world, according to this passage, is illuminated; Augustine does not yet mention a direct illumination of the mind itself.

An extremely important reference is made to the theory of knowledge in the *De immortalitate animae* (387). The soul, Augustine thinks, is not capable of seeing the intelligibles in themselves "except through some kind of connection (*coniunctione*) with them."[35] When the soul does see the intelligibles, it furnishes proof that it is bound with them "in a marvelous, though not corporeal, way, i.e., not in space."[36] The significance of these remarks lies in the fact that later in his development Augustine will insist that the world of the intelligibles is the divine intellect precisely as it is the deposit of ideas and types. Then, since knowledge is union, and the thing known is God, there is *some* kind of direct knowledge of God.

In the *De magistro* (389), the language used by Augustine is pregnant with words that will be exploited later.

> I am taught not by my words but by the things themselves which are made manifest by God who presents the objects within me. . . . We speak about things which we know by the presence of that interior light of truth which illumines and causes enjoyment for what is called the interior man.[37]

Finally, "men gaze upon that . . . interior truth."[38]
Augustine employs the expressions *docere, pandere, illustrare,* and *intueri* (as the correlate of *illustrare*) with a crescendo of meaning.

Augustine presents the most forceful statement thus far of his position on illumination in his *De libero arbitrio* (388-395).

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[35] VI, 10. *Writings of St. Augustine,* II (New York: CIMA Publishing Co., 1947), p. 27.

[36] X, 17, *ibid.*, p. 36.

[37] "Docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, deo intus pandente, manifestis. . . . ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur." (*Supra,* fn. 17, 18.)

[38] "Interiorem . . . illam veritatem pro viribus intuentes." (XIII, 45; PL 32, 1220; CSEL 77, 53, 21.)

> The human soul is by nature in contact with the divine types (*rationibus*) on which it depends. When it says, this would be better than that, it sees this in the type with which it is in contact, provided it tells the truth and sees what it says it sees. . . . He would not see in his thoughts that it ought to have been done, unless he saw it in those types through which all is accomplished.[39]

Although in the passage quoted illumination is not mentioned, it is demanded by the context—knowledge is compared to seeing. In his forty-sixth *quaestio* (389-396), Augustine expressly blends the notions of illumination and knowledge in the *rationes.*

> Insofar as the mind clings to God with clarity, to that degree does it discern through its understanding those divine types (*rationes*); the mind is flooded, and shines in this intelligible light.[40]

It is to be remembered, of course, that the *rationes* (or *species* or *ideae*) are the intelligible exemplars of things and are identical with God in as much as they are the divine ideas.

> Original ideas are the stable and unchangeable forms or *rationes* of things. Not having been manufactured, they are eternal and have always existed in the same way. Moreover, they are contained in the divine mind.[41]

The most graphic use of the light analogy is found in Augustine's later works. For example, in Book XV of the *De Trinitate* (c. 416):

> But we ought rather to believe that the nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which, according to the disposition of the Creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal light, of which light it is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted.[42]

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[39] XII, 5, 13. *The Problem of Free Choice,* trans. M. Pontifex (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955), p. 153.

[40] *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII; PL 40, 31.

[41] *Ibid.,* PL 40, 30.

[42] XII, 15, 24. *The Trinity,* trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), p. 366.

If the objects seen are the *rationes* in God, so too, the light itself is God.

> In the category of intellectual objects there are varied objects which appear in the soul, such as virtues and their contraries, vices. . . . The light which illumines the soul differs correspondingly so that we perceive all things with intellectual veracity whether by the soul's power alone or by the assistance of the light. The light is God himself. The creature, even though he is rational and intellectual and made in God's image, squints at the opaqueness of the object and sees very little when it tries to intuit that light.[43]

This remark of Augustine also demonstrates that while man sees the Truth, the *rationes,* of God *in* the Light, he does not see God the Light Himself. Just as with corporal vision man does not see the light but rather the object which it manifests, so too God *as light* is not seen directly. This passage is important since it exonerates Augustine of any heterodox ontologism.[44]

Although the intelligibles are seen and are identified with God in the Word, God is not seen as He exists in Himself, in the totality of His being. He is seen only insofar as He is the ground of intelligible truth. In this same context, the celebrated passage from the *De Trinitate* must also be quoted.

> With the eye of the mind, therefore, we perceive in that eternal truth, from which all temporal things have been made the form according to which we are, and by which we effect something either in ourselves or in bodies with a true and right reason.[45]

It is well also to note that Augustine never speaks of seeing the intelligibles in *God* but at most only in the *truth.* In fact, Augustine expressly denies a vision of God to the upright Moses as being impossible to man.[46] What seems likely, then, is that Augustine distinguishes between God in Himself, on the one hand, and His role as Truth or the ground of intelligibility, on the other. Materially the same, they are formally different. It is the latter which is seen.[47]

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[43] Sic etiam in illo genere intellectualium visorum alia sunt, quae in ipsa anima videntur, velut virtutes quibus vitia sunt contraria. . . . Aliud autem est ipsum lumen quo illustratur anima ut omnia vel in se vel in illo veraciter intellecta conspiciat: nam illud iam ipse Deus est, haec autem creatura, quamvis rationalis et intellectualis ad eius imaginem facta, quae cum conatur lumen illud intueri palpitat informitate, et minus valet. (*De Genesi ad litteram* L. XII, XII, 31, 59; PL 34, 479.)

[44] For this whole problem, see Hessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 82ff.

[45] *Op. cit.*, IX, 7, 12, p. 281.

The image of light which lies at the heart of the illumination theory seems deliberately chosen to separate God from man. Augustine is well aware that knowledge is a kind of union, as was seen. This fact could lead to extreme conclusions. The image of light is used to put the necessary qualifications upon the harsh ontologism that could be drawn from the fact that what is known, the *rationes*, are materially the same as God.

> But we so contemplated it (that most excellent and unchangeable nature which our mind is not) that it was not far from us, and at the same time was above us, not in place, but by its own venerable and marvellous excellence, in such a way that its own light seemed to be present about us.[48]

The first book of the *Retractiones* can also be cited in evidence for this.[49]

### EXPLANATION OF THE ILLUMINATION THEORY

One is tempted to conclude, then, that God is present to man's mind not objectively but effectively. It is not his substance, but the operation of self-revelation which appears to the human spirit and is described with the images of light and illumination.[50]

This explanation is confirmed by the striking image used by the mature Augustine to explain how the corrupt man has genuine knowledge of ethical norms. Such perception does not spring from an analysis of his own nature; that is contingent and mutable, while the norms are not. Nor is the man's upright character, his *habitus,* capable of furnishing this knowledge, since he is by hypothesis corrupt. Augustine resorts to the image of a monogram ring and a piece of wax.

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[46] *Ibid.*, II, 16, 27; PL 42, 863.

[47] "denn Gott als Wahrheit ist Idealitat, die Fulle der intelligiblen Dinge. Augustin will demnach sagen, dass die Totalitat des Intelligiblen vor unserm geistisen Auge steht, und wir so aus ihr die Typen der Dinge schopfen." (J. Hessen, *op. cit.*, p. 83.)

[48] *The Trinity*, 6. *ed. cit.*, XV, 6, 10; p. 462.

[49] Note that it is the *lumen rationis aeternae*, and not the *ratio aeterna* which is described as being present to the mind.

[50] J. Hessen, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

> Where are these rules written in which even the unjust man recognizes what is just, and in which he perceives that he ought to have what he does not have? Where then, are they written except in the book of that light which is called Truth? From thence every just law is transcribed and transferred to the heart of the man who works justice, not by wandering to it, but being as it were impressed upon it, just as the image from the ring passes over into the wax, and yet does not leave the ring. But he who does not work justice, and yet sees what is to be worked, he it is who is turned away from this light but is still touched by it.[51]

The key feature of this image is not the concept of illumination. It is possible that Augustine has momentarily departed from it to make a special point. The figures employed emphasize that God is not immediately present to the soul, but available to it only in virtue of his effects. The cognition elicited is not the result of *direct* union with God, although for the sake of the metaphor there is an initial contact between the ring and the wax. Knowledge is a knowledge of God's ideas but only insofar as these ideas have in some fashion been transferred to the soul.[52]

Much can still be said regarding the process of illumination. In the first place, it is a strictly natural phenomenon, entirely distinct from the illumination proper to the mystical life.

> But we ought rather to believe that the *nature* of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which . . . are subjoined to intelligible things in the *natural* order.[53]

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[51] *The Trinity, ed. cit.,* XIV, 15, 21; p. 440.

[52] The metaphor, of course, ultimately traces back to Aristotle. Cf. O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus,* 2nd ed., III (Braunschweig: Vie, 1907), 1031.

[53] *Supra,* fn. 42.

Secondly, Augustine's tantalizing image of the ring and wax forces the student to ask exactly how the mind is subject to the divine ideas.[54] To resolve this question, Augustine's motives for adopting the illumination theory must be closely scrutinized.

The basic argument for the illumination theory can be simply presented. The first approach is based on the necessity characteristic of the concepts of the mind.

> When anyone speaks to me about his own mind, as to whether he understands or does not understand this or that, and whether he wishes or does not wish this or that, I believe what he says; but when he speaks the truth about the human mind, either specially or generally, I recognize it and approve.
>
> It is, therefore, obvious that what a person sees in himself is one thing, for another does not see this but believes what the speaker tells him; but what he sees in the truth itself is another thing, for another can also behold the same thing; the former is changeable in time, while the latter remains steadfast in its unchangeable eternity. For it is not by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes that we gather, by way of analogy, a general or special knowledge of the human mind; but we contemplate the inviolable truth, whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind *is*, but what it *ought to be* in the light of the eternal types.[55]

The second approach is quite similar.

> Something similar takes place when I recall a beautifully and symmetrically intorted arch which I have seen, for example, in Carthage. In this case a certain reality, which was made known to my mind through my eyes and transferred to my memory, produces an imaginary view. But in my mind I behold something else, according to which that work pleases me; whence also, I should correct it if it displeased me. Therefore, we pass judgment upon these particular things according to that form of the eternal truth, and we perceive that form through the eye of the rational mind.[56]

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[54] For an illuminating study of this problem, see Gilson, *Introduction*, pp. 105ff.

[55] *The Trinity, ed. cit.*, IX, 6, 9; p. 278.

[56] *Ibid.*, IX, 6, 11; p. 281; PL 42, 967.

Augustine, then, is not interested in the general or universal nature of the mind's concepts. It is the note of immutability and necessity which enables man's concepts to serve as norms for his judgments about individual objects. Obviously this necessity cannot spring from the mutable objects themselves, even if some kind of induction or abstraction were possible in variables. The law or necessary type of the object cannot be derived from the object since it is mutable and usually represents the type only imperfectly; the *rationes* in the mind of God must be invoked.[57]

Gilson argued from these passages that Augustine looked to the divine ideas only for the normative and necessary character of his knowledge and not its actual content.[58] Consequently, it was only the *judgment*—whether an object adequately corresponds to its archetype—that depended upon illumination and not the *concept* itself. This view seems untenable for two reasons. Augustine constantly refers to knowledge in the ideas without restricting knowledge to judgment. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the normative character of these events could be found in the ideas without the content of the concept itself.

The third observation to be made is that divine illumination does not dispense with sensory perception, at least with regard to knowledge that has some sensible referent, for example, the notion of man.

> Nor is our mind capable by itself of seeing them (creatures) in God, in the ideas by which they were made, so as to know by this vision their number, magnitude and qualities, even though we do not see them through the senses of the body.[59]

On the other hand, there is no evidence of an abstractive process lying below this cognition.[60] One might be tempted to search for some intimation that Augustine had a notion of abstraction. After all, his early doctrine of anamnesis was borrowed from Plato, and this in turn was replaced by the illumination theory borrowed from Plotinus.[61] Might he not have had some affiliation with Aristotle also?

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[57] See Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 123ff.

[59] *De Gen. ad Litt.* L. XII, V, 16, 34; in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 82; PL 34, 333.

[60] On this whole question, see Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-19.

> In reality there is no problem for Augustine about the conversion (*Umsetzung*) of the sensible to the intelligible; if he did not resolve it, it is because he did not pose it.[62]

Augustine sees the universe as matter in which the divine ideas have implanted the intelligible. Everything in it is order, measure, and number.[63] For Augustine, however, matter cannot act on the spiritual soul. He has of course no concept of an agent intellect which, for scholastics, elevates the sensible to a level of operation where it encounters the immaterial. More basically, Augustine lacks a clear notion of man as a substantial unity.[64] The soul, however, can 'act' on the body. The Augustinian soul directly deciphers changes undergone by its body, and numbers the exterior bodies which produce these changes. Thus the mind can read the intelligible directly in the image.

This position is no nearer Malebranche's ontologism than it is Aristotelian-Thomistic abstraction. True, the human mind has knowledge in the divine ideas, insofar as it is led to the *exemplars* of created things. But the mind does not know *things* themselves directly in those ideas—this would be ontologism, and would render sensory perception superfluous. As has been seen, the latter result is impossible.

For Augustine, the world is transparent; God's light radiating intelligible content shines through it, producing knowledge in man. In an abstraction theory, however, it is the object in the form of a phantasm which is illuminated by the mind; in virtue of this premotion the object becomes a genuine agent towards which the mind is passive. Thus, for a moderate realist, the intellect (agent) is empowered by God as a secondary cause, which in turn empowers the object known to produce truth. In Augustine's theocentric world, however, only God is Truth; created 'truth' is merely the creature's perception of the uncreated through the window of the created.

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[61] B. Kalin, *Die Erkenntuislehre des hl. Augustinus* (Sarnen: Ehrli, 1921), pp. 58-61.

[62] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[64] See Kalin, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

The importance of the *De magistro* to an understanding of Augustine's later work on illumination now becomes apparent. In the *De magistro,* Augustine had shown that there could be no medium to knowledge of the intelligible. Such a medium would have to be a sign that would point towards the truth. But Augustine argues quite correctly that the truth itself must be known in order that one might see the sign's orientation towards it. In the *De magistro* Augustine restricted his analysis to language and human conversation, and pronounced negatively upon its contribution to knowledge.

In his later works he generalizes these results. The same negative judgment is pronounced upon sensory cognition. It cannot serve as the instrument which leads to intelligible knowledge; at best it is transparent to intelligible content. Knowledge of the way a man *is* serves as the occasion for the knowledge of the way a man *ought* to be—that is, man's existence in the divine archetype. The individual can no more lead directly to its *ratio* or archetype than can a sign lead to its referent without some pre-knowledge of the referent.

In both cases, a relation is engendered; to see the relation both terms must be pre-known. In the case of signification, knowledge of both the object signified and the object which serves as the sign must precede knowledge of the sign-object *as* a sign. In the case of intelligible truth, both knowledge of the *ratio* and knowledge of the particular must precede awareness of how the particular ought to conform to its pattern.

The same thing can be expressed from a different point of view. In the *De magistro* Augustine focuses his attention on the relationship between subject and object of cognition. It is a 'logical' question, in the meaning of that term used by Randall. Augustine does not consider the process by which words engender knowledge, though there is some foreshadowing of an analysis in terms of the *via resolutiva*.

In his later work, Augustine again focuses his attention on the subject-object relationship in cognition. But this time he drives the object back to its ultimate ground in divine truth. Instead of mere *abstraction* from the role of words or, in this case, the singular thing which is involved, he ignores it to the point of total *exclusion*. The singular is, in fact, totally irrelevant; knowledge for Augustine is not an encounter between the mind and the existential singular. It is entry into the world of the divine intelligibles.

What is illumination then? What does the image mean in its most fundamental sense? Hessen seems to have captured the spirit of St. Augustine and the rhythm of his imagery with his brief summary.[65] On God's part, it is a self-revelation (*Sichoffenbaren*), a self-proclamation (*Sichkundtun*). To the creature, it is a self-baring (*Sichöffnen*). God manifests himself to his creature, while he retains a detachment that is connoted by the metaphor of light.

Illumination is knowledge of God—insofar as he is the ground of intelligibility for the world; God is light itself. Illumination is also knowledge of creatures, but their intelligibility is rooted in their divine exemplars and, unlike God's, is only derived. To be made knowable they must be illuminated by, must be made transparent to, the light of their Creator.

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[65] Hessen, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

TIMOTHY McCARTHY, O.P.

# TWO LIGHTS IN THE DARKNESS

*Our mind is never satisfied*
*unless the truth that includes all*
*illumines it.*
Dante

In a letter to Can Grande della Scala, Dante explained the nature of his latest poem, the poem that is known to us as the *Divine Comedy.*

> From one point of view, the subject of this work is simply the state of the soul after death. For it is this that the whole poem, from start to finish, considers. But from another point of view, the entire work is an allegory—an allegory regarding man's use of his free will: how he is punished for using it poorly, and how he is rewarded for using it well.[1]

In earlier letters Dante said that he was writing this work "for the good of a world that is living badly," and "to lead men living in the world from misery to happiness."[2]

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[1] Cited by Etienne Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949), p. 278, footnote.

[2] Edmund Gardner "Dante," *Encyclopedia Brittanica* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica Inc., 1947), VII, 39.

It is evident, therefore, that Dante did not compose the *Divine Comedy* simply to delight or amuse his readers, but to instruct and enlighten them as well. "His purpose," as Edmund Gardner says, "was to form men's characters by teaching them what courses of life will meet with reward, and what with punishment."[3]

Among the many truths which Dante wove into this poem, few were more carefully enunciated than that regarding the relationship between reason and revelation. Conscious that his age was greatly given to speculative thought, he was anxious that men should claim neither too much nor too little for the powers of reason. For while Dante never hesitated to applaud the conquests of the human mind, he also never ceased to extol, as Benedict XV pointed out, "the reverence and perfect docility with which men ought to receive the Holy Scriptures."[4] This paper considers Dante's insights into the relationship between reason and revelation. It first considers these insights as they appear in the gradual unfolding of the poem. Then it attempts to summarize and comment upon them.

## PLOTTING THE JOURNEY

In the middle of the journey of our life
  I came to my senses in a dark forest,
  for I had lost the straight path.[5]

The story begins Thursday night, April 7, 1300. Dante, age thirty-five, has strayed into a "wild, rough, and stubborn wood," the forest of spiritual blindness. How he arrived there, he does not know. Like others before and since, spiritual indifference had come upon him gradually, imperceptibly.

During that night a sense of his spiritual indigence strikes him with terrible force. As the sun begins to rise, its rays striking the summit of the mount of righteousness, Dante summons his strength and determines to ascend.

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[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Benedict XV, *In Praeclara Summorum, Catholic Mind,* 19 (1921), 243.

[5] Dante Alighieri, *The Inferno,* I, 1-3, H. R. Huse, trans. (New York: Rinehart, 1954). All references to *The Divine Comedy* are taken from this translation.

But no sooner does he begin his climb when three beasts bar his path. A leopard (lust), a lion (pride), and a shewolf (avarice) paw the earth and ready themselves to attack. Dante cowers, turns, and descends again to the wood. Now, as despair begins to cloud the hopes of early morning, he sees in the distance a majestic figure advancing toward him. Virgil, the poet who sang the song of Aeneas, hails Dante and explains his mission. A Gentle Lady in heaven (Mary), he says, has asked Lucia (Light) to rescue him from that river (evil) "no less terrible than the sea." Lucia, in turn, asked Beatrice (the light of Revelation) if she would usher Dante beneath the mantle of Divine Mercy. Beatrice then called upon Virgil (the light of Reason) to prepare Dante for his encounter with the supernatural. Virgil, having disclosed all this to Dante, concludes:

> So what is it? Why, why do you hold back?
>     Why keep such cowardice in your heart?
>     Why are you not bold and free
> Since three such holy ladies
>     care for you in the court of heaven?[6]

Dante answers:

> You have disposed my heart with such desire
>     that one wish is in us both.
> Lead on, my guide, my lord, my master.[7]

### THE INFERNO

> Through here you go to the City of Grief.
>     Through here you go to eternal pain.
>     Through here you go among the lost people.
> Abandon every hope, you who enter here.[8]

Before Dante will once more walk the streets of Florence, he will descend to "where the emperor of the dolorous realm half protrudes from ice," climb to the earthly paradise atop the mount of purgatory, and finally, soar to that "threefold Light which in a single star looks down upon our storms." Each of these journeys has its purpose. In hell, Dante will receive sufficient light to turn his back on sin. In purgatory, this purification will continue, restoring his powers to their pristine rectitude. Paradise will so bathe him in God's light and love as to draw him irresistably to the Good.

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[6] *Ibid.*, II, 121-6.
[7] *Ibid.*, II, 136f.
[8] *Ibid.*, III, 1-3, 9.

The doctrinal content of the *Inferno*, compared with that of the *Purgatorio* and the *Paradiso*, is less in evidence. Too much of the world still dwells in Dante's heart for him to profit from the sublime discourses of later cantos. Master pedagogue that he is, Virgil advances his student gradually, allowing the scenes of hell to speak for themselves, pausing only to direct Dante's attention to this or that peculiar feature of Satan's empire.

Nevertheless, from the beginning one significant fact asserts itself—Dante's total dependence upon his guide. Deprived of Virgil, Dante is without eyes, without spirit, without strength, and the best that can be said for him is that no one realizes this more surely than he.

As Dante passes through hell's antechamber, and descends beyond the higher regions of upper hell, the broad outline of the relationship between Dante and Virgil begins to focus. On Dante's side, there is reverence. "O Master," he calls him. "O you who honor every art and science."[9] "O Good Guide."[10] "O Supreme Genius."[11] Virgil adopts a paternal concern toward his charge. "My son," he calls him, and "my child."[12] Virgil accepts his fatherly responsibilities. When Dante's mind wanders or when he delays over some precipice, he corrects him. "O Foolish Creature! How deep is the error that blinds you!"[13] Later, caustically: "He listens well, who notes what he is told."[14]

This relationship of father and son prevails throughout the *Comedy*. Yet, scarcely has the journey begun when it becomes apparent that Virgil is indeed a unique father, and Dante, a most remarkable son.

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[9] *Ibid.*, IV, 73.
[10] *Ibid.*, X, 16.
[11] *Ibid.*, X, 4.
[12] *Ibid.*, VII, 110.
[13] *Ibid.*, VII, 71.
[14] *Ibid.*, XVI, 99.

Nowhere is this more evident than when they meet their first opposition. Much against his will, Phlegyas, the devil who rules the noisome waters of lower hell, ferries the pair to the city of Dis. No sooner do they gain the shore when more than a thousand devils rain down from the sky crying "Who is this one without death; let him return by himself; let him see if he can. Let him go who so boldly entered this kingdom."[15]

> Reader, imagine my fear
> at the sound of those words
> for I knew I could never return.[16]

Dante's courage abandons him. "O dear guide of mine, let us retrace our steps."[17] Virgil, unmoved, counsels Dante to control himself while he confers with the soldiers of Satan's garrisons. But as Virgil reaches the city's gates, they close. Now Virgil's confidence is shaken. Reason has done its best, and failed. "His eyes upon the ground, and with a face shorn of all light," he returns to Dante. Both will wait for help from above.

As they linger on the shore outside the city's walls, Satan determines to complete their rout. He despatches his handmaidens, the Furies, to terrorize them into complete despair. Virgil sees through their tactic. Fearing not for himself, but for his companion, he counsels Dante:

> Turn round and close your eyes
> for if the Gorgon shows herself
> and you see her, that will be the end of you.
> Thus my master spoke, and he himself turned
> me round, not trusting my hands,
> but with his own, he covered my eyes.[18]

At last, there came a "crash full of terror, a sound like that of a whirlwind." An angel streaks across the water. Before the sweep of his wings "a thousand ruined spirits fled, scattered like frogs before the sound of a snake."[19] Virgil uncovers Dante's eyes. The gates of Dis roll back. Together they enter Satan's walled city.

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[15] *Ibid.*, VIII, 84-6.
[16] *Ibid.*, VIII, 96.
[17] *Ibid.*, VIII, 101.
[18] *Ibid.*, IX, 54-60.

While this incident reminds us of Dante's dependence upon Virgil, it also bespeaks another dependence, equally significant. Dante's reliance upon Virgil is balanced by Virgil's reliance on powers higher still. In the ensuing cantos of the *Inferno*, the refrain of these two dependencies is heard again and again.

### THE PURGATORIO

To move over better waters now hoists sail
  the little vessel of my mind
  which leaves behind so rough a sea.[20]

Two days have passed since Dante and Virgil began their sojourn. The poets have spent the third night following the underground river that courses from hell to the plain beneath the mount of purgatory. Arriving at that plain, Dante presses his brow and finds there seven protuberances, one for each of the capital sins. In climbing this mount, these disfigurations will disappear, one by one, until at journey's end, Dante will be free to encounter Beatrice.

The relations between Dante and Virgil, on one hand, and Virgil and the supernatural, on the other, remain what they were before. But the precise character of these relations, suggested through images in the *Inferno*, becomes, in the *Purgatorio*, the subject of Virgil's discourses, and the answer to Dante's questions.

Dante's dependence on Virgil is no less complete. In Canto III, while Virgil washes the soot from Dante's face, a boatful of souls is delivered to the foot of the mountain. The delight of the crew upon finding the two poets induces them to forget the climb ahead. Cato, the warden of Purgatory, disturbed at their delay, berates the newcomers.

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[19] *Ibid.*, IX, 76.
[20] Dante Alighieri, *The Purgatorio*, I, 1-3.

What is this, laggard spirits?

What negligence, what delay is this?
Run to the mountain, and
  get rid of the slough
  which keeps you from seeing God.[21]

So quickly do they disperse at his command that Dante thinks himself wholly abandoned, and fears that Virgil has left him. Sighting his guide once more, his heart sighs with relief. "For how could I have gone on without him? Who but he could have brought me up that mountain?"[22]

Here, in purgatory, Dante expresses the same filial piety which characterized his earlier relations with his master. On entering the thick smoke where anger is tamed, Dante's eyes are so overpowered that he presses them shut, and gropes for his guide.

As a blind man goes behind his guide
  to avoid getting lost or hitting something

. . . . . . . . . . . .

So I went through the bitter and foul air
  listening to my master who kept saying,
  'See that you are not separated from me.'[23]

But if Dante's continued dependence on Virgil finds ample expression throughout the *Purgatorio,* so too does Virgil's reliance on higher assistance. Virgil, in fact, far from attempting to cloak his limitations, proclaims them unequivocally. As reason's representative, he holds himself responsible to herald the arrival of a brighter light.

On the evening of their first day in purgatory, the two poets determine to pass the night on a ledge overlooking the track where slothful souls make satisfaction for their indolence. Dante takes this opportunity to question his master about problems which have been troubling him. When the question falls within reason's ken, Virgil's answer is the very essence of clarity. Thus, Virgil's analysis of the Church's troubles wholly satisfies Dante's mind. "The people, seeing their guides strive only for material things for which they are greedy, feed on them also, and ask for nothing more."[24]

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[21] *Ibid.,* III, 119-23.
[22] *Ibid.,* III, 4-6.
[23] *Ibid.,* XVI, 9-13.

Yet, to questions which lie beyond the reach of reason, Virgil openly declares his ignorance. When Dante asks his master to reconcile the apparent contradiction between human freedom and divine omnipotence, Virgil does not pretend to provide a complete answer.

> Whatever reason can see in this
> I can tell you; expect to hear the rest
> from Beatrice, since it requires Faith.[25]

Earlier in the *Purgatorio*, when Dante asks how the shades of heretics can suffer from the cold, Virgil's reply is still more direct.

> Mad is he who hopes that our reason
> can explore the infinite workings
> of One Substance in Three Persons
>
> Be content, O human race, with the quia [facts]
> for if we could have understood all,
> Mary would not have needed to give birth.[26]

Side by side, the poets approach the end of their common sojourn. They pass the plain where hunger purges gluttony, and then the final circle of flame which purifies sins of the flesh. When they have arrived at the top of the mountain, Virgil addresses Dante for the last time. The ancient poet has revealed all that reason can disclose. Under his guidance, Dante has freed himself of sinful habits. He has become free. His will is no longer the prisoner of desire.

> The temporal fire and the eternal
> you have seen, my son, and have come to a place
> where I, of myself, discern no further.

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[24] *Ibid.*, XVI, 99-102.
[25] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 45-8.
[26] *Ibid.*, III, 36-42.

While the glad fair eyes [of Beatrice] are coming,
  which weeping made me come to thee,
  sit down and take your rest.

No more expect my word or sigh.
  Free, upright, and whole is thy will.
  Wherefore do I miter thee, King over thyself.[27]

Dante, then, is biding his time, strolling through the idyllic forest, when "lo, a sudden brightness flashed, and a sweet melody ran through the luminous air."[28] From the east comes a magnificent symbolical pageant of the Church, the entourage which is to present Dante with God's greatest gift to mankind—Revelation. At its head are seven flambeaus, the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit; next, forty-five elders, representing the books of the Old Testament; then, surrounding the chariot, the four creatures of the Gospel. The chariot is drawn by a lion with an eagle's head, symbolizing Christ in his divine and human natures. Behind follow Luke and Paul and the writers of the catholic Epistles.

The procession stops before Dante. Trumpets blare; angels swim into the distance. At last, Dante's eyes meet those of Beatrice. There remains but a single barrier between them. With a measure of sternness, Beatrice tells Dante that penitence must now complete the work of his purification. She reminds him of countless graces refused and inspirations dismissed. Crushed by these thoughts, the stricken Dante is led by angels to the waters of Lethe (Forgetfulness), where the memory of sin is forever effaced from the soul. Dante comes forth renewed and pure, unencumbered by even the recollection of offending God, light enough to mount the stars.

## THE PARADISO

O Supreme Light that rises so high
  above mortal concepts, give back to my mind
  a little of what thou didst appear.[29]

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[27] *Ibid.*, XXVII, 126-40.
[28] *Ibid.*, XXIX, 15, 36.
[29] Dante Alighieri, *The Paradiso,* XXXIII, 69-72.

In the educational system of the medieval university, the building block of pedagogy was always a prescribed text: in theology, it was the Bible; in law, Gratian; in medicine, Galen. A *baccalaureus* would read the texts, commenting as he went along, and answering questions as they arose. After completing a given section, the *magister*, who sat behind and above him, would complete the commentary and respond more incisively to the objections.

A somewhat analogous situation obtains in the *Divine Comedy*. Virgil, Dante's *baccalaureus*, has read, commented and responded to certain difficulties. Now Beatrice will shed additional light on truths already considered, and, at the same time, will introduce Dante to truths of a higher order.

Beatrice takes the occasion of Dante's first question—regarding the presence in heaven of nuns who had violated their vows—to provide her pupil with a general explanation of the origin and end of human knowledge.

> In one way only can your minds be opened
> since only from sense impressions do you grasp
> what afterwards can be understood more abstractly.
>
> Because of this the Scriptures condescend
> to your capacity and attribute hands
> and feet to God while meaning something else.[30]

She then explains that though these nuns married, it was not their will to do so. These souls, Beatrice continues, truly reside in the Empyrean itself. They are only reflected in lower spheres "to signify the degrees of heavenly happiness less exalted."[31] So delighted is Dante with these words, that he exclaims:

> O beloved of the first Lover! O Divine One!
> I see clearly that our mind is
> never satisfied unless the truth
> that includes all illumines it.

[30] *Ibid.*, IV, 39-45.
[31] *Ibid.*, IV, 38.

Then it rests, like a beast in its den,
when it reaches it, and it can—
otherwise every desire would be vain.[32]

Still, though man's intellect is able to reach that "truth that illumines all," it continues to have grave limitations: limitations of its own making, as well as those imposed by God.

Foremost among the limitations man makes for himself is haste, that tendency, rooted in pride, to judge more quickly than the evidence warrants. Saint Thomas, answering Dante's questions regarding Solomon's wisdom, counsels him thus:

And let this word be lead on your feet
to make you move slowly, like a wearied man,
both to the 'yes' and 'no' you do not clearly see.

For he is low among fools who,
either in one case or the other,
affirms or denies without distinctions;

Because it happens many times
that a hasty opinion inclines to error,
and later, feeling binds the mind.[33]

"Let us not be too sure in judging," he continues, "for I have seen all winter long the briar show itself stiff and rough and then bear a rose at its top."[34]

Besides those errors into which men fall through their own indiscretion, vast regions of truth are, of their very nature, beyond the grasp of reason.

Thus it is that every minor mind
is a receptacle too scant for that Good
which has no end and measures Itself by Itself.

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[32] *Ibid.*, IV, 118-27.
[33] *Ibid.*, XIII, 112-21.
[34] *Ibid.*, XIII, 125-8.

> Consequently the light your world receives
> penetrates into eternal justice
> as the eye penetrates within the sea;
>
> For although at the shore the bottom is seen,
> on the main it is not, and nevertheless
> the bottom is there, its depths hiding it.[35]

This radical incompleteness of human knowledge will never completely disappear. Even in heaven certain truths will escape us.

> O Predestination! how remote your source is
> from the vision that does not see
> the first cause entire!
>
> And you, mortals, be careful
> about making judgments, for we who see God
> do not yet know all the elect.[36]

Again, in the following canto:

> And when you return, report this to the mortal world
> so that it will not presume any more
> to advance to such a goal.
>
> The mind which here shines, on earth is dull;
> so consider: can it do down there
> what it cannot accomplish in heaven?[37]

Nearing the end of their expedition, Dante and Beatrice arrive in the circle of the fixed stars just as Christ and his Mother are leaving. When Dante momentarily sights the "Light that lights all lights," the vision brings him such pain that he sinks to his knees. When the pain subsides, he is amazed that the sight has not damaged his vision, but strengthened it. For the first time, he finds it possible to look into Beatrice's eyes.

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[35] *Ibid.*, XIX, 49-58.
[36] *Ibid.*, XX, 129-35.
[37] *Ibid.*, XXI, 99-105.

Before Dante can enter the Empyrean, he must prove his awareness of fundamental supernatural truths. Saint Peter, the first of his examiners, tests him in matters of faith—an examination which documents Dante's conviction of the intimate relation between reason and revelation. Saint Peter asks: "Speak, good Christian, make yourself clear, what is Faith?" Dante answers.

> As the pen of your brother [Paul]
> wrote for us: Faith is the substance of things
> hoped for, the evidence of things unseen.
>
> The profound things
> which favor me with their appearance here
> are so hidden from eyes below
>
> that their evidence is merely a belief.[38]

Saint Peter interjects: "Whence did this dear jewel come to you?" Then Dante: "The abundant rain of the Holy Spirit which is diffused over the old and new parchments." Peter presses him: "Why do you hold them as divine?" The miracles, Dante answers, are proof of this. Peter again: "What assures you that those deeds really occured?" Dante makes his celebrated reply.

> If the world turned to Christianity
> without miracles, that fact is such
> that the others are not a hundredth part as miraculous.[39]

In succeeding cantos, Dante returns to this theme, stessing, at the same time, the transcendence of faith and its essential reasonableness. When Saint John, Dante's examiner on the virtue of charity, asks him how he came to direct his love to God, he answers: "Through philosophical reasoning and through the Authority which descends from here."[40] Regarding God's existence, Dante again points to the concurrence of reason and revelation.

[38] *Ibid.*, XXIV, 58-66.
[39] *Ibid.*, XXV, 105-8.
[40] *Ibid.*, XXVI, 24-6.

This truth is unfolded to my intellect
by that one [Aristotle] who shows me the first love
of all the eternal substances.

Then, too, the voice of Him
who said to Moses, speaking of Himself,
'I will make you see all worth,' unfolds it.

You too [John] declared it to me at the beginning
of the lofty proclamation that announces clearly
to the world below the mystery of this place on high.[41]

Having satisfied his examiners, he prepares to enter the final and only true heaven. Before ascending his mind is once more strengthened, this time by the light of glory. "Such a vision was kindled in me that no light was too bright for me to understand."[42] Instantaneously, he finds himself in the actual presence of God. Beatrice's role as Revelation has ended. In a final salute to his guide, Dante exclaims:

O lady in whom my hope is strong,
you have lifted me from slavery to freedom.

. . . . . . . . . .

Continue your generosity toward me
so that my soul that you redeemed
may be freed from my body pleasing to you.[43]

## CONCLUSION

How then did Dante conceive the relationship between reason and revelation? Passing over the texts already cited, three conclusions might be drawn from the very structure of the poem. First, by providing himself with two guides, distinct in personality and genius, Dante indicates that reason and revelation are distinct and autonomous, each starting from its own principles, and attaining its own

[41] *Ibid.*, XXVI, 36-45.
[42] *Ibid.*, XXX, 58-60.
[43] *Ibid.*, XXXI, 84-90.

conclusions. Second, by delineating Virgil's continual dependence upon Beatrice, Dante affirms reason's subordination to revelation. Third, by deputing Virgil and Beatrice to serve as guides for one continuous journey, he bespeaks the harmony and concurrence of these two principles.[44]

But underlying and implicit in his entire consideration of reason and revelation, and indeed, throughout the *Divine Comedy* is another truth of which perhaps our age has even greater need. It is the truth that the progress of the mind depends in no small measure upon the purity of the will. When men are the slaves of their lower desires, they have neither the energy nor the inclination to contemplate truth, whether it be the fruit of reason or of revelation. In the poem itself, Dante could appreciate the deeper truths of reason and revelation only after he had been purified of his earthly vices. And what was true of Dante is true of every man.

There are, then, two lights available to human darkness—the light of reason and the light of revelation, but both of these lights are candles, and the winds of desire and self-will can easily blow them out. Only when those winds have been stilled can the light dispell our darkness.

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[44] Gerald Walsh, *Dante Alighieri* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946), p. 158.

RAYMOND BLAIS, O.P.

# THE HUMORAL THEORY: PRECURSOR OF MODERN THEORIES OF TEMPERAMENT

*The temperaments have become almost a symbol*
*of permanence of aspiration*
*changing its form*
*only as a result of the march*
*of progress.*
A. A. Roback

A recent trend in modern psychology is the attempt to delineate and explain the manifest psychophysiological differences found among men. This movement, the psychology of personality, assumes various forms and has many different points of view, for personality is a complex of many variables, though in itself personality is that which expresses the wholeness or uniqueness of the person. The most fundamental and important factor which enters into personality[1] is temperament, which has been defined in the following manner:

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[1] There are three main components of personality: morphology, temperament and character. Catholics and other religious groups admit a fourth component, viz., grace: "[Grace] is able to sound all the depths of our conscience, intellect,

> The innate, characteristic, physiological structure and functional disposition of certain bodily organs and tissues, regarded particularly from the viewpoint of the influence which such structure and disposition exert upon the characteristic sensational, emotional, intellectual and volitional reactions of an individual throughout life, as well as upon his somatic or morphological characteristics.[2]

This excellent definition makes clear for us the two-fold function of temperament: 1) Temperament influences the personality directly through the effects of the physiological structure of the individual upon his psychic life; and 2) it influences the personality indirectly, by modifying the other psychological factors. Temperament thus defined is seen to be innate rather than acquired, and the result of bodily dispositions rather than something purely psychical.

### CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANCIENT GREEKS

The dependence of temperament upon the physical constitution is by no means a new idea—physicians and philosophers of ancient Greece were well aware of the psychosomatic relationship. The difference between the new theories and the old teachings is merely in the details behind the interconnection of mind and body. The ancients ascribed the peculiarities of temperament to the "humors" (the four fluids or juices of the body said to affect one's health). This doctrine was advanced by Hippocrates in the fourth century B.C. and was generally accepted by everyone until about the time of the discovery of the circulation of the blood by Harvey in the seventeenth century, a time-span of over two thousand years. It is this period, the period of the prevalence of the humoral theory, which

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memory and will, to touch our affectivity as well as persuade our intelligence; the assistance of our organic faculties is open to its workings. On certain temperaments its influence is calming; others are stirred into activity by brusque invitations and interior demands." (R. W. Gleason, S.J., *To Live Is Christ* [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961], p. 177.)

[2] Leo M. Bond, O.P., "The Effect of Bodily Temperament on Psychical Characteristics," *The Thomist*, X (1947), 440.

we will review in this paper, indicating at the same time its influence upon modern theories of temperament.

### *Significance of Humoral Theory*

The importance of the humoral doctrine and its impact on medicine must not be underestimated. There are two principal reasons why interest in the classical approach to temperament has been so persistent. In the first place, it was the humoral doctrine that provided the groundwork for modern research by establishing the relationship between temperament and body-chemistry. Recent experiments in the field of endocrinology point to a certain observable similarity between the effects of hormones upon psychical disposition and the ancient notion of temperamental differences produced by humors. In both the humoral and the endocrinal theories the nature of the blood is the chief determinant of an individual's dispositions toward certain passions. In the humoral theory, the humoral content of the blood accounted for individual psychological differences, whereas in the endocrinal theory, it is the hormonal content of blood that causes different inclinations to passions.

In the second place, the four-fold classification of temperaments based upon the four humors of the body is still useful today because it implies a certain fundamental division of emotional response. This classification is used by empirical psychologists in their analysis of individual differences. Moreover, even though the humoral basis of temperament is no longer accepted, the names given by the Greeks to the various temperamental types are still with us as part of our everyday vocabulary. Who, for instance, does not know that a "choleric" is a person who is easily aroused to anger, or that a "melancholic" is an individual with a sad and reflective nature? The very notion of humors has persisted in such expressions as "good humor," "bad humor," "humorous," etc.

These reasons should indicate the need for an understanding of the age which devoted careful attention to the humors, an age to which ours is greatly indebted for its exploration of the mysteries of personality. As early as 1927, when endocrinal research was still in its infancy, the psychologist Roback clearly saw the importance of the humoral theory and its relation to modern theories of temperament:

> From Humors to Hormones! It is one of those curios of cultural destiny that after so many migrations and transformations, the doctrine of humors should, like a colossal ballad or rondo extending over twenty-five centuries, hark back to the beginning when all explanations centered around the fluids of the body. The original theory, now concluding its cycle in the almost universally received opinion of today that the secretions of the endocrine glands, injecting into the blood hormones of various sorts, are of vital importance in the organization of a given temperament, provides at present much food for thought, even if the thinking, without the indispensable experiments back of it, must necessarily remain of the groping kind.[3]

### *Early Greek Thinkers*

Although Hippocrates is usually credited with being the originator of the theory of the four temperaments, he was by no means the first to indicate the correlation between psychical disposition and the purely physical components of the human person. About fifty years prior to Hippocrates, Empedocles had prepared the way for the humoral theory with his doctrine of the four elements.

Empedocles (495-435 B.C.), an important figure among the pre-Socratic philosophers, produced, though only incidentally, a crude psychology in his quest for an explanation of natural phenomena. Like other early Greek thinkers, Empedocles had a limited basis for speculation. His observations were unaided by instruments, there was an almost universal prejudice against dissection of the human body, and the study of the animal organism was superficial and incidental. The result was only a very general explanation of all phenomena. Before Empedocles, Thales had thought that everything that existed was composed of water; Heraclitus, that all is fire; and Anaximenes, that all is air. Empedocles combined these doctrines and taught that everything is made up of four elements, water, earth, air and fire, as the following fragment indicates.

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[3] A. A. Roback, *Psychology of Character* (Cambridge: Sci-Art, 1952), pp. 101f.

> But if thy assurance of these things was in any way deficient as to how, out of Water and Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose the forms and colours of all those mortal things that have been fitted together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being. . . .[4]

Empedocles went on to say that thought, pleasure and pain resulted from the manner in which these elements were mixed in the human body: "For out of these are all things formed and fitted together, and by these do men think and feel pleasure and pain."[5]

Unfortunately, a large segment of Empedocles' writings has been lost; but a considerable amount of his thought is known through a later Greek philosopher and natural scientist, Theophrastus (c. 370-287 B.C.). In his work *On The Senses*, Theophrastus gives us a much fuller picture of Empedocles' teachings on the effects of the mixture of the four elements in man:

> Those in whom these mingled elements are of the same or nearly the same [amount], being neither widely separated nor too small nor of excessive size,—such persons are most intelligent and keen of sense; and others are intelligent and keen of sense according as they approach to such a mixture; but those whose condition is the very reverse are the least intelligent. Again, persons in whom the elements lie loose and rare are slow and laborious; while such as have them compact and divided fine are impulsively carried away; they throw themselves into many a project, and yet accomplish little, because of the impetuous coursing of their blood. But when the composition in some single member lies in the mean, the person is accomplished in that part. For this reason some are clever orators, others artisans; for in the one case the happy mixture is in the tongue, in the other it is in the hands. And the like holds true for all the other forms of ability.[6]

[4] Empedocles, *Poem on Nature*, fragment (71), trans. John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 215f.

[5] *Ibid.*, fragment (107), p. 220.

[6] Theophrastus, *On the Senses*, par. 11, trans. George M. Stratton, *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917), pp. 75f.

The above passage represents for some the earliest record of a theory of temperament;[7] but there is some evidence that the school of Pythagoras, founded at Croton, Italy about 529 B.C., had already been teaching a similar theory. Alcmaeon, who was a physician rather than a philosopher, and a younger contemporary of Pythagoras,

> taught the necessity for a physiological balance or 'harmony' of the elements. . . . To Alcmaeon, disease was the 'monarchia' or preponderance of any one of the elements over the rest.[8]

### *Hippocrates*

It was Hippocrates, however, who crystallized the medical knowledge of the pre-Socratics into a science, and elaborated upon the earlier theory of the "elements," developing it into his fundamental doctrine of the "crasis" (mixture, blending or temperament), commonly referred to today as the Hippocratic humoral theory.

Hippocrates (c. 460-377 B.C.) was born in the Aegean island of Cos, and descended from an old family of priest-physicians. There flourished in his time two great medical schools in the Greek-speaking world: one on the island of Cos, Hippocrates' birthplace, and the other at Cnidus, a peninsula of the Asiatic mainland not far away from the school at Cos. Hippocrates was a member of the school of Cos, and it was mainly there that he practiced medicine; but he also travelled extensively and became renowned as a physician among the Greeks.

Hippocrates adopted the theory that the body of man, and the universe as a whole, was made up of the four substances familiar to the pre-Socratic philosophers: air, fire, water and earth. Corresponding to these in order were their qualities: dry, hot, moist and cold. In addition to these elements and their qualities, Hippocrates discerned within the body four fluids or humors which bore the same qualities as the elements: yellow bile (dry), blood (warm), black bile (moist) and phlegm (cold).[9] For Hippocrates, health depended upon the right mixture of these components.

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[7] Stratton, *op. cit.*, p. 168, note 40.

[8] Arthur J. Brock, *Greek Medicine* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1929), p. 6.

> The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; these make up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or enjoys health. Now he enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, and when they are perfectly mingled. Pain is felt when one of these elements is in defect or excess, or is isolated in the body without being compounded with all the others.[10]

When the four humors were present in proper proportion to each other, i.e., when there was a *eucrasia* or a proper balance of the body fluids, the body would be healthy. On the other hand, when one of the humors happened to be in excess of its proper proportion, a *dyscrasia* (or disease) resulted. The proper balance of the humors within the body depended upon the relation of the individual to his environment. A great deal of emphasis was put on the climate in which the patient lived, and in case of need he would be advised to change his surroundings. The balance of the humors was also affected by the food and drink taken into the body, as well as by the amount of moisture present in the air.[11] Hippocrates developed a set of rules to control these various factors in the treatment of different diseases. This doctrine was a modification of Alcmaeon's teaching that health was present whenever a perfect harmony, or equal proportion, of the elements existed; whereas for Hippocrates health consisted in a right combination of the four humors.

Besides teaching that disease was due to an excess of one or the other of the four humors, Hippocrates maintained that certain people had a natural tendency to a slight preponderance of one of these humors over the others, thus constituting the different "temperaments" —sanguinous, phlegmatic, bilious and melancholic. Each person is more readily disposed toward diseases of his own particular type. For instance, concerning the bilious (choleric) temperament, Hippocrates described such individuals as being

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[9] For a more detailed explanation of the origin of Hippocrates' humoral theory see Henry E. Sigerist, *A History of Medicine*, Vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 317-26 and also George Sarton, *A History of Science*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 339.

[10] Hippocrates, *Nature of Man*, IV, 1-10, trans. W. H. S. Jones, LCL, IV.

[11] Hippocrates, *Airs Waters Places*, *passim* in Jones, *ed. cit.*, I.

> men who are hard, lean, well-articulated, well-braced, and hairy; such natures will be found energetic, vigilant, stubborn and independent in character and in temper, wild rather than tame, of more than average sharpness and intelligence in the arts, and in war of more than average courage.[12]

On the other hand, Hippocrates assigned the following characteristics to the phlegmatics: "Slackness and sleepiness can be observed in them, and as far as the arts are concerned they are thick-witted, and neither subtle nor sharp."[13] The predisposition toward diseases for each particular temperament is illustrated in the following passage:

> Phlegmatics are liable to dysenteries, and women also, phlegm running down from the brain because of the humidity of their constitution. The bilious have dry ophthalmia because of the warm dryness of their flesh.[14]

It is interesting to note that throughout the works of Hippocrates the doctrine of humors is implied but never clearly stated; it remains in the background, and very little is said about the humors themselves. The predominant emphasis is on the phlegmatic and choleric temperaments, presumably because these are the two extreme types. But despite these apparent defects, Hippocrates' humoral doctrine laid the foundation for the more solid theories of temperament which followed; his doctrine never lost its initial vitality, although it underwent many modifications throughout the following centuries. One such modification occurred shortly after the death of Hippocrates, when his original exposition assumed a more scientific cast in the writings of Aristotle.

[12] *Ibid.*, XXIV, 56-60.
[13] *Ibid.*, 51-3.
[14] *Ibid.*, X, 41-6.

# THEORIES OF TEMPERAMENT

## *Aristotle and Pseudo-Aristotle*

Aristotle was born around 384 B.C. at Stageira in Thrace, and was the son of Nicomachus, a court physician under Amyntas II, the king of Macedonia. Aristotle never became a physician, but was undoubtedly keenly interested in medicine—he wrote excellent treatises in descriptive and comparative biology—but there is no record that he ever wrote strictly medical works.

For Aristotle, blood, because of its general nutrient function, was the seat of all temperamental differences. Individual characteristics were not to be accounted for by an excess of one of the four humors, but by the various admixtures or components of the blood alone. Aristotle attributed the tendency of the blood to clot to the earthen element in its composition, and this tendency constituted the choleric temperament. Blood which lacked fibrin, however, was described as "watery" and was conducive to fear, i.e., gave rise to the melancholic temperament:

> Some . . . animals with watery blood have a keener intellect than those whose blood is of an earthier nature. This is due not to the coldness of their blood, but rather to its thinness and purity; neither of which qualities belongs to the earthy matter. For the thinner and purer its fluid is, the more easily affected is an animal's sensibility. . . . At the same time too great an excess of water makes animals timorous. For fear chills the body; so that in animals whose heart contains so watery a mixture the way is prepared for the operation of this emotion. . . . Such animals, on the other hand, as have thick and abundant fibres in their blood are of a more earthy nature, and of a choleric temperament, and liable to bursts of passion. . . . The character of the blood affects both the temperament and the sensory faculties of animals in many ways.[15]

The temperamental differences produced by each of the four humors were described more fully by Aristotle than had been done by Hippocrates. Aristotle, for example, elaborated on the melancholic temperament which Hippocrates barely touched upon, and he divided it into two types, the "cold melancholic" and the "warm melancholic." Pseudo-Aristotle assigns different characteristics to each, and attributes the differences to the low or high temperature of the atrabile (black bile), which, although cold by nature, is capable of being heated:

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[15] Aristotle, *De partibus animalium*, II, 4, 650 b 18-651 a 13, (Oxford trans.).

> But those who naturally possess an atrabilious temperament immediately develop diverse characters in accordance with their various temperaments; for example, those who are originally full of cold black bile become dull and stupid, whereas those who possess a large quantity of hot black bile become frenzied or clever or erotic or easily moved to anger and desire, while some become more loquacious.[16]

Pseudo-Aristotle summarized his description of melancholics as follows:

> To sum the matter up, owing to the fact that the effect of black bile is variable, atrabilious persons also show variation; for the black bile becomes very hot and very cold. And because it has an effect upon the character (for heat and cold have such an effect to a greater extent than anything else in us), . . . it gives us our own special characters . . . the result is that all atrabilious persons have remarkable gifts, not owing to disease but from natural causes.[17]

In this passage, Pseudo-Aristotle considers the natural excess of black bile a greater determinant of temperament than that of any other humor. Aristotle's modifications, however, are not of major significance, and they did not affect the influence of the original humoral theory to any great extent; the Hippocratic humoral doctrine survived, but it did so especially in the form established later by another great physician of Greek antiquity, Galen.

### *Galen*

Born in the year A.D. 131 in Pergamos, Asia Minor, Galen was the son of a successful architect who was well schooled in philosophy and mathematics and who imparted to his son a sound liberal education. At the age of seventeen, Galen began studying medicine at Smyrna, Alexandria, and later continued his studies at Corinth. Although Galen's works are primarily medical in character, his interests also included philosophy, and he wrote extensively not only on anatomy, physiology, and medicine in general, but also on logic, drawing heavily from Aristotle and the Stoics for his philosophy, while adding his own contributions. The Stoics, however, were more interested in ethics, and their writings did not contribute to Galen's medical knowledge. Galen's outstanding achievement was to gather and coordinate all that was known of medicine and the related sciences, and to add to this the results of his own personal observations of animals and experimentation with medical subjects.

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[16] Pseudo-Aristotle, *Problemata,* XXX, 1, 954 a 28-34.
[17] *Ibid.,* 955 a 30-40.

What interests us in this paper, however, is that Galen transformed the crude theory of the four humors into a doctrine of observable symptoms that determine man's temperament. Galen revised the idea of humors and gave it a popular form. This accomplishment was important as a first step toward a psychology of temperament, and it is his classification that still perdures in modern times, though on a more scientific footing through the discovery of the endocrine glands and their relation to temperamental differences.

For Galen, as for Hippocrates and Aristotle, the temperaments depended upon the dominance of one of the four humors in particular individuals. The sanguine was the man in whom blood was predominant; he was warm-hearted and volatile. The person in whom there was an excess of phlegm was cold and apathetic. Even today such an individual is said to be phlegmatic. Others in whom black bile was the dominating humor were known as melancholics; these were vigorous but sad. Those in whom yellow bile was in excess were quick to anger and strong in action, and known as cholerics. Galen was the first to distinguish clearly between the melancholic and the choleric types which prior to him were both labelled "bilious."[18]

Galen's classification goes further than that of Hippocrates, for in

[18] Galen, *On the Natural Faculties,* II, ix, 131f., trans. Arthur J. Brock, LCL.

it each of the four basic temperaments is further divided according to the admixture of the qualities which correspond with the four humors, producing eight distinct types. Four were simple, in which one of the four qualities (warm, cold, humid and dry) was predominant, with the other three qualities in various degrees of equilibrium. The other four were combinations, such as warm and dry, warm and humid, cold and dry, cold and humid, these constituting the four classical types still in use today.[19] In addition to these, Galen spoke of a perfectly normal type, in which the humors and their qualities were all harmoniously balanced.[20]

According to Galen, all four humors were produced in the liver,[21] from which they were transmitted to the organs of the body through the blood vessels. This idea perdured throughout the Middle Ages, and was adopted by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In this theory the liver was looked upon as an organ of internal secretion: what we call today an endocrine gland.

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MIDDLE AGES

During the ten centuries subsequent to Galen, there were very few new discoveries in medicine. The medical tenor of that long period was conservative—the physicians kept alive the body of Greek medicine, mainly in the form established by Galen, systematizing it even further, making commentaries on it, and adding to its detail somewhat —but there did not arise any new great creative genuises such as Hippocrates and Galen.

The twelfth century marks the humble beginnings of a revival in medicine, even if that revival was largely no more than a renewed knowledge of Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen, with mild reactions to their teachings. In the West, the revival of medicine may be traced to the translations of the Arabic versions of the Greek medical and philosophical authorities into Latin. The Arabs themselves were essentially concerned with compiling and remembering knowledge from all sources rather than initiating inquiry, and it is to them that we are indebted for the survival of the medical and scientific knowledge of the ancients through the Middle Ages.

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[19] For a good example of a modern adhering to the four-fold classification, see Conrad Hock, *The Four Temperaments* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1934).

[20] Galen, *De temperamentis*, II, c. 3, in *Omnia opera* (Venice: Juntas, 1625), I, p. 15.

[21] Galen, *On the Natural Faculties*, II, xiii, 30ff., *loc. cit.*

### *Avicenna*

Avicenna (980-1037), the greatest of the Arabian scientists, followed the teaching of Hippocrates and Galen, and, like most of his contemporaries, never questioned any of their works. Avicenna's most famous medical writings are contained in the *Canon* of medicine. The *Canon* was translated into Latin by Gehrard of Cremona in the twelfth century and thus made accessible to the medieval scholastics,[22] who used it as a standard textbook in the universities. In another work, the *Poem on Medicine*, Avicenna writes on the "Second natural component—Temperaments," drawing up nine different types, just as Galen had done in the second century:

> The temperament has four aspects which the physician will separate or join together. It may be warm, cold, dry or moist. . . . These qualities are found in the elements. . . . These qualities are different in that there will be only one and they group themselves without opposing each other. We have an idea of the temperament of someone because of this arrangement of elements and thus, we give him the classification of that which predominates. The temperament is said to be balanced when it includes the four qualities. . . . Every man, in whom the qualities are not in equilibrium and which lead him towards one extreme, is not void of the others because of that, but they do not exist in comparable proportion. He carries the classification of the dominant one: he is said to be of a temperament of fire, earth, water or air. . . . Thus, I have given the nine temperaments and in that I make no innovations.[23]

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[22] Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 640, note 11.

[23] Avicenna, *Poem on Medicine*, trans. Haven C. Krueger (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1963), pp. 15f.

Similarly, in a manner more reminiscent of Hippocrates, Avicenna describes the "Third natural component—Humors: The body is made up of humors of different colors and of different temperaments. They are phlegm, yellow bile, blood and black bile."[24]

### *Moses Maimonides*

Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), Jewish physician and philosopher, also exerted considerable influence on the medieval writers. Maimonides' chief aim was to reconcile Jewish theology with Greek philosophy, especially with that of Aristotle. Besides numerous writings on medical subjects, many of which are commentaries on Galen and Hippocrates, the Jewish philosopher wrote *The Guide of the Perplexed,* to which he owes his philosophical fame. In this work, it is clear that Maimonides accepted the Galenic theory of temperament: "The moral qualities of the soul are consequent upon the temperament of the body."[25] Maimonides goes on to show the strong effect of temperament upon an individual's disposition:

> There are, moreover, many people who have received from their first natural disposition a complexion of temperament with which perfection is in no way compatible. Such is the case of one whose heart is naturally exceedingly hot; for he cannot refrain from anger, even if he subject his soul to very stringent training. This is also the case of one whose testicles have a hot and humid temperament and are of a strong constitution and in whom the seminal vessels abundantly generate semen. For it is unlikely that such a man, even if he subject his soul to the most severe training, should be chaste. Similarly you can find among people rash and reckless folk whose movements, being very agitated and disordered, indicate a corruption of the complexion and a poor quality of the temperament, of which it is impossible to give an account. Perfection can never be perceived in such people. And to make an effort for their benefit in this matter is pure ignorance on the part of him who makes the effort.[26]

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[24] *Ibid.,* p. 19.

[25] Moses Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed,* III, c. 12, 20b, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).

[26] *Ibid.,* I, c. 34, 40a.

The case for these people, however, is not hopeless. Moses continues:

> For this reason the teaching of this [divine] science to the young is disapproved of. In fact it is impossible for them to absorb it because of the effervescence of their natures and of their minds being occupied with the flame of growth. When, however, this flame that gives rise to perplexity is extinguished, the young achieve tranquility and quiet; and their hearts submit and yield with respect to their temperament.[27]

This passage reflects the practical advantage of an understanding of natural dispositions as determined by temperamental differences; it is this same practical aspect that urges man on in his study of individual differences today.

### *St. Albert*

Following Avicenna and Maimonides, the two men who deserve much credit for the movement toward a revival in medicine are Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. These two scholastics extended the ancient humoral doctrine and modified it even further in the light of increased scientific knowledge.

Albert the Great of Cologne (c.1200-1280), the most eminent naturalist of the thirteenth century, synthesized Aristotelian, Arabian and Jewish elements to include all contemporary knowledge in the fields of astronomy, geography, botany, zoology and medicine. In all these disciplines, Albert made definite contributions through his own personal experience, which he considered indispensable:

> Of all the things which we have set down, some we have proved by experience. Others, however, we have borrowed from authors who we know for certain would not state anything without having first ascertained of them through experience. For experience alone gives certainty in such matters.[28]

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[27] *Ibid.*, I, c. 34, 40b.

[28] St. Albert the Great, *Lib VI De veget. et plantis*, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, X (Paris: Vives, 1891). This and all subsequent translations from Latin and Italian are my own.

In addition to his own observations, Albert based his writings on the classical writers and the popular traditions.

### *Comparison of Contemporary Theories with St. Albert's*

Albert's account of the humors and his description of the temperaments is similar to Galen's. As with Galen, the humors are all produced in the liver;[29] but regarding temperamental differences, Albert surpasses Galen in his description of the four classical types. A comparison of the characteristics assigned to each temperament by St. Albert with those of a modern endocrinologist reveals a striking similarity between the two. Before we make such a comparison, however, it will be useful to describe in general the influence of the endocrine glands on temperament.

Hormones are chemical compounds produced by the endocrine glands and secreted directly into the blood stream for transmission to all parts of the body. Among the numerous glands classified as endocrine by medical researchers, the pituitary, the thyroid and the adrenals (sometimes called suprarenals or surrenals) are outstanding in the influence their secretions exert upon temperament. The pituitary gland is sometimes termed the "master gland" because it regulates the flow of secretions from all the other endocrine glands. Hence, a consideration of the thyroid and adrenal glands suffices to illustrate the effect of hormones upon psychical characteristics.

For the proper development of the individual, the endocrine glands must produce the proper balance of hormones. (This notion is similar to the *eucrasia* of the ancients.) If one of the glands is deficient, or produces an excess of hormone, disease may result. For instance, children born with defective thyroid development are mentally arrested and dwarfed, a condition known as cretinism; underactive adrenals give symptoms known as Addison's disease.[30] A slight dysfunction of any one of the endocrine glands, however, producing a preponderance

[29] St. Albert, *De animalibus*, XII, tr. 1, c. 6, *ed. cit.*

[30] Persons suffering from Addison's disease become weak, dehydrated, and bronze in color and eventually die.

of one hormone over the normal hormonal balance in the body, gives rise to individual temperamental differences, as well as to morphological and character variations, at least in part.

The Italian school of clinical anthropology founded by Achille di Giovanni in 1890 and propagated by Nicola Pende was the first to elaborate a system of classification of psychophysiological types based upon the various endocrine glands as the root causes of the variety. Limiting ourselves to the two glands mentioned above (thyroid and adrenals), their functioning correlates with the four classical types: the characteristics of the hyperthyroid (an individual whose thyroid gland is slightly overactive) are similar to the choleric's; the hypothyroid (whose thyroid is somewhat underactive) has the same or nearly the same characteristics as the phlegmatic; the characteristics of the hypersurrenal are like those of the sanguine; and lastly, the hyposurrenal is seen to be similar to the melancholic. A comparison of these four endocrinal types as described by Pende with the four humoral types of St. Albert reveals a close similarity.

For Albert, the choleric is a person easily moved to anger and fervor, with fiery imaginations;[31] he is also quick of movement and very unstable.[32] Pende ascribes the following traits to the corresponding endocrinal temperament, the hyperthyroid: "Especially dominant . . . great psychic irritability . . . mental unrest, precipitousness conjoined to the instability of the whole psychic process."[33]

The melancholic temperament compares just as favorably with the hyposurrenal type. St. Albert says that melancholics are sad and grave individuals who suffer from terroristic imaginations.[34] Elsewhere, Albert describes melancholics more fully:

> Those, however, who have cold, fetid and turbid blood are deep and as it were immovable thinkers, and their ideas are obscure . . .

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[31] St. Albert, *De animalibus*, I, tr. 2, c. 2.

[32] *Ibid.*, XX, tr. 1, c. 11.

[33] Pende, quoted by F. M. Barbado in "La physionomie, le tempérament et le caractère, d'après Albert le Grand et la science moderne," *Revue Thomiste*, XXXVI (1931), 338f.

[34] St. Albert, *De animalibus*, I, tr. 2, c. 2.

> therefore such individuals are timid by nature. Their fear does not easily leave them, nor do they accept consolation, and these men suffer the loss of reason and mental disorders. And sometimes men, finding nothing pleasurable in themselves and suspicious of others, kill themselves and are not lovable, loving solitude which is the evil of human life, and delighting in meanness and many other evils to which they are subject, and are frequently thieves even when they do not need the things which they steal, and many suffer from insomnia on account of the dryness and coldness of their temperament.[35]

Of the hyposurrenal type, Pende writes,

> The psychic characteristics of hyposurrenal types are a grave depression of all psychic energies, a grave weakness of the intellective processes, a great lack of will power, melancholy, an unsurmountable sadness, lack of trust, courage and hope.[36] . . . Insomnious and alert.[37]

The similarity between the descriptions of Pende and of St. Albert is also found in the other two types. According to Albert, phlegmatics are lazy, sleepy, have a feminine softness and a poor memory; they sleep a great deal and have dull intellects.[38] Pende's corresponding hypothyroids are apathetic, slow in mental processes, their intellects are never completely developed or perfected, and are more often of inferior to mediocre quality;[39] they are easily fatigued physically and mentally, with a great need for sleep.[40]

Finally, sanguines according to St. Albert

> are of a very joyful temperament and have a cheerful disposition, always hopeful, not depressed by misfortunes and they have a good intellect and good qualities.[41]

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[35] *Ibid.*, XX, tr. 1, c. 11.

[36] Pende, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] St. Albert, *De animalibus*, XX, tr. 1, c. 11.

[39] Pende, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] St. Albert, *De animalibus*, XX, tr. 1, c. 11.

Pende says that hyperrenal types have a large amount of moral and intellectual energy and are euphoric.[42]

The close correspondence observable between Albert's and Pende's temperamental types is not a mere coincidence. St. Albert and the proponents of the Italian school both derived their descriptions from observation and experience; human nature is the same now as it was in Albert's time. If St. Albert posited humors instead of hormones as the basis of temperamental differences, it was on account of the dearth of scientific knowledge and instruments of research in his own era. His observations, however, were accurate, as evident from the foregoing comparison.

### *St. Thomas*

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), pupil of St. Albert the Great, followed in his master's footsteps; in his psychological tracts he too continued the traditional theory of temperaments based on the four humors: "For mixture, the activity of active and passive qualities is required; and mixed bodies differ in temperament according to the predominance of one or the other."[43]

St. Thomas agrees with the physicians of antiquity that intelligence in man varies according to his temperament: "And thus . . . physicians are able to judge of a man's intelligence from his bodily temperament as a proximate disposition."[44] In accord with Maimonides, Aquinas also speaks of concupiscence as being dependent upon temperament: "For by temperament some are more prone than others to concupiscence."[45] Elsewhere Thomas says:

> Some things are pleasurable on account of bad habit, which becomes as it were like nature. Others are pleasurable on account of a faulty nature. For example, some men have corrupted and pervert-

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[42] Pende, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[43] St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Sent.*, d. xliv, q. II, a. 1, *Opera omnia*, VII (Parmae, 1857).

[44] St. Thomas, *Cont. gent.*, III, 84, ed. Leonina, *Opera omnia*, XIV (Rome, 1926).

[45] *Ibid.*, II, 63.

> ed temperaments. On account of this there follows in these persons very perverse imaginations and sensible affections. Since these powers are acts of bodily organs, it is necessary that they be in conformity with the bodily temperament.[46]

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUBSEQUENT AGES

Humoral psychology proved to be remarkably enduring. In the sixteenth century, for instance, Chrysostom Javellus (born c.1470), commenting on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, mirrored St. Thomas' teaching that a man's intelligence is dependent upon his temperament. For Javellus, every man has a natural aptitude for a particular type of knowledge according to his temperament: Sanguines are best disposed for the study of subtle subjects, such as metaphysics and theology; cholerics have a special aptitude for mathematics; phlegmatics are not proficient in the study of subtle subjects, but acquire knowledge through the use of histories, rhetoric and sensible things; and lastly, melancholics are not apt for scientific investigations but are more receptive of revelations and higher impulses, thus producing poets and prophets.[47]

The early Hippocratic and Galenic notions of the temperaments prevailed until the seventeenth century when the work of William Harvey on the motions of the heart and the circulation of the blood (c.1616) revised the Galenic tradition. Prior to Harvey, Vesalius, a student of Galen, had laid the foundation for modern anatomy. Their observations and dissections encouraged greater speculation regarding the kinds and causes of the temperaments.

The growth of an empirically grounded psychology was impeded in the seventeenth century by the Cartesian mechanistic view of man, a view which John Locke's empirical psychology with its materialistic conception of man was unable to correct. Later new divisions of types and new names were proposed for the temperaments by Kant and

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[46] St. Thomas, *In VII Ethic.*, lect. 5, ed. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1949).

[47] Chrysostom Javellus, *In metaphysicem Aristotelis epitome*, lib. I, in *In universam Aristotelis epitome*, ed. Bonellus, (Venice, 1555), pp. 133f.

Wundt, Ebbinghaus and Spurzheim among many others. Even today the work of Kretschmer and Sheldon attests to the respect afforded the theory of temperaments, a theory which has provided man since the time of Hippocrates with a means to better understand himself and his relationships with other men.

MICHAEL DUFFY, O.P.

# PASTORAL COUNSELING AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONTEMPORARY COUNSELING STUDIES

*Of the 350,000 clergymen in the United States*
*not more than 7% have adequate knowledge*
*concerning the psychological operations*
*of the human being.*
Academy of Religion and Mental Health

One of the lasting achievements of our century has been the uncovering of the values of interpersonal communication both among men and between man and God.[1] Some of the basic findings of existentialism and psychiatry in the twentieth century have been about the unique reality of the I-thou relation and dialogal intercourse. Psychiatry has already exercised a profound influence on the field of counseling and it seems inevitable that eventually psychiatry will have an even far greater effect on psychotherapeutic counseling.

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[1] James Collins, *Three Paths in Philosophy* (Chicago: Regnery, 1962), p. 380.

## THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTER OF THE COUNSELING MOVEMENT

As it has become increasingly evident to counselors that in dealing with the problems of individuals they need a philosophical framework to guide their procedure, the writers in the field have begun to indicate a concern for a philosophy with an adequate treatment of the nature of man. As early as 1950 Frederick Thorne admitted that:

> Many personality problems involve questions which are more properly in the realm of philosophy or religion than in the field of the psychological sciences. We live in a world in which the question of value judgments seems to be inextricably bound up with many problems of living.[2]

Recently there has been evidence of a special interest on the part of counselors in existentialist philosophical thought, especially those strains which emphasize that the norm of all knowledge is found in the meeting of persons.[3] Pastoral counselors, especially Protestants, are not unaware of their debt to existential thought. The revitalization of religion in our day is, of course, commonly traced back to the early existentialist thinkers. Soren Kierkegaard was a lonely individualist intent on rescuing the unique self from the anonymous mass. More recent existentialist religious thought has developed Kirkegaard's insights, and men like Martin Buber have shown that the unique self becomes a self only in its human relations. For Buber, "All real living is meeting."[4]

In his book *I and Thou* Martin Buber explored the meaning and scope of the I-thou relation. At the heart of Buber's reasoning was the belief that when we treat anything merely as an object it has the status of the third person neuter pronoun "it." This is also true when we treat a human person as an object, but when we speak to the other in the full depth of his human personality we no longer think of him as "it" but address him as "thou." And for Buber it is only in the resonance of saying "thou" that we are able truly to say "I."[5]

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[2] Frederick Thorne, M.D., *Principles of Personality Counseling* (Brandon, Vermont: Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1950), p. 15.

[3] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Science, Religion and Christianity* (Westminster: Newman Press, 1958), p. 32.

[4] Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), p. 11.

Specific references to Buber's writings and other existentialists have become more frequent in current books and articles on counseling. The influence is most marked in the definite emphasis among counselors today on the importance of the relationship between the counselor and the counselee. Carl Rogers, the dominant name in counseling for a decade, wrote in 1955 that:

> There is, to borrow Buber's phrase, a real I-thou relationship, a timeless living in the experience which is *between* the client and me. It is at the opposite pole from seeing the client, or myself, as an object. It is the height of personal subjectivity.[6]

Counseling individuals who have sought out help can serve as an unparalleled means to reach the recesses of another's existence and to elicit a response from him that will enable him to order his life better and to realize more fully his capabilities. Priests today are called upon to fully acknowledge the worth of the individual and to be equipped to help those they come into contact with to solve the problems confronting them. Although his preparation is largely theoretical, the priest engaged in pastoral work finds the most crucial problem he encounters consists in understanding the actual needs of all those put under his care and of finding the way to meet them adequately.[7]

The study of philosophy can be of considerable help in furnishing the counselor with a basis or a framework for enabling the individuals he deals with to better orientate their lives to proper goals. The classical philosophical tradition teaches that philosophy has as its goal not merely the arrival at a certain system of propositions or theses, however logical the system or however true the propositions of which it is composed. A philosophy is not a body of propositions but a way of life. People want to know not just what propositions to accept, but what kind of life to live, and on what basis. It is the business of philosophy to articulate the principles by which a man can live.

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[5] William Barrett, ed., *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, IV (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 626.

[6] Carl R. Rogers, "Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question," *The American Psychologist*, X (1955), 272.

[7] Noel Mailloux, O.P., from a paper delivered on June 22, 1955, at the Institute for the Clergy on Problems in Pastoral Psychology, Fordham University, New York.

## THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF MAN

The fact can be verified that contemporary secular counseling has expressed a definite interest in a philosophical conception of the nature of man. At the present time in contrast to an earlier emphasis in books and journals on counseling techniques and methods, more thought and effort are being devoted to questions of philosophical foundations and theoretical bases.[8]

The almost total absence of a coherent view of the nature of man in the literature of the counseling movement may be regarded as clearly detrimental. Martin Buber feels that the ills of the contemporary world spring from the injury that has been done to the essentially personal nature of man, not only as between man and man, but also as between man and God.[9] For Buber man's personal nature has not been properly understood. If the personal nature of man and man's relation to God is to be restored, it will first have to be better understood, and the pastoral counselor at the level of individual consultation can play a significant role in its restoration and implementation. The key to the success of the properly trained pastoral counselor in dealing with the needs of individuals is the manner in which, proceeding in light of a fundamentally correct view of the personal nature of man, he is able to accept his clients, to understand his clients, and to establish successful relationships with his clients.

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[8] John F. McGowan and Lyle D. Schmidt, *Counseling: Readings in Theory and Practice* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), p. 97.

[9] John Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 197.

### THE ROLE OF THE PASTORAL COUNSELOR

The generic aim of all types of counseling is to help people to help themselves by gaining understanding of their problems and more especially of their inner conflicts. Counseling is distinguished from psychotherapy in that the latter refers to techniques employed by therapists working with those persons with deep, difficult to uncover, emotionally laden psychological problems. Counseling is concerned with procedures employed with relatively normal people who have personal problems which they feel are beyond self-solution. Counseling is usually reserved for the relatively superficial treatment of mild personality problems in normal people. The relationship between client and counselor which is today considered of prime importance in counseling, is used in different ways, from the offering of suggestions as to available resources, to the interpretation of the client's attitudes and feelings. The directiveness of the counselor varies. In directive counseling the counselor may assume the role of an authority offering the client an evaluation of his problem and defining courses of action. In non-directive counseling the counselor functions as an agent who encourages the client's expression of feelings. The counselor uses the technique of "reflecting" the client's feelings and helping the client to assume responsibility for them. In this way the client thinks things out for himself, developing his own goals and planning his own course of action.[10]

We can propose as a definition that counseling is a face-to-face relationship in which the counselor, a person preferably competently trained in psychological science, consciously attempts by attitudes and verbal means to help others solve problems of life.

In the book *Counseling in Catholic Life and Education,* Fr. Charles

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[10] Lewis R. Wolberg, M.D., *The Technique of Psychotherapy* (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954), p. 12.

Curran shows the reader that personal difficulties exist in a far greater number of the general population than most of us realize.[11] Fr. Curran feels that it is only as we grow aware how common serious problems are and how often people may never have talked to anyone about them that we better appreciate what counseling can mean. Certainly every priest sooner or later finds himself in the role of counselor. The average good Christian always has resorted, and according to surveys still does resort, to the clergy for counsel in matters involving personal problems.[12]

Extensive pastoral counseling is nothing which simple common sense or practical experience *alone* enables one to do. Even for the priest who is not a specialist, beneficial pastoral counseling is a technique to be learned, and it presupposes a thorough knowledge of many things. The Academy of Religion and Mental Health reports that of the 350,000 clergymen in the United States not more than 7% have adequate knowledge concerning the psychological operations of the human being.[13]

The need for the pastoral counselor to recognize the psychological dimensions of the problems that come to him was made quite evident by a survey of pastoral counselors conducted at Loyola University by Fr. Paschal Baute, O.S.B., the Dean of Students at St. Leo College in Florida. Fr. Baute surveyed 113 pastoral counselors who were doing graduate work in counseling under Fr. Curran at Loyola. The majority of the 94 who replied to the survey were actually engaged in pastoral counseling. One of the questions asked was this: Psychological or psychiatric factors are of *major* importance in what per cent of your cases? More than half of the counselors indicated that in at least 50% of the cases they handled, psychological or psychiatric factors were of major importance. The pastoral counselors reported that the most frequent problem which confronted them was marital difficulties between husband and wife. A noteworthy 93% of those surveyed said that marital problems were either a most or more frequent problem. Family relations between parent and child were the second most common problem. Personal adjustment and mental hygiene was the third most frequent area in which the help of the counselors was sought out. Sixty per cent of the pastoral counselors expressed a need for more understanding and knowledge in the area of feelings, emotions and motivation. The survey also indicated that the counselors felt that they were most competent dealing with spiritual problems, then vocational difficulties, and thirdly marital problems. The counselors said, however, that they were inadequate in dealing with first alcoholism, then scrupulosity and then homosexuality.[14]

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[11] Fr. Charles Curran, *Counseling in Catholic Life and Education* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 55.

[12] Dr. John R. Cavanagh, *Fundamental Pastoral Counseling* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1962), p. 19.

[13] "Are We Ready for Dialogue," *Academy Reporter*, VIII (1963), 1.

### *Traits of the Pastoral Counselor*

Not everyone engaged in the ministry is designed by his personality traits to do extensive counseling. It is difficult, however, except in a very general way to list the more common characteristics recommended for counselors. It is generally agreed that the counselor's personality traits and the ways in which he communicates these traits to his clients will determine his effectiveness as a counselor. Observation of counselors has led one author to conclude that the three traits which are essential to effective counseling are those which cause the counselor to behave in ways which demonstrate that he is secure, sensitive, and objective.[15] The pastoral counselor should have an interest in people as individuals, and he should be sensitive to the complexities of motivation. Fr. Noel Mailloux, O.P., points out that while it is quite true that often psychopathologists forget that at least some human acts emanate from clearly conscious judgment and free determination, theologians, on the other hand, frequently fail to give due consideration to the serious obstacles encountered in the acquisition of fully rational functioning.[16] Thorough grounding in psychology will help the pastoral counselor acquire an attitude of acceptance because it will enable him to be interested in the mental processes behind another's behavior instead of passing judgment on the behavior itself.

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[14] Paschal Baute, OSB, "A Research Project on the Evaluation of Pastoral Counselor Training," conducted at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois; unpublished, copyright 1963.

[15] Henry Weitz, "Counseling as a Function of the Counselor's Personality," *Personnel and Guidance Journal,* XXXV (1957), 277.

### *Client Attitudes*

Early in his counseling work the priest will realize that a quite frequent attitude on the client's part is that the pastoral counselor will "do something to him," will make him better. One of the most important discoveries that the client must make is that the responsibility for his condition and recovery is his. Enabling the client to be aware of his self-responsibility without alienating him is a delicate undertaking, but it is a technique which can greatly increase the counselor's ability to achieve positive results. Recent studies in counseling have underlined this responsibility aspect of the counselor-client relationship, and non-directive counseling especially can provide the pastoral counselor with significant insights in this area. Almost all the authors in the field of counseling also insist that the fundamental needs of the client are the need to be understood and the need to be accepted. In this area too the non-directive approach has helped in the developing of a realization of the importance of the counselor's attitude during interviewing. It is important to note, however, that the non-directive school for the most part has stressed technique while recently in the field in general there has been a dramatic shift in concern from technique to a practice giving prominence to the relationship between counselor and client, a relationship which is established through acceptance and understanding.

People today regard the doctor, the teacher, the counselor, the priest, as people who do things to us or for us, or who tell us what to do or how to do it. The client expects to be told, to be informed, to be led, to be questioned, to speak only in response to the counselor. It is precisely in this area that non-directive counseling can make a noteworthy contribution to the pastoral counselor's technique. Pastoral counselors should attempt to have those they work with enter into a relationship in which those seeking help accept responsibility rather than a relationship where it is apparent that there is only counselor acceptance of responsibility. The tendency for clients to play a mere passive role is especially frequent in a counseling relationship with a priest, for the client views the priest as an authoritarian figure who will tell him what to do—who will provide an answer for the client's problem. There is no doubt that the problem of authority is one of undeniable difficulties of priestly counseling. Certainly a first principle in this area would be, however, that a clergyman is a priest first and a counselor second. There are times when a priest must give positive information; a priest cannot remain non-directive at any price. To help develop spiritual values in people, a priest must at times assume the role of instructor and even admonisher—but even here there are right and wrong ways of answering questions and giving information.

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[16] Noel Mailloux, O.P., "The Problem of Scrupulosity in Pastoral Work," *Proceedings of the Institute for the Clergy on Problems in Pastoral Psychology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1956)—cited in Hagmaier and Gleason, *Counseling the Catholic* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), p. ix.

The pastoral counselor must recall that fundamentally counseling refers to a helping process, the aim of which is not necessarily to change the person but rather to enable him to utilize the resources he now has for coping with life. The outcome we would expect from counseling is that the client do something, take some constructive action on his own behalf. Generally it is acknowledged that the goals and objectives expressed by individuals for other people are frequently reflective of the needs of the person who expresses the goals, rather than of the people for whom supposedly the goals are proposed.[17] People can form the habit of advising others as an escape and compensation for the unsolved problems in their own lives. Pastoral counselors should not expect to effect remarkable personality changes in those they counsel. Follow-up research supports the view that normally counseling simply does not accomplish major personality changes. When the relationship in counseling does lead to significant personality changes, it may be termed *therapeutic*. Rogerian theory assumes that there is a single characteristic of interpersonal relationships, namely, non-directiveness or permissiveness, which can account for the therapeutic value of the relationships between all combinations of client and counselor personality.[18] This view must be regarded as too narrow for it precludes the positive role a counselor may maintain in a counseling situation.

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[17] Dugald S. Arbuckle, *Counseling: An Introduction* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1961), p. 4.

To imply that a pastoral counselor may help a client decide what to do does not always mean that the pastoral counselor gives him advice or tells him what he should do. There may be occasions when this is the best way to proceed, but it must be stressed that generally a person facing a choice where he must take responsibility for the consequences needs to be given an opportunity to do his own thinking, rather than to have someone do it for him. This is where the professionally trained counselor differs most from the man in the street. To the average person counseling, even pastoral counseling, is practically synonymous with giving advice. To the professional counselor it is quite a different procedure. This does not mean that the pastoral counselor cannot supply all the necessary information in an interview. Indeed, imparting sound relevant information without advice tends to accentuate rather than to blur the pattern of client responsibility in the counseling relationship. Giving a person factual information bearing on some complex issue implies that one thinks he has the capacity to make use of it.

Practicing counselors often mention that one of the most pervasive sources of bias which influence information giving is the client's own wishes and the counselor's own awareness of them. There is a natural desire to tell the client what he wishes to hear. Frequently the counselor may attempt to estimate the client's chances of success in a field and attempt to advise him accordingly, but again research data makes it fairly clear that counselors cannot be expected to make a good enough prognosis of success for clients to base decisions safely on this procedure. The pastoral counselor must be consistent, realistic, matter of fact; but to the degree to which it is prudent the pastoral counselor should see to it that the client keeps the responsibility for his own life firmly in his own hands.

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[18] Edward S. Bordin, "Ambiguity as a Therapeutic Value," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, XIX (1955), 9.

In regard to how much the counselor can expect to accomplish, Rogers' non-directive technique teaches that the client should "become himself" but that:

> Being himself doesn't 'solve problems.' It simply opens up a new way of living in which there is more depth and more height in the experience of his feelings, more breadth and more range. He feels more unique and hence more alone, but he is so much more real that his relationships with others lose their artificial quality, become deeper, more satisfying . . . this process . . . is a learning by the client. . . . But it is a strange type of learning. Almost never is the learning notable by its complexity, and at its deepest the learnings never seem to fit well into verbal symbols. Often the learnings take such simple forms as 'I *am* different from others'; 'I do feel hatred for him'; 'I *am* fearful of feeling dependent'; 'I do feel sorry for myself'; 'I am self-centered'; . . . But in spite of their seeming simplicity these learnings are vastly significant in some new way which is very difficult to define.[19]

To uncover these notions in the client is to engage in successful counseling.

### *The Use of Non-Directive Techniques*

There are a few general statements which may be formulated to guide the pastoral counselor in determining when non-directive counseling may assist a client to "become himself." Frederick Thorne, who is responsible for some of the most reliable criticism of non-directive counseling, indicates an important distinction in regard to the method's application when he points out that the use of the non-directive approach is indicated more positively with persons who are dissatisfied with themselves and anxious to change, but that its use cannot be so readily advised in regard to persons who are satisfied with themselves and have no insight into the fact of maladjustment or the desirability of changing.[20] Thorne sensibly insists that the counselor should try to be passive according to the indication of the situation rather than to follow any ideological basis. This widely favored view of Thorne has been supported by the work of Hans Strupp who found in a study of the use of various counseling techniques by professional counselors that, "an increase in experience leads to a diversification of therapeutic technique, and conversely reliance on one specific technique is a characteristic of inexperience."[21]

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[19] Carl R. Rogers, *loc. cit.*, 269.

According to the manner in which clients present their problems, there is an important further classification that is made today: One group is identified as primarily "cognitive" in nature, and another group presents problems that are primarily "affective." This means that in terms of the way clients present their problems some choose to present material based on a "factual" or cognitive approach, while others present more affective or "feeling" material. These differences in presentation seem to indicate a need for varying approaches in handling problems. Some people seem to be more comfortable if they can intellectualize their problems whereas others tend to become emotionally involved with any problem they face. The pastoral counselor could expect the client who presents his problem factually to be more inclined to the acceptance of a rational working out of his difficulty, but the emotionally inclined client will have to be treated very carefully, especially in the early stages of interviewing and probably to some extent passively.

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[20] Frederick C. Thorne, "Critique of Recent Developments in Personality Counseling Theory," *Journal of Clinical Psychology,* XIII (1957), 237.

[21] Hans H. Strupp, "Psychotherapeutic Technique, Professional Affiliation and Experience Level," *Journal of Consulting Psychology,* XIX (1955), 100.

## *Michael Duffy, O.P.*

### THE ROLE OF RELATIONSHIP

The non-directive school helped to uncover the value of acceptance and understanding in counseling procedure. But it was eclectic or directive counseling with its concern with the role of personality which has had a considerable influence on the great attention paid to relationship in contemporary counseling studies. John McGowan and Lyle Schmidt, after their complete survey of the literature of contemporary counseling, concluded that the relationship which develops between the counselor and client is the most significant aspect of counseling. They insisted that each counselor should develop an attitude toward counseling and a technique that are consistent with what he is as a person.[22]

Trained counselors can and do agree upon the essentials of a good counseling relationship, and counselors also tend to create a similar counseling atmosphere, regardless of the training provided in the schools where the counselors performed their graduate work. It may be said that the relationship or rapport between counselor and client is the primary medium of assistance in successful counseling. Those factors which foster the development and maintenance of an effective relationship are of primary importance. According to McGowan and Schmidt these factors seem to be the essential characteristics of the counselor himself:

> His attitudes, values and intentions in his relationships with others; his real purposes and goals in making counseling a career; and finally, his objectives in counseling with a particular client. . . . These characteristics tend to be more essential than the counselor's specific knowledges or his counseling 'techniques.' If a counselor is technically competent, and in addition is fundamentally a friendly, warm, and accepting individual who is comfortable in close relationships with others, and who sincerely wants to be of assistance to them, then a surprising number of errors in technique can be made without seriously jeopardizing the potential success of the counseling relationship.[23]

[22] McGowan and Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 354.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. vi.

The competently prepared priest who intends to devote a considerable portion of his time in the apostolate to pastoral counseling should be greatly encouraged by these findings. If the values, intentions, goals and objectives in counseling a particular client are among the most crucial factors in affecting a successful relationship, it would seem that a capable priest would be especially apt to have success in counseling, for it is precisely in these areas where he should be most respected.

The other conviction of McGowan and Schmidt is that

> each counselor will develop both an attitude toward counseling and a technique that are consistent with what he is as a person or what he hopes to become. This implies that the road toward becoming an expert counselor will be shortened considerably if the new counselor accepts this personalized orientation to the process and attempts to approach his preparation and study with increased self-awareness as one objective of his training.[24]

What the counselor brings to the counseling situation as a person is of great significance. The discipline, balance, and spiritual development which a faithful priest will cultivate should greatly help to prepare him for counseling.

### *The Art of Listening*

There are some further norms for pastoral counseling which can be formulated in the light of the importance of counselor-client relationship. Normally the aim of the initial interview is primarily diagnostic. This does not mean that the pastoral counselor must be able to label the client's personality disorder but rather that the counselor make a general evaluation of the client's psychological status and of his suitability for counseling. It is always most essential that the client be given a chance to talk. Dr. Cavanagh states flatly that as counselors clergymen tend to talk too much.[25] The value of listening has long been recognized and practiced. In *Counseling*

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Cavanagh, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

*the Catholic,* Fr. Gleason shows that the art of listening should play a special role in pastoral counseling. Fr. Curran tells his students that a person who is deeply involved in personal problems probably has been told what he should do, often many times, and it has not helped. The first thing such a person needs is an opportunity to unburden himself. To do this, he must be able to go to someone in whom he has confidence and whom he feels will listen to and understand the weight of his problems and the degree of his own weakness.

The ability to listen well is, for the average priest, the safest and soundest of techniques. Admittedly listening is not the only effective tool of the priest-counselor. Advice and persuasion when a solution to a problem is quite clear to *both* counselor and client are at times the best procedure. The listening technique is best used in cases where a solution to a complicated and largely unresolved human problem is far from clear to the client. The priest should be slow to presume that most human problems are resolved by "common sense" solutions. Merely remaining silent is not really the essence of the listening process. Intelligent, active listening means that the counselor is not only listening but *understanding.* The counselor by listening intently and with obvious interest quite readily establishes a working contact between the counselee and himself which will serve as an excellent basis for developing a successful relationship.

For the initial interview Dr. Cavanagh recommends that the client do 80% of the talking and the pastoral counselor 20%.[26] Towards the end of the interview the client should be assured that his talking so freely has been worthwhile. It is the acceptance and understanding together with the atmosphere of hopeful recovery that is created by the listener which wins the confidence of the client and draws him back for further counseling. According to Fr. Curran:

> The fact that others know our peculiar weaknesses and defects and still accept us, makes us feel less discouraged. It brings great

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

> self-confidence. The counselor's quiet and understanding acceptance must be real. It cannot be put on. The artificial reassurances that people often give in an attempt to cheer us are superficial and lack deep understanding of our real problems. They not only do not help but frequently are deeply resented. By contrast, the true acceptance which a skillfully penetrating response conveys is never resented but is genuinely appreciated. It always encourages further expression. Unless the person being counseled can be thoroughly himself with all his disordered, hesitant and confused ways of expressing himself he cannot feel he belongs in the counseling situation.[27]

There is general agreement that each counseling visit should not last more than one hour and in most cases one visit a week is adequate. Frequency of interviews should depend primarily on the client's needs. At least in the early stages of counseling discussion of feelings may be more valuable than uncovering all the facts. The counselor may never be sure at what point the client may state his major difficulties. Sometimes even after a number of interviews the client may still be holding back significant material.

### *Understanding and Acceptance*

If a counselor has sound feelings about the people he is working with and a basic belief in their worthiness and ability to grow, then it follows that how he expresses these beliefs is not as important as the fact that he manages to convey them regardless of the verbal techniques he employs. To be too conscious of the importance of saying the right thing at every pause is a state of mind that hampers the counselor's work. For the inexperienced pastoral counselor it is better to begin with good relationships and attitudes and then gradually perfect and polish the verbal skills than to work on the verbal skills first and ignore the human realities. It is understanding and acceptance which are the key to a successful relationship. Acceptance does not involve either approval or disapproval of the particular aspects of a client's personality, but rather, it is necessary to reiterate, the personality as a whole, not any facet of it, is accepted by the counselor. To understand is simply to grasp clearly and completely the meaning the client is trying to convey. To understand in this way it is not enough that one find out the facts of the individual's life. It is the attitudes accompanying the facts that matter, the way the person sees them and reacts to them. To respond to the factual details of a client's statements is not usually difficult, but it is hard to detect the nuances of feeling which are expressed.

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[27] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

The beginning counselor in the initial stages of interviewing feels in regard to the client that, "I must make him like me." The more experienced counselor thinks, "I must like him." John McGowan of the University of Missouri says that when he teaches a course on practice counseling he begins by telling the students to "be yourself."[28] The practicing counselors are urged not to try to play a role which may reflect nothing more than how they feel they should react on the basis of whatever previous training they have had.

Perhaps the most important conclusion from our survey is that it seems preferable for the pastoral counselor to adopt a counseling theory or technique to his own personality and to establish his own verbal style than to attempt to change his own personality to fit a technique. This is in no way meant to imply that a pastoral counseling relationship is essentially the same as a social relationship. There are basic differences. Many experienced counselors, however, have found that social skills that have worked well for them in previous social relationships have proved equally effective in establishing a successful counseling relationship. If the counselor really wants to help him the client will know it, and this is one of the basic feelings that must be communicated. The counselor must have a genuine interest in each client as *he now is.* At all times it should be evident that the pastoral counselor is on the client's side in his struggle for understanding and mastery—that the counselor is not using unwelcome facts as weapons against him. The structure of pastoral counseling should be: these are the facts—this is the reality we face—how can we best come to terms with it so that the client may achieve that maturity of mind and action which will bring him closer to sanctification and a fuller expression of life in Christ.

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[28] John F. McGowan, "Developing a Natural Counseling Style," in McGowan and Schmidt, *op. cit.,* p. 369.

CYRIL L. LANDMESSER, O.P.

# THE PROVIDENTIAL GOD OF GENESIS

*There is a divinity that*
*shapes our ends,*
*Rough-hew them how we will.*
Hamlet

In these times of repeated scientific advances, the world continues to move away from an idea of the supernatural, and many people are all too ready to accept a mechanistic explanation of the universe. After circling the earth in outer space, a Russian cosmonaut, Major Gherman Titov, exclaimed that he "saw no God out there" and he attributed all the wonders of the world which man knows to man alone. He saw no need for a divine providence when the universe was moving toward perfection directed solely by the intelligence of man.

But men were not always this rash. They were not so within the confines of ancient Israel. There, the worship of the one true God prevailed. The peculiar glory of the Jews throughout their checkered history, amid the surrounding corruptions of polytheism, was their primitive concept of the one true God; the all-loving Father "who provideth for the raven, when the young ones cry to God, wandering about because they have no meat" (Job 38:41); the personal God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who delivered Israel from the bondage of Egypt, the great ruler of all nations, who brought the Philistines, the mortal enemies of the Jews out of Caphtor, and the despised Syrians out of Kir (Amos 9:7).

The universal providence of the God of revelation clearly distinguishes Him from the unfeeling deities of the cultured heathen and the tribal gods of the untutored savage.[1] The world in which we live, and of which we are part, is not the outcome of some aimless chance, but the ordered design of God the Creator. To deny God's providence is to suppose that the Supreme Intelligence acted with less foresight than we would allow a normal human being.

> Providence in God means no more than intelligent planning for divine action. It means that God acted intelligently in building the world and governing it. He knows where He is going and how, what this particular stone is for and where it belongs.[2]

"In bringing a world into existence, God went to work in an orderly way with a definite goal in view. That goal is Man, who is the crown and the lord of creation."[3]

### GOD'S WAY WITH MEN

"Although we find the word 'providence' for the first time in the Book of Wisdom [14:3; 17:2], belief in divine providence is contemporaneous with primitive revelation."[4] The author of the Book of Genesis continually manifests God's providence, even though he does not refer to it as such, in the events he chooses to relate to his readers.

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[1] See Richard Downey, *Divine Providence* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 2.

[2] Walter Farrell, O.P., *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1941), I, 121.

[3] Margaret T. Monro, *Thinking About Genesis* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), p. 129.

[4] Paul Heinisch, *Theology of the Old Testament* (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1955), p. 160.

> The idea of a universe driving with evident purpose to a goal without a directive transcendent Cause is unacceptable to a sound philosopher. It was quite unthinkable for the author of Genesis.[5] This deep consciousness and conviction of God's personal care for them, both as individuals and as a nation, were dominant features of Jewish history, unique in the annals of mankind.[6]

Genesis tells the history of the ways of God with men and of men with God. It is an historical book, but not everything in it is history, and the history that is in it is history with a purpose. This does not diminish its value as history, nor our respect for the sources on which the sacred writer depended. Modern studies are day by day increasing in us a healthy respect for the accuracy of these traditions.[7]

> Genesis, like most books in the Bible, has behind it a long literary history which is much more complex than we might imagine at first glance. This book is actually the result of combining many ancient traditions and sources. These traditions had previously been recast and given shape in many earlier spoken and written versions. Today it is customary among biblical scholars to single out the various traditions or sources in Genesis and to speak of them, with their special qualities and characteristics, as if they were books in themselves. In many respects it would be preferable to handle them just that way.[8]

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[5] Alexander Jones, *Unless Some Man Show Me* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951), p. 88.

[6] William B. Murphy, O.P., *et. al.*, *God and His Creation* (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1958), p. 219.

[7] See Bruce Vawter, C.M., *A Path Through Genesis* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), p. 20 *passim.*

[8] Ignatius Hunt, O.S.B., *The Book of Genesis Part 1 with a Commentary* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1960), p. 6. For a detailed study of criticism of the authorship of Genesis and the other books of the Pentateuch, we refer the reader to A. Robert and A. Tricot's *Guide to the Bible* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1951), Vol. I, c. 5, pp. 49-109; see also Luis Alonso Schökel, S.J., *Understanding Biblical Research* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963). For a highly technical consideration see Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis* (London: SCM Press, 1961). This work, translated by John H. Marks, ranks as a full-scale commentary, and its limitations are the dominant interests of the author himself.

But our present concern is a brief description of Genesis and a consideration of divine providence as manifested in that book.

The first eleven chapters of Genesis are its introduction.

> They tell of events which took place before the existence of any human witness. We do not usually call them history, but in the sense that we use 'history' to distinguish fact from fancy, the true from the imaginary, these chapters can be called historical. What they teach is not myth or fable, but reality.[9]

They concern the history of God's dealings with men prior to the call of Abraham. This is necessary that we might fit Israel into the proper place in the larger family of man.

> These chapters are a deliberate claim made for Yahweh of all the divine actions ever done anywhere at any time, and a dispossession, in God's favor, of all the gods and goddesses of the nations.[10]

Genesis traces the descent of Jacob from Adam by a process of elimination, which is at the same time a gradual narrowing of the theme. Although many of the peoples mentioned were more ancient, more powerful and more cultured than Israel, none of them were chosen by God as his peculiar possession.[11]

> With the mystic call of Abraham from Mesopotamia to Palestine, God begins the formation of the ethnic group in which He will found His Kingdom on earth.[12]

The sacred writer pictures for us (Gen. 1-11) the creation of the world and man, man's fall from grace accompanied by the promise of redemption, God's care of man after the fall, the general corruption of men and the flood with the salvation of Nöe and his family;

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[9] Vawter, *op. cit.*, pp. 31f.

[10] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[11] See Dom Bernard Orchard, ed., *et al.*, *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1953), p. 177, 136d, g. In all other citations this work will be referred to as *CCHS.*

[12] Peter F. Ellis, C.SS.R., *The Men and the Message of the Old Testament* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1962), p. 11.

and the writer ends with the Tower of Babel and the dispersion of men. The sacred writer is here concerned with the period of pre-history; in the rest of the book he tells the story of the patriarchs who lived in the second millenium B.C.—of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and how God protected them. The providence of God is clearly illustrated in the Joseph story.

Genesis manifests a lofty conception of God. The sacred writer teaches us that there is only one God, that He created all things, that He made man master of created things.[13]

> God's love is the meaning of the creation of heaven and earth. His love, too, alone can explain the selection of a special people, the making of a covenant with them and the great promises given to them and fulfilled in our own day.[14]

God's love in the Book of Genesis is seen as creative, merciful and selective. A manifestation of divine providence begins to emerge here which will become more pronounced throughout the Bible, resting upon faith in God's omnipotence, upon faith in God's omniscience which foresees future contingent acts, and upon faith in God's justice (Wis. 12; 14:3; 15:5-6). Above all, however, providence rests upon God's love, which, though embracing all creation, is tendered primarily to men and is able to make evil itself serve a higher end (Wis. 16:3, 5; 39:3; 41).[15] "God not only conserves His creatures in existence; He guides those endowed with intelligence to their proper end, i.e., His glory and their own happiness."[16]

## GOD'S PLAN FOR MEN

Differences can arise when providence is attributed to God. In men providence is a part of prudence, and the prudent man takes counsel in order to resolve his doubt. But how can God be said to have any doubts—an obvious imperfection. A dilemma exists, for if God cannot be called prudent, He can not be called provident. Also, providence deals with temporalities, but God is eternal. These difficulties, however, run counter to what is taught in Sacred Scripture, and to the many definitions of the Church on the question.[17]

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[13] See *ibid.*, p. 74; also Monro, *loc. cit.*

[14] Kathryn Sullivan, R.S.C.J., *God's Word and Work* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1958), p. 3.

[15] Cf. Heinisch, *loc. cit.*

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

> Theologically, the existence of divine providence may be shown from the fact that the types or ideas of all creatures pre-exist in the divine mind. But the very manner in which creatures attain their specific ends manifests a created order of things, and thus this actually existing order of things to their end is itself a creature. There must, then, be a pre-existing plan in the mind of God according to which the created ordering of things is realized. This is divine providence, which is defined as the *idea of plan, existing in the divine mind, of the order of creatures to their end.* . . . Providence is the logical sequel to creation. In accord with the infinite knowledge of the divine intellect, the divine will freely calls the universe into being. Providence is simply the plan of the divine mind to conserve that same universe and to direct it to the end which God decrees for it. Providence presupposes God's love, justice and mercy.[18]

In the text from the First Vatican Council, the providence of God is described in all the following ways: universal, or all-embracing, based on the universal causality of God; immediate, in that it is God himself who orders and governs as the unique source of conservation for the universe; infallible, or certain in the attainment of its purpose, because of God's unerring knowledge of every being both in its causes and in its effects; uniform, or in harmony with the laws of nature, for no creature, operating through secondary causes, can escape the universal cause—God.[19]

> God is Himself simple, without complication, multiplication or composition. But myriad creatures are required to reflect even a glim-

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[17] See Denzinger-Schönmetzer, S.I., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Frieburg: Herder, 1962), no. 3003.

[18] Murphy, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 220f.

[19] See Downey, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-37; also Murphy, *et. al., op. cit.*, pp. 221-23; also St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (New York: Doubleday Image Books Edition, 1956), III, *passim.*

> mer of His beauty, just as the diamond requires many facets to display the perfection of brilliance in the depths of the gem.[20]

"The material universe itself is an expression of the divine thought, and a distant reflection of the beauty of God; it is all alive with light and with love."[21] Such love is seen repeatedly in the events related in Genesis.

### GOD'S CARE OF MEN

In the beginning, God prepares a home for mankind. Man is seen as the special object of God's care.

> God said, Let us make mankind in our image and likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, the cattle, over all the wild animals and every creature that crawls on the earth. (Gen. 1:26)

Man is at home in the garden of Eden, and "the great love of God is expressed metaphorically in the well-being that goes with living in a garden of delights."[22] It must be remembered, too, that this account is theological not geographical.

Again the care of God for man is manifested in the creation of woman. "Then the Lord God said, 'It is not good that the man is alone; I will make him a helper like himself.'" (Gen. 2:18) And after man's temptation and fall, God not only promised a redeemer in the Protoevangelium (Gen. 3:15), but He cared for his creatures in the world. "The Lord God made garments of skin for Adam and his wife and clothed them." (Gen. 3:21)

The providence of God for His creatures is most manifest in the promise of redemption, "for the promise is made to the race collectively and not individually. It is for each one with the help of God and his own free will to ensure that he shares in the blessing promised to all."[23]

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[20] Murphy, *et al., op. cit.,* pp. 225f.

[21] Jean Mouroux, *The Meaning of Man* (New York: Doubleday Image Books Edition, 1961), p. 18.

[22] Ellis, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

> Mankind is not cursed by the Almighty. Rather, it is the earth that is cursed because of man. Man had been made to rule over this earth, but henceforth the earth will be restive under this rule and will yield itself to his uses only reluctantly and through his strenuous toil.[24]

After slaying his brother, Abel, Cain complains that God's punishment of him is too severe and that he has become prey to all men. But God in His providence cares for Cain by giving him a "token" by putting him under His protection (Gen. 4:15). God's blessing is seen in the increase of the human race, for Adam begot unnamed and unnumbered sons and daughters (Gen. 5:4).

Man's wickedness then becomes widespread and God decides to punish the entire race (Gen. 6:5-7). But the providence of God includes His knowledge of Nöe, the just man, and God "hastens" to bring him out of the midst of these iniquities (Gen. 6:8). "Then the Lord said to Nöe, 'Go into the ark, you and all your household; for you, in this generation, I have found just in my sight.'" (Gen. 7:1) The ark is seen as the divinely appointed means of temporal salvation, and "the flood was likewise the means of freeing 'the sons of God' from the danger of the corruption which surrounded them."[25] Then God said to Nöe and to his sons with him, "I will establish my covenant with you, and with your descendants after you." (Gen. 9:8-9) This covenant, one of three indicated in Genesis, is one of the great landmarks in the history of God's providential preparation and election of Israel. God saved Nöe out of a mass of corruption that he might raise up a new people pleasing to him.[26]

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[23] *CCHS*, p. 187, 145d.

[24] Vawter, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[25] *CCHS*, p. 190, 147f and 148a.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 191, 149a.

### *God's Care of Abraham*

The providence of God, presupposing His love, justice and mercy, is clearly manifested in the call of Abraham (Gen. 12). Through God's mercy, Abraham is removed from the idolatry and pagan error in which he had been raised and is directed towards the land of Palestine.

> Today, archeological investigations show that Abraham's journey was part of a migratory movement from east to west. It has also been discovered that the cities of Ur and Haran, where Abraham stayed for a time, were linked together by the common worship of the moon-goddess, Sin. Thus, the biblical account is set in a definite place and period.[27]

The story told of Abraham in Egypt during a famine is an excellent example of God's protection (Gen. 12:10-20).

God's covenant with Abraham (Gen. 15:1-8) is a great design and the utter gratuity of the covenant left the Jews in open-mouthed admiration. God will re-establish this covenant with the son of Abraham and some see in Abraham's laugh as he heard the news that his aged wife was to bear a child, a note of disbelief.[28] But God's ways are not ours, and it is not easy to see the path that He has traced in His providence. Yet when Abraham displays perfect obedience to God in the apparent sacrifice of Isaac, God's providence is manifested in His reward to the patriarch. "I will indeed bless you, and will surely multiply your descendants as the stars of the heavens, as the sands on the seashore." (Gen. 22:17) This promise is repeated to Jacob when God changes his name to Israel (Gen: 25:11-12). The promises made by God to the patriarchs take on greater meaning when seen as parts of God's design for his chosen people.

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[27] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 25; see also Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J., *Introducing the Old Testament* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 1-11.

[28] Cf. Vawter, *op. cit.*, pp. 145f.

### *God's Continuing Care*

A remarkable example of God's providence is found in the story of the wife sought for Isaac (Gen. 24). Abraham's trust in the Lord is complete and he sends his servant to his "land and kindred." The servant is told by Abraham that God "will send His angel ahead of you and you will obtain a wife for my son there." (Gen. 24:7) Thereupon the servant journeys to Nahor and goes to the town well, where he boldly seems to set down conditions for God to meet if Isaac is to obtain a wife. Then God "arranged" that Rebecca go to the well at which Abraham's servant was waiting.[29] Rebecca complies with the conditions and the servant of Abraham must acknowledge the providence of God. "Then the man bowed in worship to the Lord, saying, 'Blessed be the Lord, the God of my master Abraham, whose constant favor to my master has not ceased.'" (Gen. 24:26-27)

Jacob wrestles with an angel (Gen. 32:22-32), and

> it was only by divinely given strength that he could hold his own, . . . from this achievement he was to learn that God's blessing and protection would be with him in all the difficulties of the future.[30]

So we can say that God not only conserves His creatures in existence; He guides those endowed with intelligence to their proper end, that is, toward His glory and their own happiness.

However, it is in the Joseph story that the providence of God is most beautifully demonstrated.

> Of all the lives of the Hebrew patriarchs, Joseph's is the most thoroughly reported and done in the greatest detail. For one thing, of course, he was the most recent of the patriarchs, and the traditions concerning him were consequently fresher and more abundant. But there were other reasons for this as well. In a sense, Joseph's

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[29] Cf. Heinisch, *op. cit.*, p. 159; also Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
[30] *CCHS*, p. 199, 155a.

> career was more intimately connected with the Israelites than were any of his predecessors. Because of Joseph the Israelites entered Egypt, where they were to be formed into a people and whence they were to emerge a ransomed people to the glory of God and as a standing testimonial to His grace.[31]

Joseph's brothers sold him into slavery in Egypt. There, he was falsely accused by his master's wife and thrown into prison. His ability to interpret dreams eventually freed him, brought him before God's Pharoah, and made him viceroy of Egypt. All this is in the plan of God's providence.

When famine came to the land, Egypt was spared disaster by Joseph's foresight. Israel, however, suffered hunger and Jacob sent his sons to Egypt for grain. When Joseph finally revealed his identity to his brothers their fear appeared justified.

> By all rights Joseph's brothers could fear his vengeance, but Joseph had not played his game with them so long for any petty purpose. He was now in a position to do great things for his family, and there was only love in his heart. We may think, indeed, he was more than generous in minimizing his brothers' sin, attributing all to God's providence in working good despite man's evil-doing.[32]

But Joseph magnanimously recognizes the over-ruling providence of God in his being sold into Egypt by his brothers.

> God sent me out ahead to preserve your family upon earth, to keep you alive, to rescue you in a remarkable manner. Therefore, you have not sent me here, but God. (Gen. 45:7-8)

Jacob then takes his family into Egypt, where they would survive the famine and continue God's plan. We see in the Joseph story too how God knows how to make even error and sin serve His purposes. At the end Joseph could say to his brothers, "You intended evil against me, but God intended it for good, to do as He has done today, namely to save the lives of many people." (Gen. 50:20)

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[31] Vawter *op. cit.*, p. 241.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 378f.

### MAN'S VIEW OF GOD

To the skeptic, the cynic, the unbeliever, the history found in the Bible will lack authenticity. They will not see God as an historical personage of unequalled importance. They will not see God in His unceasing role of intervention on man's behalf. They will fail to see God's plan, His ordering of men to their goal. However,

> historical realities are not envisaged in the Bible according to 'the natural course of events.' The Biblical authors are not concerned any more than were those to whom they addressed themselves, with what we call 'secondary causes.' God does everything—rain, war, the birth of a child, the prosperity of the flock, intelligence and madness, life and death.[33]

The author of the Book of Genesis sees history as God-directed, manifesting the conduct of God towards His people. "Thus one comes to discover a general economy of history in the Bible: we call it the 'Plan of God.'"[34] A lesson which permeates biblical history is that God directs the history of men. Genesis unveils the providence of God from the creation of the world and the first man down through the story of Joseph in Egypt. God's providence will be revealed again and again throughout the Bible. Once seen, man can only marvel at the all-loving Father who stands revealed to our admiring gaze.

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[33] Georges Auzou, *The Word of God* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960), p. 216.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

FINIAN TURNER, O.P.

# THE SECULARIZATION OF HISTORY THROUGH THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

*The extraneous objective forces*
*which have hitherto governed history*
*now pass under the control of man himself.*
Engels

Bossuet, the "last of the old school" of prelate-historians, had written his *Discourse on Universal History,* interpreting all historical events in the light of divine Providence. His general thesis was: "If God be really God and if Christianity be the unique Revelation of the Son of God, all falls under Providence and Providence centers round the words and works of Christ."[1] This was the old traditional view, the Augustinian outlook, which gave an ultimate meaning to all the disparate occurences that thrust themselves up from the stream of history.

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[1] M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., *The Meaning and Matter of History* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 96.

Bossuet held that there was a benevolent God who was also a just judge. He ruled over all and directed all to return eventually to Him in the Kingdom that was to come. He Himself spoke to man in the flow of time through awesome revelation: in the cloud and thunder of Sinai; in the great desert of the Exodus; in defeat and victory; and finally, in the most magnificent theophany that man was ever to experience. He struck life into the womb of mankind, and from a Virgin Mother God issued forth incarnate—a man who would show men how to live. His message broke the chains that bound men to the earth. There was a new endless life to come which was to be won by suffering and death, by counting as nothing the things of this earth. This life in time became the preparation for the next life in glorious eternity.

This was the traditional Christian view of history, fully and finally articulated by Bossuet and men of his mold. The eyes of different men began to look another way and just beyond the horizon they could see the flashes of a new outlook beginning to project themselves upon the scene. They felt the change heralded upon the winds of discontent; the sounds of muffled rumblings began to insinuate doubts and then boomed out blatant denials: The old view was false. It came from an abuse of evidence. It is not Providence that determines history; it is man and his human capacity for progress.

### *Background of the Break with the Traditional View*

The change in the outlook on history did not abruptly expel the traditional Christian view of Providence, but, like the Idea of Progress which it espoused, it moved in gradually, smoothly, inexorably.

There were causes that had been preparing the way for the secularization of the Christian view, or rather, for the change from the theological view of history based on Providence to the philosophical view of history based on man. "The inauguration of the philosophy of history was an emancipation from the theological interpretation and was antireligious in principle."[2] Some of these causes had been festering for generations, some for centuries. As the end of the seventeenth century came, these and other, newer causes were seized upon by the men who had grown discontented with the institutions of Christianity and had made the illogical leap to identify their discontent with the God of Christianity. These men were the *rationalists.* They believed that there were several reasons which justified, even demanded, a new view of life, as well as of history.

First of all, they were influenced by Averroism which had survived as an undercurrent down to the time of the seventeenth century philosopher Pierre Bayle, who promulgated it in his *Critical and Historical Dictionary.* This anti-clerical doctrine held for a naturalist interpretation of religion and ethics, excluding God from the everyday economy of the universe. Although it somehow avoided atheism, the supernatural was ruled out, and natural laws along with an eternal nature were the explanations of religion itself.

Secondly, the recent revival of ancient pagan philosophy and literature put the focus back on man and his achievements, showing what intellectual and scientific advancements the men of the past had made—without the Christian God. Similarly, the great travels of exploration and colonization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had brought back stories of marvelous pagan civilizations having high standards of morality and advanced cultures. Some, especially China, had simple, tolerant cults devoid of superstition and dogmas, both of which seemed to be the curse of Christianity.

The rationalists also saw what looked like a breakdown of traditional Christian Providence. The multitude of sects spawned by the Reformation, along with their constant wars and bickering, seemed to point to the lack of a peaceful, unifying element in Christianity. The common notions and beliefs which all men of all ages have held, founded on reason alone, could act as the basis for a rational outlook on life, for a natural religion.

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[2] Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: Phoenix Books: 1949), p. 104.

Finally, and perhaps the most important of these causes, were the contributions of Descartes with his mathematical method and his insistence upon clear and distinct ideas, and the deterministic mechanism of Newton.

### *Voltaire and the "Philosophy of History"*

Missionary work reporting the ancient and highly civilized culture of China gave Voltaire the starting point for his book, *Essays on the Manners and Mind of Nations* (1756) which was a refutation of Bossuet's work, an attack on the Bible as history, and a view of history which contradicted the theological one. It was in this work that the term *philosophy of history* was first used in opposition to the traditional Christian view. Voltaire's aim in the *Essay* was to show that Bossuet's universal history was not universal and that Providence was not evident in the empirical course of history. Voltaire's method in writing his work was rather simple:

> He collects as many significant cultural facts as possible and interprets them by the standard of common human reason. Civilization means to him the progressive development of sciences and skills, morals and laws, commerce and industry. The two great obstacles to this progress are dogmatic religion and wars—the main topics in Bossuet's theology of political history. . . . In Voltaire's essay God has retired from the rule of history; he may still reign, but he does not govern by intervention. The purpose and meaning of history are to improve by our own reason the condition of man, to make him less ignorant, better and happier.[3]

As much as Voltaire sought to approach history as a philosopher and an historian, neither his *Essay* nor his subsequent works formed any true philosophy of history. Their only unity was a chronological arrangement of events with the Idea of Progress maintained as a hypothetical principle. There was no unifying center or single philosophical principle as an end which gave his works the intrinsic validity of a system of thought.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

### *Montesquieu and the "General Laws"*

Providence had been replaced or secularized by the rationalists with their Idea of Progress as the dynamic, directing force in history. Voltaire gave the new "theologically-emancipated" view its name, *philosophy of history,* but it was up to others to give the new concept its principles of unity and order which would bind it into the smoothness of an ideological system.

Montesquieu (1689-1755), in his *Esprit des lois,* gave some help in this direction through what he called "general laws," to which both political and physical phenomena are subject. These general laws were geographical and climatic. His thought was, however, too unsystematic to work out a philosophical theory embodying these laws. Montesquieu did state that all products of social life are closely interrelated, but in his attempt to explain this through the correlation of laws and institutions with historical circumstances, he did not distinguish or connect the various stages with civilization. He separated social phenomena from their existence and relations in time.[4]

### *Turgot and the Two Laws of Man's Development*

Turgot (1727-1781) conceived universal history as "the progress of the human race advancing as an immense whole steadily, through alternating periods of calm and disturbance towards greater perfection."[5] The passions of man have been the driving forces of such progress, but they only operate until reason can take over.

Like the others promoting the Idea of Progress, Turgot saw that there must be laws to facilitate man's limitless perfectibility. The great advance in the physical sciences showed these philosophers of history the importance of discovering the law which lay at the basis of any development. This would enable them to understand the present state of the science and to predict its future ramifications.

[4] J. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 148.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 155.

Just as there were laws in the physical sciences, so also in this science of human progress there were laws because man's laws followed upon and were influenced by the laws of science.

Turgot formulated two laws for man's development. The first was that every change brings an increase of progress to a people. The second law was that there are three stages of intellectual development. Man's progress can be measured by the increased sophistication of his intellectual concepts. The first stage is theological. Here invisible, intelligent beings are thought to cause physical phenomena. In the second, the metaphysical stage, the abstract ideas of essences and faculties are said to be responsible for physical phenomena. Finally, in the third and positive stage, experience proves that mathematical hypotheses formed from observing the reciprocal mechanical action of bodies explain physical phenomena.

### *Condorcet*

Condorcet (1743-1794), following the principles of his friend Turgot, set himself the impossible task of writing the complete history of the progress of humanity, attempting to show the successive changes in society and the effects of one historical event on the next. His hope was to be able to trace the gradual advance of humanity towards happiness. However, his view of the past hampered him from the start:

> He condemns almost every institution which the societies of the past had evolved, and attaches supreme importance to the progress of intellectual enlightenment in the mind of the individual. . . . The history of the past was little more than a dismal catalogue of absurdities and crimes against humanity, all of which would have been avoided if man had been content to follow his innate good sense.[6]

Condorcet expressed this philosophy of history in his book, *The Progress of the Human Mind*, by delineating ten periods of civilization which he thought indicated the important steps in knowledge. The failure of his system resulted from the fact that these periods were neither justified nor coordinated in importance. Further, he ignored the prominent role played by institutions in social development and rather considered them as hindrances to the freedom of human thought and progress. He did not see them as the spontaneous expressions of societies, embodying their ideals.

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[6] Christopher Dawson, *The Dynamics of World History*, ed. John J. Mulloy (New York: Mentor-Omega, 1962), pp. 44f.

### THE FIRST MODERN PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY

The first stage in the development of the philosophies of history had passed. Its role had been "to ground the faith" in the concept of human progress. The philosophers turned their minds away from God because He was too obscure, too mysterious, too unknowable. They did not try to seek reasons *for* their faith, but rather to establish reason *as* their faith; it could explain itself. Men no longer had to find the reasons for physical phenomena in God; they could find them in nature by the diligent application of the human intellect, and thereby they could form the sciences which would give direction and explanation to the once mysterious world. The next step was that man himself was subject to many of these laws. This gave him a greater "freedom" from the dogmatic strictures which bound him to God because man was no longer in the dark—he knew nature and could forget the mysteries.

Over and above the natural scientific laws, there emerged the Idea of Progress which had special significance for man, since it lifted him into an autonomy whereby he could provide the ultimate explanations of life. The plan of Providence gave way to the unhindered march of human progress which would be ever perfectible due to the nature of reason. Reason's positive study of history and of worldly phenomena showed that civilization inevitably marched forward as man's intellect became more aware of physical and social phenomena. The more reason discovered the laws of these phenomena the more it could forsee the future and could consciously direct its course. Man had taken the place of God; reason had solved all mysteries.

### *Saint-Simon*

With Saint-Simon (1760-1825) there was a more concerted effort to seek a true social law which would give validity and unity to the Idea of Progress as the physical laws did for the physical sciences. Slowly a sociology was developing. The concept of human progress was evolving into a science which would study the laws of social change and the positive development of civilization. Saint-Simon's attempt at such a science saw the goal of all progress in the conversion of individual and human efforts to a new social ideal of human happiness. This would be attained by the new "priest-class," the scientists, who would raise the lot of the working class through their knowledge of the "law of development" which was educed from history. This law stated that epochs of organization and construction and epochs of revolution or criticism follow each other alternately. Although Saint-Simon began a science of Progress by "educing" his law of development, he did not organize a definite system. This was left to his followers.

### *Comte*

History for August Comte (1798-1857)

> is no longer the temporal unfolding of an absolute truth and the providential fulfillment of an eternal design but a secular history of civilization, the truth of which is 'relative' by being related to changing conditions and situations.[7]

This concept gave Comte a philosophy of history which found its laws and development within the changing phenomena of this world and not outside it in some absolute Providence. It is the ideas of man that indicate the stage of progress which he has achieved at any given moment. The advance of society through history is concomitant with the intellectual development of that society. He developed this theory in his work, *Cours de philosophie positive.*

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[7] Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

"Comte adopted the Law of the Three Stages as a fundamental psychological law which has governed every domain of mental activity and explains the whole story of human development."[8] This fundamental law indicates that each brand of our civilization and knowledge successively passes through three different stages (which we have already seen in Turgot's thought). There is the theological or fictitious stage, a point of departure where the mind invents imaginary deities to explain natural phenomena. Then there is the metaphysical or abstract stage, a state of transition where the mind substitutes abstract entities for the natural causes. Finally, there is the scientific or positive stage, the final term; here the mind renounces absolute notions and turns to empirical observation and logical reasoning to seek the explanations of things.

Comte sought in this law a means of expressing the closer union of all the aspects of a civilization as it continually progresses towards its goal of happiness.

> The whole philosophy of Comte hinges on the theory of Progress. . . . He had made the discovery that all social development is the expression of a spiritual 'consensus' and it is this which creates the vital unity of society. Consequently the emphasis is neither on an improvement in material well-being . . . or an increase in the freedom and enlightenment of the individual such as Condorcet had traced . . .; the accent now is on the formation and growth of a living community which embraces every aspect of human life and thought, and in which every age has a living and internal connection with the past and the future. In other words, in order to construct a genuine sociology, the study of social institutions must go hand in hand with the study of the intellectual and spiritual forces which give unity to the particular age and society in question.[9]

### *Hegel*

Hegel (1770-1831) was dissatisfied with the traditional view of Providence as governing the world because often the designs of the providential God could not be perceived and had to be accepted on faith. In order to demonstrate God's execution of his purpose, philosophy was necessary. "The ultimate design of the world must be perceived," said Hegel. So he postulated the "cunning of reason" which works behind the passions of men in such a way that the pursuit of their individual goals and interests is prompted by an anonymous impulse which necessitates their will and decisions.

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[8] Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

[9] Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 46f.

Men move in harmony with reason, or as Hegel otherwise calls it, Mind, Spirit, the Infinite. However, this is only fully realized in the State. "Since the State is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life."[10]

Hegel views the whole historical process as the concrete realization of the Infinite Spirit, or Mind, or Reason, which are his rational substitutes for divine Providence.

The advance of civilization from a state of despotism to the rule of monarchy (the Christian parliamentary monarchy of Prussia) involves a dialectical process of thesis (despotism), antithesis (democracy) and synthesis (monarchy) in which each level is indicative of the concrete expression of Mind or Spirit in the world. There is here a progressive evolution in which Spirit becomes freer by becoming more aware of itself, and it becomes more aware of itself through an increasing awareness of and harmony with all the other phenomena it encounters. This involved process can be seen in two remarks of G. Cairns:

> Hegel defines Freedom as the self-awareness of Spirit, that all its limitations or negations are simply self-manifestations of the One Absolute and Infinite Spirit under its concrete aspect.
>
> Spirit is free when nothing outside itself limits or compels It, when It is absolutely and completely self-determined. This ultimate self-awareness of Spirit (the metaphysical state of Freedom) can be achieved only at the human level and at the human level only in

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[10] Christopher Dawson, *Understanding Europe* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1952), p. 192.

> an organized community of persons, the State. This is because one cannot achieve self-consciousness unless he first become conscious of an Other-consciousness. . . . All selves (persons) are real only with reference to their opposites (Other Selves). . . . Self and Other are then seen as essential dialectical moments in self-awareness of the one ultimately real Individual, the Absolute Spirit.[11]

This can be summarized in Hegel's own words from his work *The Philosophy of Right*:

> We should desire to have in the state nothing except what is an expression of rationality. The state is the world which mind (Geist) has made for himself. . . . Man must venerate the state as the Divine upon Earth. The march of God in the world, that is what the state is.[12]

In his philosophy of history, Hegel transfers the spiritual community to the state, attributing divinity to it, and demanding for it all the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual community, thus denying the Christian doctrine of the supernatural order. Man's spiritual individuality and his full freedom also seem to lose some of their strength under the Hegelian system.

A basic criticism can be levelled at this very involved theory, founded as it is on the concept of the state as the actuality of the ethical order and the perfect embodiment of the Spirit or Reason. Hegel's concept of the state, with its absolute and ultimate value, limits the movement of history and places the particular as the universal. He has reversed the historical evolvement; Christianity did not derive from the state, as we could conclude from Hegel's line of thought, but was itself "the spiritual habit which the European state assumed and from which its highest values were derived."[13]

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[11] Grace E. Cairns, *Philosophies of History* (New York: The Citadel Press, 1962), pp. 282f.

[12] Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, cited by Dawson, *Understanding Europe*, pp. 194f.

[13] Dawson, *Understanding Europe*, p. 200.

### *Marx*

The philosophy of history of Karl Marx (1808-1883) is enunciated in the famous words of the *Communist Manifesto*: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class-struggles.” The economic antagonisms which pit class against class are the explanation of the intellectual and political history of a given period. It is economics which studies the inevitable evolution of matter and sees to its proper utilization. This follows a basic dialectic of thesis (capitalism), antithesis (socialism) and synthesis (dictatorship of the proletariat) towards the ultimate goal of the classless society of the free and equal.

Marx’s system amounts to an economic determinism where the modes of production indicate the dialectical stage in the evolution of matter and determine the development and relations of man, society and history. In the following quotation from Marx we can see the underlying determinism of his philosophic interpretation of history:

> The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. . . . With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transferred. In considering such transformation a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.[14]

Once the final synthesis of the proletarian rule has been achieved, man becomes free of this economic determinism. The economic forces which are a part of the impersonal evolution of matter finally come under man's control, or in Engels' words:

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[14] Karl Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*, cited by Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

> The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. . . . It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.[15]

Marx's philosophy of history centers around the concept of economic factors as the determinants of history. But this, in reality, is only one neutral factor in the vast panoply of causes, effects and accidents which contribute their part in modifying the historical event. As far as Marx's economic theory goes, it has some valid and important concepts within it. However, the theory itself cannot stand in solitary completeness and cannot provide the ultimate answers to man's struggle in this world.

## CONCLUSION

The Idea of Progress, which first started as a substitute for the Christian religion, gradually began to obtrude certain philosophic overtones upon the minds of its adherents, until they began to see it as a science of history and society. The old emotional and religious overtones began to fall away and the rationalist philosophers bent themselves to the task of discovering or "educing" the laws of Progress from the stream of historical events.

As each great thinker became convinced that he had found *the* fundamental law of Progress, he would try to form a coherent system of philosophical thought around it. Sometimes these men succeeded as did Comte, Hegel, and Marx; sometimes it was left to their followers to carry on their work. But always where there was success, weaknesses could be found. The magic of Progress, the idea of man's beginning and future being wrapped up with his earthly existence—these tended to make the philosophers of history work in very unphilosophical ways. Things were taken for granted, bland assumptions made, illogical leaps in thought executed, so that there was present in each system the glaring danger of denying man's immortality and even his individuality.

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[15] Friedrich Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,* cited by Cairns, *op. cit.,* p. 297.

All of this is not to say that these philosophies of history were useless. They helped greatly toward effecting a scientific study of man in society (sociology); they showed the true importance of the scientific explanation for things, and greatly increased man's knowledge of the world in which he lives by their insistence on empirical observation. They taught man not to explain all historical events by simply reducing them to the result of God's immediate causality. This would be to ignore the secondary causes through which God works and to consider as negligible the tremendous effects of the human will and human caprice in the history of man.

From these philosophies of history man did come to know himself better and to move with more confidence and understanding through this world. He saw, too, the great relationships which help to shape society, civilization and the broad scope of history itself. Yet, to the extent that these philosophies forced God out of their consideration, to that degree they were falsified. They did not set man free from God; they set him adrift from the ultimate meaning and explanation of life. They had deleted God from the affairs of this world. What was needed, and what was coming, to render meaning to man's history was a balanced view of life, an intelligent Christian synthesis.

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